WHO, WHAT AND WHY IS THE MAGISTRATES LEADERSHIP EXECUTIVE?

For some time I have been gathering knowledge and information about a body that, without fanfare and indeed not a little secrecy, was created in 2018.  My first post on this topic was on 14th June of that year. Later, in October, quietly and without any public announcement a new body was inserted into the governance of the magistracy. It was called the Magistrates Leadership Executive, the MLE.    It came bearing the imprimatur of the Lord Chief Justice, the endorsement of the Senior Presiding Judge and the stated purpose of providing the magistracy with 'strategic leadership.'  The official narrative runs as follows: the old National Bench Chairmen's Forum had served its purpose; the 2016 Justice Select Committee had identified a need for more strategic leadership of the magistracy; after extensive consultation a new body was created with the support of the senior judiciary to provide just that.

Support from magistrates was less enthusiastic.  At that time the apex of their representation was the National Bench Chairmen's Forum, a body whose members were elected by their peers;  bench chairs chosen by bench chairs, accountable to those who selected them. Its abolition was preceded by a consultation. That consultation found that a majority of magistrates doubted the need for change at all and that among those prepared to accept reform a clear majority wanted any successor body to be elected rather than appointed. Both findings were registered but were set aside. Instead an appointed body was created reporting not to the magistracy but to the Senior Presiding Judge. Within a year of its creation two of its first members had resigned without explanation. 

The decision to appoint rather than elect, as it was later explained to the Justice Select Committee, was taken because an appointed body would have greater 'status' in dealings with the senior judiciary. In  simple terms the process was just another episode in the erosion of the binary concept of an independent part time lay magistracy which was also the most junior part of the judiciary. The principle underlying this arrangement is ancient and important: that justice in the lower courts should be administered by the people, through the people, with no professional stake in the outcome.  Indeed the Ministry of Justice with its recent frantic advertising for new magistrates to overcome the previous government`s recruitment  deficit consistently emphasises the continuing need for local people to administer local justice.  

The National Bench Chairmen's Forum embodied this principle in its governance. Its members were elected by the bench chairs of their regions. They were accountable to those who chose them and could be removed by them. They were, in a meaningful sense, representatives of the magistracy. The MLE is not. Its members are selected through a process that the public cannot observe by a panel whose composition is not published, appointed by the Lord Chief Justice on the advice of the Senior Presiding Judge. Their continuance in office depends on the SPJ's satisfaction. Their terms of reference can be altered or terminated by the SPJ.  

The logic offered for this arrangement was that the  'status' as above was enhanced in dealings with HMCTS  via the  judiciary and by default to government.  It might be noted in passing that an institution which can only acquire status by surrendering democratic accountability has a somewhat complicated relationship with the concept of representation. It is either a sophisticated constitutional argument or an admission that the independence of the magistracy's leadership was deliberately curtailed to make it more pliable. Readers may form their own view. Beneath all the gentlemanly toing and froing  there is under it all a political conjurer`s sleight of hand argument: it concedes, without apparently meaning to, that the MLE's authority flows downward from the judiciary, not upward from the magistracy. 

Three magistrates have held the post of National Leadership Magistrate. Jo King JP was the first, appointed July 2018. She had been the moving force behind the proposals that created the role she then took up; a sequence of events that should at minimum have prompted independent scrutiny of the appointment process and evidently did not.  Duncan Webster OBE JP succeeded her in 2019. His tenure was characterised by an accessible public presence; committee appearances, conference speeches, extensive correspondence with bench chairs  and by one episode that demands examination at greater length than it normally receives.  In January 2022 following the extension of magistrates' maximum custodial powers to twelve months significant criticism was directed at the magistracy from elements of the legal profession. Webster's response was to write to all magistrates. He had spoken, he told them, to the Lord Chief Justice. They had concluded together that it would not be 'appropriate nor dignified' for the magistracy to respond publicly. The Lord Chief Justice was, he added, confident that magistrates would exercise their powers responsibly.

Let us be precise about what happened here. The nominally unelected independent leader of the magistracy consulted the most senior professional judge in the land and then wrote to 13,000 unpaid members of the part time lay magistracy to instruct them not to speak. That instruction was issued in the name of representation. Its content was suppression.

The current National Leadership Magistrate is Alexia Fetherstonhaugh JP appointed by Lady Chief Justice Carr on the advice of Lord Justice Green with a term running to December 2026. Her deputy is Emily Aitken-Fell JP. Nine regional and specialist positions complete the current complement of twelve. Their names are now published on the judiciary website. Whether the magistrates in their regions know who they are, or what they do, is a different question.

For the record below is the current membership of the MLE (as published on the Judiciary website, 2026)

Alexia Fetherstonhaugh JP, National Leadership Magistrate

Emily Aitken-Fell JP, Deputy National Leadership Magistrate

Sara Brown JP, London Regional Leadership Magistrate

Clare Sawdon MBE DL JP, Midlands Regional Leadership Magistrate

Sharon Gould JP, North East Regional Leadership Magistrate

Kulvinder Panesar JP, North West Regional Leadership Magistrate

Jacky Froggatt JP, South East Regional Leadership Magistrate

Thura KT Win JP LLM FCMI MCIArb, South West Regional Leadership Magistrate

Lisa Gerson MBE JP, Wales Leadership Magistrate

Dippy Kharaud JP, Lead Diversity and Community Relations Magistrate

David Browne JP, National Digital Lead

Nigel Woodley JP, Deputy National Digital Lead Judiciary

The MLE's stated functions sound substantial: supporting the governance of magistrates' courts, working with HMCTS and the MOJ, providing leadership support to Presiding Judges and bench chairs, sharing guidance and best practice. In practice these functions resolve into something more modest. Regional leadership magistrates sit on Judicial Business Groups where they are one voice among professional judicial and administrative voices, advising the Presiding Judge. They communicate guidance downward to bench chairs. They relay concerns upward to the Magistrates' Liaison Group which is chaired by the Senior Presiding Judge and includes HMCTS officials. They have no budget, no disciplinary powers and no executive authority over any part of the system.

Their power is limited to three categories. First, consultation responses participating in reviews, submitting evidence and  attending hearings. Second, internal communications;  the mechanism by which the Lord Chief Justice's views reach all magistrates, as the 2022 episode above  illustrated. Third, strategic planning:  the MLE produced a Strategy for the Magistracy for the period 2019 to 2022, endorsed by the Lord Chief Justice and then decided not to make it publicly available; a detail of almost satirical aptness for a body whose defining characteristic is the management of information.  Recent developments suggest that HMCTS's programme of digital transformation is now formally within the MLE's ambit. Whether this represents a genuine voice for magistrates in the digitisation process or an additional channel through which digitisation policy is transmitted to the benches, remains to be seen.

The Magistrates' Association has  stated publicly and repeatedly that the MLE lacks legitimacy, that its members should be elected and that in its present form it is not a meaningful voice for the magistracy. The MA believes that elections, not selections, will ensure accountability.

It is unsurprising that relationships between the MLE and the Magistrates Association have not been without friction.  This blogger has not infrequently commented upon the latter organisation`s tendency to parrot government initiatives with nary a criticism and to question whether it truly represents the views of its members never mind the magistracy as a whole.  In 2025 a formal governance consultation sought views on the future structure of magistracy leadership. The MLE submitted its response included in which was a proposal to expand its own membership and to remove the MA from regional governance structures. The MA's reaction was restrained but unmistakable.  It was not unexpected therefore that the MA has opined that they risked weakening the independent voice of magistrates. They prioritised the expansion of the appointed body at the expense of the elected one.  Undoubtedly the net effect of the proposal, if implemented, would be to further concentrate the formal representation of the magistracy in a body accountable to the judiciary while reducing the influence of the body accountable to magistrates themselves. This would complete a logic that has been present in the structure since 2018 building further on increased emasculation of an independent magistracy in the decade previously. 

Last week I commented on the Courts and Tribunals Bill 2026.   This is arguably the most consequential legislation affecting the magistracy in a generation. To its credit the Magistrates Association has been engaged, articulate and specific. Its national chair has given evidence, issued public statements and pressed a clear position, broadly supportive of the direction but insistent on resources. Magistrates' courts face genuine bottlenecks; insufficient legal advisers, insufficient probation presence, insufficient courtroom capacity. The reforms will only work if those bottlenecks are addressed. This is a serious argument, made seriously, in the right forums. By contrast the MLE has not, in any traceable form, said anything about any of it.

The Senior Presiding Judge cannot comment (publicly) on legislation before Parliament. The National Leadership Magistrate reports to the Senior Presiding Judge. The NLM's ability to speak publicly on matters before Parliament is therefore constrained by the same conventions that constrain the judiciary. At precisely the moment when the magistracy most needs a leadership with a public voice;  at the moment of its greatest political significance in twenty years the body formally appointed to provide that leadership is constitutionally forbidden from providing it.  Silence has spoken. 

The MLE is best understood not as a standalone curiosity but as one episode in a longer process. Across the 21st century the independence of the magistracy has been progressively diminished. Half the country`s magistrates courts have closed. Administrative functions once managed locally by bench committees are now controlled by HMCTS. The role of the justices' clerk,  the independent legal adviser whose presence once provided a meaningful check on institutional pressure,  has been weakened by structural changes to the legal adviser function. The governance of the magistracy itself has been transferred from an elected body to an appointed one that reports to the professional judiciary. Each of these changes has been presented as modernisation.

I have no reason to believe that  individual members of the MLE are not, by all available evidence, dedicated, capable and well-intentioned. This post is not directed at them. It is directed at the structure they inhabit and the interests that structure serves. Whether or not it also serves their individual egos and ambitions is not for me to opine.  My personal involvement as a magistrate began just prior to the dying embers of the ancient regime finally being  extinguished.  Soon there will be few of my former colleagues who will have a memory of how things used to be.  The mantra of local justice for local people now has reduced substance with 300 or so active professional District Judges[MC] or Deputies employed by HMCTS. 

There are some who question the continued longevity of the institution of lay justices.  However until the day comes when this country can afford the increased costs of an estimated 700-1,000  full time salaried only judiciary for the lower [soon to be lowest?]court  i.e. District Judges,  the magistracy is likely to remain as an institution where over 90% of criminal cases are completed despite many within the legal profession hoping otherwise.  The MLE cannot protect or articulate that principle because the terms of its existence prevent it from doing so. It cannot advocate independently. It cannot speak to Parliament. It cannot challenge HMCTS publicly. It cannot even claim to speak for those it represents because those people never chose it.

Lay justice in England and Wales is not dead. It is alive in the daily work of every bench. But the governance of lay justice,  the structures that are supposed to give magistrates a voice, has been captured. The MLE is the evidence for that capture, clearly visible to anyone who cares to look.

Those who govern us are addicted to secrecy.  We read and hear about it every day. Tribunals, hospitals, charities, police, supposed independent inquiries etc etc etc.  The delegated guardians of our well being; the bodies charged with supervising the supervisors have that similar common theme.  Until that mentality of government changes the MLE will fall into line.  The question is whether anyone in a position to change it is willing to do so. The evidence so far is not encouraging.

FOR AND AGAINST COURTS AND TRIBUNALS BILL

If one were of a cynical disposition one would not be surprised that at the  Public Bill Committee stage of the Courts and Tribunals Bill David Lammy Lord Chancellor  stated,   "I absolutely retain the right hon. Gentleman's view that juries are a cornerstone of our system. They are fundamental. This Bill is about protecting them."  In 2017 Lammy was a reviewer arguing for jury protection on racial justice grounds and was quoted in favour of juries acting as "as a filter for prejudice"

In 2020 he was a politician arguing against removing juries for efficiency reasons. In 2026 he is a Lord Chancellor doing precisely what his 2020 self called "a bad idea" while insisting  in the same breath  that juries remain "fundamental."  Tailoring his opinion to fit the moment Lammy is as genuine as a £3 note.  

Many people will have little idea of what is actually being proposed.  To understand the situation it is helpful to know what offences currently termed either way offences are being changed from the current position where defendants can choose trial by jury or summary trial by magistrates [or a single District Judge {MC}]. 

Against the Person

Assault occasioning actual bodily harm (s.47 Offences Against the Person Act 1861)

Unlawful wounding / inflicting grievous bodily harm (s.20 OAPA 1861)

Harassment (Protection from Harassment Act 1997)

Stalking

Kidnapping (in less serious cases)

Dangerous driving

Causing death by careless driving

Dishonesty / Property Offences

Theft (Theft Act 1968) — the value of items stolen is an important determining factor 

Fraud and obtaining property by deception

Burglary where violence was used, an indictable offence was committed during it, or the defendant has two or more previous domestic burglary convictions)

Handling stolen goods

Making off without payment

Going equipped for theft

Obtaining services dishonestly

Forgery

Money laundering (lower-value cases)

Criminal damage (where value exceeds £5,000 — below that it is summary only)

Drug Offences

Possession of a controlled drug (Classes A, B and C)

Possession with intent to supply (lower-level cases)

Cultivation of cannabis

Sexual Offences

Sexual assault (Sexual Offences Act 2003)

Exposure

Voyeurism

Certain child sexual offences at the lower end of the sentencing range

Public Order / Miscellaneous

Affray

Threatening behaviour / violent disorder (lower-level)

Racially or religiously aggravated common assault

Carrying a bladed article / offensive weapon

Perverting the course of justice (lower-level)

Witness intimidation

Low-value shoplifting (goods under £200) — treated as summary only for allocation purposes, but the defendant retains the right to elect Crown Court trial

The Bill introduces a new Crown Court Bench Division to hear triable either way cases likely to receive a custodial sentence of three years or less to be tried by judge alone. The trigger is the likely sentence not directly the defendant's criminal history. However the two are linked in practice: a defendant with previous convictions is likely to receive a heavier sentence upon conviction, potentially pushing them above the three year threshold and therefore into jury trial territory. Conversely, a first-time offender facing the same charge may be assessed as likely to receive under three years, routing them to the judge alone Bench Division.  

The Bill`s supporters have made some cogent arguments.  They would argue that the principle is proportionality not discrimination. Differential treatment based on criminal history is not unequal treatment in the impermissible sense; it is simply proportionate justice.  A first-time offender and a repeat offender are not in identical situations before the law and treating them differently reflects that reality. Equality before the law does not require identical procedures; it requires that like cases be treated alike.  In addition unlike juries, judges will provide reasoned judgments for their decisions to convict or acquit.  On the other hand the argument on the basis of reducing the crown court log jam by an appreciable amount has been mocked by those using live statistical analyses. 

The core objection to the Bill in its present form is that equality before the law would be fundamentally compromised.   If two defendants face identical charges eg theft of identical value or the same class of assault  but one receives a jury trial and the other does not solely because of past conduct unrelated to the current charge, the law is being applied unequally to the present accusation. The principle that every person is innocent until proven guilty of the charge before the court is undermined if prior history determines the mode of trial for a new, separate allegation.  In addition, previous convictions might prejudice the allocation decision itself. A judge assessing likely sentence at the pre trial stage to determine which court will hear the case  will inevitably be aware of the defendant's record. Because a defendant's right to a jury trial will depend on the likely custodial sentence a judge will, for the first time, need to conduct a hearing to determine the likely sentence.  Such pre trial hearings are long established but prejudicial information before guilt has been proved might be placed  in the public arena.  Jury retention has long been argued as a constitutional safeguard not a privilege.  However as recent posts here have explained, the situation of perverse verdicts presents a challenge to that ancient concept.  A common argument amongst opponents of the Bill is the possibility of a disproportionate impact on vulnerable groups.  Defendants from ethnic minorities might feel that they should be tried by peers from their community and not a judge alone.  That, however, is an opinion likely to open a can of worms. 

The iniquity of mode of trial choice was apparent in the case of the 25p banana.  In the case of R v James Gallagher — Birmingham Crown Court, August 2008.  The defendant, James Gallagher, aged 23, of Linwood Road, Handsworth, Birmingham, was tried at Birmingham Crown Court having elected trial by jury. He was acquitted of burglary and the theft of a banana worth 25p from Birmingham's Bullring shopping centre. It had been alleged that he had entered an Italian restaurant before it had opened and stolen the piece of fruit.  

The district crown prosecutor for Birmingham, Martin Putar, stated that the CPS felt there was sufficient evidence and it was in the public interest for the prosecution to proceed. It is almost a perfect illustration of both sides of the argument simultaneously.  The Bill`s proponents would argue that a jury of twelve was empanelled, Crown Court resources deployed, and a full trial conducted for the theft of a 25p  piece of fruit; an obvious disproportionate use of public resources.  Those against  reform argue that Gallagher's own stated reason for electing,  that he feared the magistrates would convict him, but the jury acquitted him.   Under the Courts and Tribunals Bill 2026 that option would no longer be available to him and on his own assessment he would have been wrongly convicted.  Of course his own apprehensions are just those; they are not facts. It is perhaps the single most vivid real world example of the tension at the heart of the entire debate and has been quoted in parliament on a few occasions. 

Some jurisdictions based on common law allow with restrictions a defendant to choose mode of trial: Canada, USA, Australia and new Zealand. The current proposal is the English right of election to be removed rather than qualified. In Canada and most US states the defendant in limited offences retains the right with certain conditions  to choose either mode; the Bill proposes to eliminate that choice entirely for either way offences with maximum custody three years, replacing election with administrative allocation by a judge. No major common law jurisdiction with a comparable tradition has gone quite that far in one legislative step. 

It is reasonable to conclude that if there were a different Lord Chancellor at the dispatch box, a cabinet minister without the political baggage of the current incumbent, the Bill would perhaps be having a less divisive route through parliamentary procedures.  But perhaps it`s no bad thing that such an incompetent hostage to fortune as David Lammy is the proponent.  The debate has exposed serious divisions on a matter of constitutional principle and that, surely, is exactly what has been lacking in recent times when Left and Right are both targeting the great British middle.   

NOT LOOKING FOR A LEGAL NEEDLE IN A HAYSTACK

Over the last few weeks  I have posted on David Lammy`s proposals for radical changes within the courts` system, removal of right to jury trials, increased magistrates` sentencing powers, removal of automatic right to appeal to crown court and the statistics on such appeals.  Lammy continues to assert that his proposals on removing some jury trials will reduce the backlog to "normal" waiting times by 2035.  But could there be another underlying reason for his apparent endeavours to change a centuries old institution which are being opposed by almost all those for whom justice for all is a basis for their involvement in our legal system? 

One must consider whether there might be a connection between some "perverse" acquittals and the ethnic or political composition of jurors.  This country is no longer  a nation with a basic set of common values. There is a growing population of Muslims whose interests are the establishment of sharia  and who appear to be, at least philosophically, believers in a theocracy, such belief inherently in opposition to the British Judeo Christian foundations of our country. The pressure for special legal protection for supposed Islamophobia, a misnomer by any etymological inspection, is a current example of an unhealthy and unwelcome trend. 

Top 5 areas by number of Muslims (England & Wales) are

1. Birmingham        341,800

2.Bradford               166,800

3.Tower Hamlets    123,900
4.Manchester           122,900
5.Newham                122,100

Top 5 areas by percentage Muslim  population

1.Tower Hamlets                                    39.9%

2.Blackburn with Darwen                     35.0%

3.Newham                                                34.8%

4.Luton                                                     32.9%

5.Redbridge                                             31.3%

The question is whether it can be shown that the above demographic is linked to perverse jury verdicts connected with offences under the public order acts or those associated with criminal damage. Evidence of acquittals “against the evidence” can be suspected eg when protesters admit an intention to damage property yet are acquitted.

Nationally Muslims are about 6.5% of England and Wales so all above areas are far above average. The top 5 wards by % Muslim population exhibit even higher concentrations of Muslims.

1.Bastwell (Blackburn with Darwen)        73.5%

2.Shear Brow (Blackburn with Darwen)  70.3%

3.Whitefield (Pendle)                                   67.1%

4.Toller (Bradford)                                       64.3%

5.Small Heath (Birmingham)                     62.1%

At ward level 70%+ Muslim populations do exist but only in a small number of tightly clustered neighbourhoods. There is no direct statistical conclusion that the Muslim prison population is directly connected with the above numbers. What can be said is that with a Muslim population of 6.5% the prisons` Muslim  population is 18%. 

What is meant by "perverse" verdicts?  Typically this refers to: acquittals despite strong evidence, convictions despite weak evidence and “jury equity” cases (e.g. acquittals contrary to law/evidence). The well-known 2010 MoJ jury research study  "Are Juries Fair?" by Professor Cheryl Thomas (UCL), found high levels of jury comprehension and adherence to evidence but no basis for concluding widespread perverse outcomes but one could also consider whether there was any sufficient effort to look for such evidence.  Can juries in demographically exclusive enclaves where Muslims are in a high minority or low majority be trusted to be objective assessors of evidence?

Recent debate has centred on acquittals in cases involving disruption of infrastructure, climate or political protest and  criminal damage linked to protest.  Examples often cited in commentary include defendants associated with groups like Extinction Rebellion, Just Stop Oil and currently Palestine Action.  Some acquittals can appear to be perverse. "Lawful excuse” in criminal damage can be subjectively framed. Human rights arguments (Articles 10 & 11 ECHR) can be engaged and what appears factually obvious might still be legally contestable.  Public or political pressures might be behind weak or borderline cases  to be nevertheless brought to trial. In such cases perverse verdicts should be no surprise. There is, however, no statistical evidence that shows an increase in acquittals “against the evidence”. What can be said is that there is increased visibility and legal complexity of politically motivated criminality and social media ready to erupt as any vulcano given the slightest pretext. However DPP v Ditchfield 2023 Protecting Property has changed the balance to some extent insofar as a defence for protest motives was excluded.  Between 2019 and 2022 there appeared to be a spike in "perverse verdicts" but since then there has been  a decline in such acquittals. Now protest motives cannot justify damage in law.  

The conclusion thus far is that there is no evidential basis to relate those protest-trial outcomes to the “top 5” Muslim-population areas identified earlier. Any attempt to do so would be inferential and on the available data, weak. That`s not to say my earlier questions are without foundation.  If the needle is unwanted it`s pointless wasting time and resources looking in the haystack.  What David Lammy [and the legal deep state] don`t want us to know (or even themselves also)  about possible socio-political influence in juries selected in areas as listed above is a question to be asked before there is the possibility of an answer. 

THE SOUND OF SILENCE.....AT POLICE INTERVIEW

Decades ago long before I was appointed I was implicated in a minor motoring incident when a 3rd party who was involved sustained a very minor injury.  I called the police and assisted that 3rd party.  In due course police arrived and I explained the situation and signed a statement.  No doubt they also spoke to the mother of the 3rd party who was a minor.  Some few weeks later I received a letter stating that no further action was being  taken and that the case was closed.  Subsequently when I joined the bench the consequences of defendants deciding to go no comment to police requests for a statement became an important consideration of the decision on a defendant`s guilt or innocence.  This authority to draw adverse inference from a no comment interview is derived  from the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994 (CJPOA), which received Royal Assent and came into effect on 3 November 1994.  The governing law is contained within Sections 34, 35, 36 and 37 of the Act and these provisions are premised on the assumption that silence reflects guilt. Previously a judge could not normally make any comment to the jury on the accused's pre-trial silence when charged or questioned by someone in authority (R v Gilbert (1977)). Similar rules applied to the lower court. The police caution beloved by TV police officers was amended to read "You do not have to say anything. But it may harm your defence if you do not mention when questioned something which you later rely on in court. Anything you do say may be given in evidence." The middle sentence is the addition to the then existing caution.

The fundamental point of the topic is whether and/or in what circumstances a person arrested and/or being interviewed should volunteer a statement without a lawyer or go no comment with or without a lawyer. 

For most people a formal police interview [noted at the scene or at police station] would be a stressful event.  Without a lawyer being present it doesn`t take much imagination to consider that one could easily give contradictory accounts of an incident or be inconsistent in a situation designed deliberately to elicit evidence of wrong doing.  Misremembering events or their chronology could easily be interpreted as a sign of guilt.  For an innocent person caught up in a possible criminal investigation and without a lawyer present going no comment might be the sensible option notwithstanding that middle sentence of the police caution.  The pressure from police that assistance will speed up the process of being able to leave the police station can lead somebody  completely innocent to become confused and liable to be drawn into a net of suspects particularly if that individual is of a compliant or vulnerable disposition. 

Somebody who is perhaps at the periphery of an unlawful situation is arguably most at risk if s/he submits to interview without legal advice.  As explained above a no comment approach is arguably the only sensible option.  The near universal advice from criminal defence solicitors is: say nothing until you have spoken to a lawyer. The right to free legal advice in the police station (in England & Wales under the duty solicitor scheme) is absolute and costs nothing. There is no rational reason to waive it. Police will often try to persuade suspected persons with the comment that if  they have nothing to hide tell us what happened. That common objection; "but I'm innocent I have nothing to hide" ignores that the interview is not a conversation between equals. It is an evidence gathering exercise conducted by trained professionals and one is not on a level playing field without representation.

There have been a few studies on the benefits or otherwise of interviewees exercising their right to silence.    Bucke, Street & Brown (2000) for the Home Office found that suspects who exercised the right to silence were more likely to be charged than those who gave accounts  but this correlation does not prove causation (silent suspects may have been those with more to hide or those with better legal advice)

 

Research by Gudjonsson (2003) on false confessions is well established: a significant minority of people confess to things they did not do under police interview pressure particularly vulnerable individuals

The PACE 1984 and subsequent CJPOA 1994 changes were specifically driven by government concern that too many suspects were using silence to avoid conviction, implicitly acknowledging that silence was an effective protection. Studies on eyewitness and self-memory reliability (Loftus, 1996 onwards) consistently show that stress significantly degrades accurate recall supporting the risk of giving unadvised statements.

The bottom line for those being interviewed at a police station is to  exercise their right to free legal advice before saying anything. No comment with a lawyer who has reviewed the circumstances is a coherent, protected strategy. No comment without a lawyer is safer than talking without a lawyer but neither is ideal.

So in short: 30 years ago in November 1994 Parliament fundamentally changed a centuries old common law right and the courts have been refining exactly how far it reaches ever since.  It`s interesting to note that another centuries old common law right to trial by jury is currently in the headlines.  

Conviction cannot be based solely on inferences drawn from silence: there must be other evidence to establish a prima facie case. 

AN APPEAL FOR APPEALS

Below are several quotes by the Lord Chancellor on the subject of the removal of an automatic right of appeal from the magistrates court to crown court.

Hansard – House of Commons (16 Dec 2025)

On replacing the automatic right of appeal:

“Sir Brian recommended a permission stage, and we accept his recommendation for creating a permission stage on appeal. That is the right thing to do, particularly because many appeals have no merits, and that is why victims fall away.”

 Mr Lammy defending the removal of the automatic right of appeal in favour of a permission stage, because many appeals are unmeritorious and can delay justice. 

Parliamentary Record – Criminal Court Reform Statement (2 Dec 2025)

In outlining the broader justice reform package that includes the appeal change, Lammy stated (as part of the Government’s explanatory statement to Parliament):“The appeals process from magistrates’ courts will be reformed so that automatic appeals to the Crown Court in criminal cases are replaced with a permission stage, limited to points of law.”— Formal description of the policy as the Government plans to legislate it. In the House of Commons, 2 December 2025 (the main announcement)

In the House of Commons, 2 December 2025 (the main announcement):

Lammy's clearest statement on the appeal changes came in his Commons statement, where he said:

"I will limit appeals from the magistrates courts, so that they are only allowed on points of law, to prevent justice from being delayed further."

It might be appropriate to quote from my post of 28/05/2024

"The above is an extract from 10 years statistics on appeals to the crown court against verdict and sentence.  I am not a statistician and leave it to others who might explore some numbers or trends.  However a glance tells us that from 2017 there was a marked change in absolute numbers.  The figures for 2020-2022 are those of the period in which the epidemic skewed statistics for myriad organisations.  It is noteworthy in my opinion to look at the years 2014 and 2019.  In the former there was a total of 11,214 appeals at crown court of which 5,731 were against verdict. 2,529 of those were allowed.  Against sentence there were 4,816 with 2,222 being successful.  In 2019 there was a total of 7,925 appeals at crown court of which 3,863 were against verdict. 1,730 of those were allowed.  Against sentence there were 3,435 with 1,705 being successful.  Figures for 2023 are total of 5,803 appeals at crown court of which 2,614 were against verdict. 1,088 of those were allowed.  Against sentence there were 2,647 with 1,272 being successful.  Considering that there are 150 magistrates courts in England and Wales on average only 39 appeals were registered  per court for the year 2023.  Over a million cases are expected annual at magistrates courts.  At the end of September 2023 there were 352,945 outstanding cases at the magistrates' courts. 

There are perhaps two takeaways from the above; the first is the relatively few appeals in total annually and the arguably high rate of success.  Considering that the prime reason for Lammy`s proposals is the reduction of the crown court backlog his argument has little foundation in reality.  When an MP asked directly whether removing the automatic right to rehearing amounted to "easier wrongful imprisonment," Lammy replied: "Of course that person would get permission to appeal if the circumstances were legally correct."



So the questions remain as to why this little noticed proposal is being propelled through parliament. It might be useful to outline the history of the right to appeal.  The automatic right to appeal from the magistrates court to the crown court has long been part of the criminal justice system in England and Wales predating many modern reforms. It derives from longstanding statutory criminal procedure law codified in the Magistrates’ Courts Act 1980 (section 108) which provides that a defendant convicted after a summary trial in the magistrates court presently enjoys an automatic right of appeal to the crown court  against his/her sentence if they pleaded guilty and against their conviction if they pleaded not guilty  without needing permission.

Lammy told the House of Commons he would limit appeals from magistrates courts so that they are "only allowed on points of law to prevent justice from being delayed further."  Currently the magistrates court is not a court of record.  Whilst the court must keep a copy of the pronouncement of the bench`s decisions and reasons there is no transcript taken of the whole proceedings which is why an appeal is a full re-hearing of the case.  To fulfil Lammy`s change there will be increased costs of  having a transcript and a judge or recorder will have to wade through said transcript to determine whether or not there is an error in law to validate the permission to  appeal.  The requirement of equipping the necessary recording equipment in hundreds of courtrooms, the payments to judges and the training of staff will not come cheap.  

A prime area of concern if automatic right to appeal is removed is that there will be a massive increase in miscarriages of justice. Since the beginning of this century the availability of legal aid in the lower court has steadily been reduced. It is disconcerting to know that the MOJ has historically refused to publish official statistics on the rate of unrepresented defendants in magistrates' courts unlike in the crown court. The government has consistently failed to provide this data, saying it was "not centrally held." In simple terms that phrase translates as "we don`t want to know these numbers so we don`t collect them in a useable format".  The most significant data came from a parliamentary question answered in 2023 analysed by the Centre for Public Data. In the first half of 2023 48% of defendants appearing in magistrates courts on imprisonable summary offences, 9,240 defendants, did not have legal representation recorded on their case. This had risen from 35% during 2022. 

Taking available information a reasonable working estimate is that somewhere between 35% and 50% of defendants in contested magistrates court trials are unrepresented with the figure likely towards the higher end for summary only imprisonable offences.  One doesn`t have to be a lawyer, statistician, or even a politician to surmise that a defendant who self represented at an original trial in the magistrates court will also be a litigant in person at a crown court re-hearing.  

As usual the Magistrates Association is caught between kowtowing to government proposals, its supposed representations of its members` opinions and the public good.  In a summary of the profession’s responses to the proposed reform on appeals (as reported in The Times), the MA’s submission to the relevant consultation stated:

“While speedy summary justice is efficient, it may occasionally result in rough edges and potential errors. Retaining the option to appeal is seen as a crucial safeguard, enabling individuals to seek redress and a comprehensive review of their cases.”

“We are supportive of the right of appeal remaining, though if this will be restricted, we are pleased that there will still be provision for points of law, which will bring it into line with cases in Crown courts.”

“The government’s proposals are a big vote of confidence in magistrates, but to maximise the success of these changes they must be accompanied by investment in recruitment and improvements to court building infrastructure.”

More recently for the MA’s Oral and Written Evidence to the Justice Committee (January 2026) that the MA submitted to the House of Commons Justice Select Committee on criminal court reform, it did cover appeals from the magistrates’ court as part of the reform package but did not supply a stand alone detailed position specifically on restricting the automatic right. Such equivocal response is typical of this government lap dog`s attitude to its functions. The MA have not publicly published a dedicated official position paper exclusively on the restricted appeal proposal in Government’s reform bills.

In stark contrast The Law Society had already made its position clear in a response to the Law Commission's review of criminal appeals explicitly stating that it supports retaining the right of a person convicted in the magistrates' court to have an appeal in the crown court through a full rehearing.  In the Commons an MP directly challenged Lammy by pointing out that the Bar Council had seen "no evidence" that the reforms would significantly reduce the crown court backlog and called on the government to publish its modelling before legislating. The Centre for Criminal Appeals which handles wrongful conviction cases renewed its strong opposition to the government announcement describing it as drastically curtailing appeal rights. 

To put it plainly I have  three bones to pick with this proposal. Firstly it will make it harder to undo wrongful convictions.  Confidence in our justice system at present is hardly hitting the heights of public approval: reducing availability of appeal will hardly enhance it.  Secondly  without audio recording in magistrates courts and there isn't any,  how exactly is a defendant supposed to identify, let alone argue, a point of law?  And finally nobody in the Ministry of Justice has yet bothered to explain why appeals rather than years of starving the courts of money and sitting days are the thing causing the backlog. Ministers would do well to look in the mirror before blaming defendants for exercising rights that Parliament gave them and which have been exercised judicially and successfully for over 100 years to their and society`s benefit. 

AN OLD ADAGE

Within all the competing arguments over the removal of some defendants` rights to a jury trial one consideration has been conspicuous [to me at least] by its absence: the comparative costs of lay magistrates and District Judges. There have been few if any financial comparisons in this century between the court costs of a magistrates bench and those of a single District Judge. The general conclusion of a cost comparison between magistrates and District Judges that dates from the early 2000s was that lay magistrates remain cheaper in direct payroll terms but the Department for Constitutional Affairs concluded that magistrates were still cheaper though not dramatically so once full courtroom costs were considered.

District Judges remain more expensive individually but more autonomous and efficient. The difference is material but not overwhelming. The debate is or should be less about pounds and more about principle. A lay courtroom might cost approximately £110,000–£120,000 annually in judicial staffing terms (Legal Adviser plus allowances and clerical support). A District Judge courtroom might cost around £200,000 per year. The differential can therefore be estimated at £70,000–£90,000 per courtroom annually.




A scenario rarely publicly explored is if lay magistrates were confined to non-custodial cases and District Judges reserved exclusively for custodial matters the additional cost would be measurable but contained. There are 1.3 - 1.4 million cases progressed annually through the lower courts system. If roughly 130,000–150,000 custodial cases per year were allocated exclusively to District Judges and each judge disposed of around 1,000 cases annually, approximately 130–150 additional full-time DJs would be required. Unpublished research seems to point to the exclusion of lay magistrates altogether adding £25-£30 million to current court costs. However when fixed costs are factored in that number is reduced. With AI on the horizon productivity within all courts is likely to improve but the question remains as to what will be or should be sacrificed to attain that position.




Cost analysis cannot be confined to judicial salaries. Some empirical research has suggested that District Judges impose custodial sentences at marginally higher rates in certain offence categories than lay magistrates. If accurate the fiscal implications are substantial but the real question is not purely fiscal. It is constitutional. How much value is placed on community participation in justice and how much on professional consistency in decisions affecting liberty? The price of summary justice can be calculated. Its character is a matter of principle. It is clearly apparent that despite propaganda from MOJ local justice is a phantom. District Judges are not appointed to be local. The idea of local justice is a left over from the era of a century ago when there was indeed a society that was local in its outlook, its spiritual and physical needs, its cohesion, its supplies. And not overlooking the fact that that society finally withered after 1945.




There comes to mind the old adage: knowing the price of a service but not its value. That truly applies to those who have been responsible for imposing change wanted or not wanted upon us affecting the very fabric of our society including our system of justice.

79 TOMORROWS TO 7TH MAY

Amidst the hurricane that once again is blowing away this government`s masquerade as a policy driven force for the benefit of the British people, especially working people, the proposal to end jury trials for those defendants who elect trial at crown court has been lost in a fog of government U turns.  Justice  secretary David Lammy has claimed that cutting jury trials could clear the 80,000 backlog within a decade. In practice this would mean that "either way" cases would remain within the magistrates courts.  He has proposed that alongside this change magistrates courts` sentencing powers would be increased to 18 months maximum custodial sentence. 

There is however a large black hole surrounding the above proposed changes; there are no, zero, zilch, statistics of how many crown court trials take place of those defendants who elect to be tried by judge and jury instead of taking their chances at the lower court. As a consequence there are no statistics of how those trials conclude.  Thus the conviction rate is a phantom that would have suited Gilbert and Sullivan or the catacombs of Paris.   All the government can offer as fact is that 68% of either way cases are sent to the crown court by magistrates  but no figure of how many defendants elected that route. It follows that this wholesale contemplated policy change has no factual foundation. 

How can such a fundamental change in the justice system be contemplated with a lack of evidence on the possible consequences?  Since the election of this government on the basis that it was not the Conservative Party there has been no coherence between aspiration and practicality of policy projects. It was only yesterday when Ministers abandoned plans to delay local elections after denying such a change in policy was in their minds just a few days ago.  

A nation`s way of treating those who break the law is a fundamental insight, perhaps the most fundamental insight, into how its government uses the power bestowed on it by the citizenry. Our so called collapsing justice system encapsulates all that is rotten within this former DPP who is forever telling us, that he is father of two teenagers, a toolmaker`s son, first in his family to go to university whose late brother lived in poverty and whose wife works in the NHS.  He supported the antisemite Jeremy Corbyn in the shadow cabinet and blames everyone but himself for the country`s woes.  He is here today but not gone tomorrow but perhaps in 79 tomorrows..............who knows?

STATUS AND SENTENCING

Equality before the law, scales of justice, justice for all and other similar phrases are supposed to consolidate the idea that nobody is above the law; the current investigations into Mandleson and the second son of our late queen appearing to justify that belief.   However as I discovered on becoming a magistrate that concept is daily tested to its limits.

Last week it was published that a specialist cancer doctor, now a convicted sex offender at Chester Magistrates Court, had been given a suspended prison sentence for his offending which later resulted in his being prevented from working for six months.  The underlying question is whether officially or unofficially offenders in magistrates courts whose benefits to society are well above the norm should have their status reflected in reduced sentencing outcomes.

The arguments in favour of such an approach are not inconsiderable the obvious being:-

1. That society suffers from their incapacity or prevention from doing their work.  There can be an assumption, rightly or wrongly, that exceptional professional offenders have more stable lifestyles than many others and are more likely to be deterred in future from a repeat of their offending. To some degree that line of thinking can be explored by careful questioning by the court.  Driving bans are truly an exceptional example where there exists formal application to argue by way of exceptional hardship to avoid such an outcome. 

2. Most highly trained and/or talented offenders have benefitted from massive amounts of public (tax payers) money to have been educated to reach their current position. 

3.  A long unsullied professional history should be a safeguard against repeat offending. 

4. The personal shame of being found guilty for many offenders is punishment in itself and magnified for highly qualified and valued personnel. 

5. Every case is different which allows guidelines to be considered as a guide and not as a strict set of outcomes. 

The arguments against such an approach to personal mitigation are as follows:-

1. Justice is not about giving consideration to the labour market; it is about just outcomes both for the offender and society.  If elite offenders are seen to benefit from their status faith in the precept in the opening words of this post could be eroded. 

2. Public financial investment in an offender should offer no part in sentencing outcomes. 

3. Many ordinary citizens facing sentence have also their personal or religious consciences which could act as a deterrent against repeat offending. 

4.  A century or more ago shame in itself might have been an accurate description of the results of offending within what was a close knit society and where large families might have spread the information leading to ostracism for the offender in his/her every day contacts.  Such circumstances are alien to today`s "screen" socialising. 

5. The law guarantees equality of treatment not equality of lifestyle impact. If impact governs then punishment becomes a function of wealth and status not culpability.

Readers might favour other points of either view. For over 20 years Sentencing Guidelines have become incorporated in ever increasing detail in magistrates and crown courts.  The system of Guidelines in my humble opinion is but a prelude to fully automated AI sentencing where human input will come at the conclusion of the process and not the beginning. How our society deals with that will be a major sign of how this country will be governed until the 22nd century dawns.  

MORE ON PERVERSITY//MOJ DANCING TO THE TREASURY`S TUNE

Within legal circles particularly and amongst others with an interest in how justice actually works in this country the government`s proposals to reduce the eligibility of jury trial for many offenders has become a totem around which they are dancing to preserve their "institution".  A caveat to any discussion on jury trials is that there are no studies on how juries actually perform, how they reach a verdict or where the verdict is not that which the judge in the case would have reached. The ridiculous position is that this government is like a deaf and blind person being told by some means to choose a colour scheme, theme and design for an imaginary new  theatre.  

Whilst perversity is not unknown in the decisions of juries less is known about its propensity in magistrates courts because although often described as a mini jury such courts of three magistrates are designated as judges. It is sensible to define "perverse" verdicts which  refer to jury decisions acquitting defendants despite judge instructions or strict legal interpretations.  In politically charged trials “perversity” is often subjective. In the last five years controversy has centred more on harsh convictions and sentences (e.g., UK climate trials) or politically charged prosecutions that critics say undermine rights. Recent examples of such verdicts are:-

1. Colston Four — Bristol crown court, (2022)

Verdict: Not guilty (public nuisance)

In late 2025 three Just Stop Oil activists participating in the same M25 demonstration that led to convictions in another jurisdiction were acquitted after the judge allowed a “reasonable excuse” defence and climate context evidence.

2. Just Stop Oil — M25 Public Nuisance Acquittals (Guildford crown court, 2025)

Verdict: Not guilty (public nuisance)

In late 2025, three Just Stop Oil activists participating in the same M25 demonstration that led to convictions in another jurisdiction were acquitted after the judge allowed a “reasonable excuse” defence and climate context evidence.

3. Just Stop Oil — Stonehenge Orange Powder Protest (Salisbury crown court, 2025)

Verdict: Not guilty: Just Stop Oil activists who sprayed orange powder at Stonehenge were acquitted of criminal damage / public nuisance in connection with an environmental protest.

Controversial verdicts with particular significance have leeched from the activities of those as above preaching climate change to the ouverte although denied antisemitism  of supporters of a "Palestine from the river to the sea" and "globalise the intifada". 

1. Sohail Sultan – Arconic Direct Action (Wolverhampton Crown Court,  Oct 2023)

Verdict: Not guilty of criminal damage.

Context: The defendant occupied and dismantled part of an Arconic factory costing an estimated £500k  in solidarity with both Grenfell victims and Palestinians.

Controversy: Despite undisputed actions causing significant property damage a jury acquitted unanimously deliberating on necessity and motivation tied to protecting property/lives abroad. Defenders called it a victory for conscience based protest; critics argue the law was effectively overridden by moral judgment.

2. Elbit Occupation – Leicester Crown Court (May 2024)

Verdict: Not guilty (criminal damage) for two Palestine Action activists.

Context: Four activists occupied an Elbit (drone manufacturer) facility for six days spray painting and damaging parts of the building in protest against the Israeli Palestinian conflict.

Controversy: The jury acquitted after about 1 hour 40 minutes, despite evidence of property damage. The defence argued actions were necessary to avoid greater harm. Critics see this as a form of jury nullification privileging protest rationale over legal property rights.

3. Discovery Park Lock-On at Sevenoaks Magistrates Court Kent (Mar 2025)

Verdict: Not guilty and five activists acquitted.

Context: Charged under new locking-on offences after blocking entrances to a weapons factory linked to Israeli arms production.

Controversy: The prosecution offered no evidence leading to acquittal. While legally clear critics interpret the outcome as indicating prosecutorial difficulty in framing direct action under novel public order law amid political tension.

4. Possession With Intent – Wood Green Crown Court (Apr 2024)

Verdict: Not guilty (possession with intent to commit criminal damage).

Context: A Palestine Action member admitted possessing paint-filled eggs intended for protest against Elbit’s former London HQ.

Controversy: The jury acquitted despite the admitted intended use of the items; commentators argue this reflects juror sympathy with protest aims trumping statutory definitions of intent.

The common factor of the above might be that the widespread misinformation of the events that began on 7th October 2023 has forged a bond between "progressive" environmental  agitators and supporters of Hamas terrorism.  In activist cases, “perversity” is less about legal error and more about disjunction between state expectations and verdict outcomes especially when activism intersects with public sympathy or human rights protections. Jurors or magistrates might empathise with the activist cause even while the act technically breaches law. This is especially visible in cases where activists engage in non violent civil disobedience although the term "non violent" is itself open to interpretation. Magistrates courts are a common venue for such verdicts because evidence is often minor or symbolic (road-blocking, locking-on) and legal defences emphasising rights, necessity and proportionality are easier to adjudicate at lower levels.

It can be opined that magistrates courts tend to acquit when disruption is minimal, evidence of intent is ambiguous and political context or a "necessity" defence is considered.  In addition trials are shorter with arguably less formal evidence procedures and more flexible handling of activist defences.

Of course before those cases above and all others are set down for trial they are filtered by police and the CPS.   Since the hate marches in London which began the day after 1,200 Israelis were murdered and 251 hostages taken in October 2023 and more recently when West Midlands Police were found to have lied about the situation prior to an Israeli football club playing in Birmingham there have been whispers that Muslim influence has been politically active within the criminal justice system.  Certainly with some MPs lending themselves to descriptions as eg the MP for Gaza and other highly motivated political figures stopping just short of ouverte antisemitism there is cause for concern that the very term "perversity" in this context is becoming the norm.  If indeed there is substance to that possibility it heralds a fundamental change in our society; a change which perhaps was initiated by the revelations of abuse which lay quietly hidden and conveniently overlooked for over twenty years by those entrusted with the safety of young victims in Rochdale and elsewhere.

Political activism cases are almost certain to increase as faith in our democratic processes decreases.  They are especially prone to divergent outcomes because of rights based defences, eg necessity, public interest and protest legitimacy when  different panels on the same evidence yield different outcomes according to some jury variability studies.

But of course none of the above is of concern to the MOJ.  All that concerns them at Petty France is dancing to the tune of the Treasury.  

ADDENDUM  4th February 2026

If proof were needed of the inroads into the belief that our courts can deliver justice when faced with a jury that holds its belief in a "cause" so outrageous that law can be transgressed, it happened today when smashing the spine of a police officer with a sledge hammer and there is video to prove it, results in an acquittal.

MAGISTRATES ASSOCIATION TOADIES UP TO GOVERNMENT: IT`S IN THEIR NATURE

The air around Petty France these days must be fairly poluted with proposals, consultations, recriminations and conclusions.  On 13th January I posted on the very small numbers of appeals from magistrates courts to the crown court where the case is reheard by a judge sitting with two magistrates. That statistic indicates that the lower courts very rarely get it wrong, an offender is unaware of his/her rights or is simply relieved to have the matter over and done with. But just as important is that the offender has the right to that re hearing provided the necessary papers are lodged within 21 days of the verdict and/or the sentence.  It would appear that without much fanfare that right is going to be resticted. 

Under the government`s proposals this automatic right would be ended. Instead a defendant would need to seek permission (leave) to appeal and that permission would be limited to points of law not a full rehearing of all aspects of the case as is the current practice.

The government`s reasons for this substantial denial of rights of appeal are firstly that this would ease the backlog on crown courts.  That argument is as thin as the clean air around Petty France.  Such are the aforesaid limited numbers of  appeals and that a courtroom and judge would be engaged for at least one sitting if not a whole day, to consider that the minimal benefits of such a change would ease the backlog is a disgrace to common sense even for this government which has shown such a facility is deeply lacking around the Cabinet table.  We are supposed to accept their argument that such a change is a necessary improvement in efficiency as opposed to a fundamental erosion of  rights.  

This anticipated change combined with the reduction in jury trials, the increase in magistrates sentencing powers and the transcribing of magistrates courts` hearings is being discussed to support the new appeal regime where only legal points are reviewed.  The change makes it likely that vital safeguards against wrongful convictions would be removed.  Vulnerable or increasing numbers of unrepresented defendants who might have had fact based grounds to appeal under the current system would be disadvantaged, to put it mildly. 

The government`s statements on this matter include, “The appeals process from magistrates’ courts will be reformed so that automatic appeals to the Crown Court in criminal cases are replaced with a permission stage, limited to points of law.” [my bold].  The official parliamentary statement of 2nd December 2025 reads as follows, "Magistrates’ courts sentencing powers will increase to 18 months, with provision to extend to 24 months if necessary to relieve pressure in the Crown court."

"The right of defendants to elect for a jury trial will be removed, meaning that it will be for the court to determine where a case will be heard, based on the severity of offences."

"A new bench division will be established in the Crown court for triable-either-way cases with likely sentences of three years or less, heard by a judge alone."

It is of no surprise that amongst the legal profession there is much scepticism on the reforms.  However the Magistrates Association in line with its toadying up to any and every government proposal issued the following statement:-

"We have long called for radical action to deal with the crisis in our justice system. The system is in a mess, with the crown court backlog so acute that some cases are being scheduled to start in 2029. Every day that a case is not heard, is intolerable anguish and uncertainty for victims, witnesses and defendants, so measures that can speed up justice are needed – as long they balance efficiency with quality of justice."

"So, we welcome the government’s plan to enable magistrates to hear cases that carry a maximum sentencing range of up to eighteen months’ imprisonment (up from one year currently), with the option to extend it to two years. This can be introduced speedily and means that more cases will be dealt with in the magistrates’ courts, where they can be dealt with more quickly – making a dent in the huge backlogs of serious cases in the crown courts."

"The measures announced today are a big vote of confidence in magistrates, but to maximise the success of these changes, and so ensure speedier justice, we need to see more resources put into the magistrates’ courts. These include:

ensuring there are enough, trained and well-paid legal advisers (without whom magistrates cannot hear cases)

repairing and maintaining the crumbling court buildings and court rooms so they are safe and fit for purpose,

agreeing a long-term and strategic plan for the recruitment, retention, training and recognition of magistrates – so that people from all walks of life will want to volunteer as a magistrate, and will not be left out of pocket for doing so.”

It would seem that the M.A. is oblivious to the government`s failure in its repeated attempts to recruit more magistrates or more likely ignoring the reality of the situation.   

The quoted press release does not specifically repeat or quote text on the change to appeal rights (i.e., replacing automatic rights of appeal to the Crown Court with a permission stage). However the context of the press release as a response to the Government’s statement  which did include the appeal rights change  implies the MA is broadly supportive of the overall reform package so long as necessary resourcing accompanies it.  M.A. chief executive Tom Franklin said, " We welcome the government’s plan to enable magistrates to hear cases that carry a maximum sentencing range of up to eighteen months’ imprisonment…”  “In addition, we supported Sir Brian Leveson’s original recommendation to create a new tier of the crown court, and we argued that those cases should be heard by a judge and two magistrates … We would like to see magistrate involvement in these, and we are ready to help should the government decide to revert away from this model…”

The conclusion must be that the M.A. is reluctant to be seen criticising with any effort the loss of these current automatic rights of appeal from magistrates courts to crown court.  An observer on that proverbial electric Clapham omnibus might conclude that addressing that core but little known principle of our justice system would be a prominent subject of discussion.  But then again like a friendly feline lying on its back to have its stomach stroked the M.A. relies on limited participation from its members when it comes to voicing support for government; any government, for like the scorpion stinging the frog as it is being carried across the river by the frog  ensuring  both their deaths, it is in their nature.