APPEALS FROM MAGISTRATES COURTS

On Tuesday, 3 March 2026 I posted AN APPEAL FOR APPEALS.  Yesterday  Clause 7 - Appeals from magistrates’ courts was debated in House of Commons.  That debate is available here. 

FAST FIT FOR THE MAGISTRACY

My previous post last week was concerning the government press release on its proposal to appoint 6,000 new magistrates; a rate of recruitment never previously attempted.  Since then I have paused to consider this activity and its possible repercussions.  

Those who have spent more than five minutes inside a magistrates’ retiring room will recognise the familiar pattern: a problem created by years of neglect is suddenly rediscovered and the conclusion is presented as a bold new vision rather than a belated attempt to patch over the consequences of earlier decisions.  It is a target dressed up as a solution. 

The magistracy has been shrinking for years. Recruitment was paused in many areas, benches were merged and experienced colleagues quietly retired without replacement. The result is a system now scrambling to fill the very gaps it engineered. The MoJ’s sudden enthusiasm for replenishing the ranks is rather like a landlord who ignored a leaking roof for a decade and now wonders why the ceiling has collapsed. The answer, naturally, is a “major recruitment drive”.  To understand why this matters one must first appreciate what a magistrate actually is, not in the brochure sense but in the functional one.  The lay magistrate performs his/her tasks without legal qualifications, supported only by the advice of a legal adviser, the training provided under the Magistrates' National Training Initiative and whatever measure of wisdom and life experience they bring to the bench themselves.

Good judgement is rarely an accompaniment of  urgency. The question that matters is whether rushing to recruit thousands of new magistrates will reduce standards. The magistracy has been chronically under recruited for the better part of two decades. Numbers have fallen from approximately 30,000 in the early 2000s to around 14,000 today. Courts have struggled with capacity; backlogs,  already severe before the pandemic,  became catastrophic during it and the Ministry of Justice eventually conceded that something had to be done. The decision to raise the mandatory retirement age from 70 to 75 was one response. This expansion of recruitment is another. 

The uncomfortable truth is that history, structure and recent experience all suggest that the risk is not only real but familiar. One of the more persistent myths repeated in official literature is that the magistracy forms part of the “independent judiciary”. Judicial in function, yes: independent in structure: no. Since the early 2000s a series of reforms, the Auld Review, the Courts Act 2003, and the creation of HMCTS have steadily centralised control. Local Magistrates Courts Committees were abolished. Bench autonomy was curtailed. Administrative power shifted to civil servants. Listing, training, deployment and recruitment are now firmly under HMCTS management.  This matters because independence is a safeguard against political pressure. When independence is diluted pressure can seep in. And pressure is exactly what a target of 6,000 new magistrates creates. Targets have a way of distorting behaviour. When the number becomes the goal the quality becomes the casualty.

There is precedent for exactly this kind of quality dilution when volume targets dominate as those with long memories of the bench will recall. The late 2000s saw another surge prompted by falling numbers. Advisory Committees reported shortened interviews, reduced panel diversity and increased reliance on paperwork. New magistrates resigned early at higher rates, often citing inadequate preparation. The Justice Committee, never known for hyperbole, warned that recruitment pressure risked “lowering the bar”.  The 2016–2019 period brought a recruitment freeze followed by a sudden reopening. Advisory Committees were reduced in number but expected to process more candidates. Training capacity was stretched. Some new magistrates sat before completing all recommended training.  The current drive shows early signs of the same pattern.  Interview times have been reduced in some areas. More new magistrates require additional mentoring. Training capacity is stretched. Benches with three inexperienced magistrates are no longer hypothetical. None of this amounts to a crisis but it is evidence of strain and strain is where standards slip.

Court closures over the past fifteen years have dramatically reduced the number of venues available and while sitting days have been extended in some areas the simple truth is that judicial competence requires regular and meaningful sitting experience. A magistrate who sits only infrequently [minimum required is 26 half days]  is a magistrate whose skills atrophy, whose confidence is limited and whose decision making is more, not less, susceptible to the kinds of errors  eg inconsistency, over reliance on legal adviser direction, failure to probe the evidence  that undermine the quality of justice.

So will rushing to recruit 6,000 magistrates reduce standards? The honest answer is that it could and history suggests that it has before. Those who care about the lay magistracy and about the quality of justice delivered in the magistrates court, should be asking hard questions now while there is still time for the answers to shape practice. The magistracy is one of the quiet pillars of the justice system. It deserves careful stewardship, not hurried expansion. Numbers matter but standards matter more. If the MoJ wants 6,000 new magistrates it should take the time to ensure they are the right 6,000.

RE-ARRANGING DECKCHAIRS ON THE SINKING SHIP OF JUSTICE

An announcement today  that the government is intent upon the fast tracking recruitment of  6,000 new magistrates is supposed to fill observers of our justice system with joyful hearts.  If the experience of the Metropolitan Police is anything to go by this sticking plaster to cover the increasingly rapid exit of experienced magistrates just won`t stick.  With the Met a decade of pruning officer numbers has resulted in a shortage of up to 1,000 experienced detectives.  Perhaps that`s a reason for apparent inefficiencies in their successful conviction rate. 

Taking lay personnel and bringing them to a knowledge base where they can be relied upon to dispense fair justice free from bias but overladen with logic and structure is not a train today and render tomorrow process.  It is a hands on process where the experience of others is transmitted on the job.  At a time when many families are experiencing financial tightening many possible applicants will be excluded being unwilling to offer the time required.  Perhaps some of those out of work will be tempted.  That should be firmly off the table.  Anyone looking for work should not be offering 13+ days annually as a volunteer. 

Like so many systems within the control of government this is yet another attempt to re arrange the deck chairs whilst the ship is sinking. 

WILL NO JURY PUT JUSTICE IN JEOPARDY?

There`s nothing quite like human memory although the makers of AI are working hard to eliminate that impediment to their function to take over the world and for all of us surviving to live a life of leisure.  I am old enough to remember when this country held its criminal justice system in something approaching reverence. In those far off days it wasn`t unusual to find a 200 word newspaper column devoted to a story of the decades long delays many defendants in India often had to face whilst on remand in prison.  Leader columns would use such examples to extoll the efficiency of our justice system.  These stories are now as distant as the Raj. 

As of this spring there are just shy of 80,000 cases outstanding in the crown court;  more than double the pre-pandemic figure and rising. A defendant charged today with a moderately serious either way offence in many parts of the country will wait the better part of two years before a jury is empanelled always assuming that jury is not itself the subject of abolition by the time the case is called.  In the magistrates courts the open caseload stands at over 310,000. The median time from charge to a contested hearing in the lower courts is now around eleven months.  

As we know to our cost the pandemic, the government`s alibi for so many problems, was not confined to this island: it was a world wide disease causing similar problems east to west and north to south.  Across comparable common law and civilian jurisdictions, criminal courts have buckled under weight they were never designed to bear. The comparison illuminates both our particular failures and the surprising limits of the remedies being proposed. It also raises questions about our ambitions that Ministers appear singularly unwilling to address.  

In the USA state courts are under no uniform management each of the fifty states being in effect an independent legal jurisdiction.  Of the worst performers Louisiana is probably the most scandalous: defendants charged with serious offences in Orleans Parish have routinely waited three to five years for trial, conditions which would provoke a constitutional crisis in Westminster.  Proceedings in Canada, California, New York, Texas and Florida for example carry individual caseloads dwarfing anything seen in England. New York state alone has had nearly 120,000 criminal cases pending at any one time.

The response in most American states has not been to abolish jury trial but to throw money at prosecutors, appoint more judges and where possible expand diversion schemes. No American legislature has seriously proposed what David Lammy is now legislating.  

Culturally and legally the situation in Canada is interesting.  For decades Canadian defendants have had the right to elect between judge alone and jury trial across a wide range of indictable matters. This has not saved Canada from crisis. The Supreme Court of Canada's celebrated Jordan ruling of 2016 established that charges must reach trial within eighteen months in provincial court and thirty months at superior court; ceilings now routinely breached, with cases thrown out not because of innocence but simply because the Crown was too slow.  Hundreds of cases a year are stayed in Ontario and British Columbia alone on Jordan grounds. The lesson Canada offers is that offering judge alone trial as a defendant's right,  as opposed to imposing it as a state convenience,  did not solve the structural problem of too few judges, too few prosecutors and too little court time. It merely shifted the queue.

Australia's states have likewise embedded bench and single judge modes into their systems over many years and similarly have not escaped delay. New South Wales introduced legislated sentence discounts in 2018 to encourage earlier guilty pleas up to 25% for a plea at the local court level;  a sensible if somewhat transactional acknowledgement of the system's dependence on defendants' cooperation.  Victoria passed significant committal reform as recently as last December restricting full committal hearings in sexual and family violence cases so as to smooth the path to higher courts. Queensland runs magistrates courts with median disposal times of around five months for contested matters. None of these states has anything approaching England's current crown court backlog as a proportion of throughput.

New Zealand, on the other hand, has achieved the largest yearly reduction in its district court criminal backlog on record; 22% in 2025,  through aggressive rostering, case management reform and remote participation protocols.  

So much for the progress made by jurisdictions based upon the concept of the common law.  Continental legal systems operate without that heritage.  The question of jury trial simply does not arise at the lower court level. In Germany, the Amtsgericht, the rough equivalent of our magistrates court, operates as a professional bench by default. A single judge or a judge sitting with two lay assessors for more serious matters is tasked with the finding of fact and the determination of sentence.  There is no defendant election.  Most cases are completed within three to four months.  The lesson to be learnt is that the absence of jury election has not produced a tyranny  but neither was it the product of crisis legislation. It was built into the system from the beginning. One cannot simply graft the result onto a different constitutional tradition and expect the same outcome.

The backlog situation in England is, surprisingly, not the worst in Europe. The honour for that wooden spoon [gavel] must go to the inventors of the pizza and the makers of the world`s finest ice cream; Italy.  Sixty percent of enforcement files in Italian courts are older than five years; a quarter exceed a decade. Criminal trials at first instance routinely take two to three years and statutes of limitation expire mid-proceedings with depressing regularity producing what amounts to acquittal by exhaustion.  Italy's Cartabia reform of 2022 introduced binding time limits, essentially threatening extinction of charges unless proceedings concluded within set periods. The result, anti-mafia prosecutors warned, was not faster justice but abandoned justice: cases dropped not because they lacked merit but because the system lacked capacity to hear them in time.  Last month a constitutional referendum on judicial structure was rejected by Italian voters.

Spain and France sit between the extremes. Spain's Juzgados de lo Penal  bench-only courts for the bulk of criminal matters carry waits of eighteen months to two years in major cities, despite having no jury election problem.   France resolves most criminal matters at the tribunal correctionnel in eight to ten months, performs roughly at the European median, and does so without juries below the most serious felony level.  Both these nations appear to be at least coping with their backlogs without emergency legislation.  

Returning to the Courts and Tribunals Bill currently making its way through Public Bill Committee, previous posts here have discussed its nuts and bolts which I do not intend to repeat except for the intention that has caused the current furore:  the right of election for either way cases to be abolished entirely and for magistrates to decide venue, subject to expanded sentencing powers of up to eighteen or twenty-four months.  The government's Impact Assessment puts total implementation at £123 million. Judicial salary costs for the additional sitting capacity required are not separately itemised. The crown court is expected to free up approximately 27,000 additional sitting days. To deliver that capacity with existing judges redeployed rather than newly recruited sounds credible until one notices that the circuit judge bench is already sitting fewer hours per sitting day than it was in 2016, that criminal legal aid rates still deter qualified practitioners from maintaining criminal practices and that the Lord Chancellor has set the Ministry of Justice a target of recruiting thousands of new magistrates and hundreds of district judges in the next year or two. "Ambitious" is the polite word most often used about these targets by those who choose their words carefully. The reforms, the government concedes, will not yield direct budgetary savings; the freed time will be consumed by the existing backlog and rising demand, not by reducing expenditure.

A cynic might conclude that the government`s plans to reduce the baglog by limiting the current use of jury trials is a diversionary tactic from its ultimate target of taking the present system in the continental direction; a movement which would have the whole legal fraternity puce with apoplectic rage.  

The oldest maxim in the law is that justice delayed is justice denied. What the international evidence demonstrates with uncomfortable clarity is that delay is almost universally the product of the same causes: underfunded courts, too few judges, shrinking legal aid, buildings that leak and systems that predate the internet age. Not one of the jurisdictions discussed above, not Canada with its bench elections, not New Zealand with its tiered system, not Germany with its entirely professional bench, has escaped the backlog problem by restructuring modes of trial. What does or will work is increased financial input to the system and probably of more significance a management than can and is allowed to truly manage; a feature which is all too obviously lacking in so many parts of our society. 

In the end the backlog crisis presents a choice. It is possible to pursue relatively inexpensive procedural changes that offer modest gains while leaving the underlying structure largely intact. Alternatively, it is possible to undertake the more demanding task of rebuilding capacity through sustained investment. The former may be politically and financially easier but it is unlikely to resolve the problem in any fundamental sense.  A system that responds by reducing the availability of jury trial, without addressing the reasons for delay, risks compounding that difficulty. 

THE MACHINE IN THE MIDDLE CHAIR

There is a document that arrives at the bench before sentence is passed on most defendants who have pleaded guilty or been convicted in a magistrates court. It is called the pre-sentence report. For decades it was the work product of a probation officer who had interviewed the defendant, reviewed the circumstances of the offence and formed a professional view about risk, remorse and the most appropriate disposal. Its authorship was human. Its limitations were human. It could be questioned, challenged and probed. The probation officer who wrote it could be asked to clarify. That report still arrives. But the professional view it contains is now substantially shaped by something that cannot be questioned in court, cannot be cross-examined and whose inner workings are protected by commercial confidentiality. It is called the Offender Assessment System known as OASys. 

That is where we are but a little history of how we arrived here is of some interest.  OASys was developed by the Home Office through three pilot studies before being rolled out across the entire prison and probation system in England and Wales between 2001 and 2005. It did not spring from a single moment of invention. The Home Office had commissioned its first statistical predictive tool, the Offender Group Reconviction Scale (OGRS), which was deployed in 1996 across probation offices in England and Wales. This simple algorithm has since been incorporated into OASys which grew to incorporate additional machine learning algorithms. The intellectual framework behind it was the "What Works" movement in criminology; the idea that recidivism could be reduced by matching offenders to evidence based interventions in place of adopting either of the two assessment tools then in use.  This revised study of sentencing was based to some extent on pioneering innovation in Minnesota USA in 1978.  In 1984 the United States Supreme Court required all judges to use  those sentencing guidelines which had resulted.  The link between the American systems and the English sentencing guidelines is real although the influence was intellectual rather than structural.

The grading of offences, lists of aggravating and mitigating factors and sentence recommendations traceable to publications by Professor Andrew Ashworth in 1983 and 1987,  was ultimately adopted by the Sentencing Guidelines Council and then its successor the Sentencing Council established in 2010. 

By January 2025 OASys was producing more than nine thousand assessments every week. The benches of England and Wales are reading its outputs on a daily basis without, in the great majority of cases, knowing quite what they are reading.  However, the National Offender Management Service describes its risk scores as the most influential document in the sentencing, planning and management process. 

OASys combines what its designers call structured professional judgment with risk prediction algorithms. It weighs static factors such as age and criminal history alongside dynamic ones including accommodation, employment prospects, relationship stability and drug use. Each of those dynamic variables is a proxy for poverty. A defendant who rents insecurely, has no steady job and lives in a postcode where drug use is prevalent will score higher risk not because of anything intrinsic to their character but because the circumstances of their life which the law is supposed to assess as mitigation have been re-encoded as danger. The algorithm does not make moral distinctions. It processes inputs.

The bench that receives this report cannot interrogate the algorithm. The defence solicitor cannot see the weighting applied to each variable. The probation officer who compiled the report may not fully understand how the score was derived. The number arrives with institutional authority, dressed in the language of professional assessment and it influences bail decisions, sentencing outcomes, the choice of disposal and, further down the line, which prison a defendant is sent to and what rehabilitation programmes they are permitted to access. This is, to use an appropriately judicial word, consequential.

When I was sitting the pre-sentence report was a document I read critically. My colleagues and I had been trained to question it, to look for inconsistencies between the circumstances described and the recommendation made, to consider whether the probation officer had taken adequate account of the defendant's own account of themselves.  Indeed with my colleagues` assent I often spent almost as much time questioning the report`s writer as I did on the sentence pronouncement.   That critical engagement was part of the magistrate's function. It is not clear how a magistrate in 2026 is supposed to exercise the same critical engagement with a risk score generated by a system they have never been told exists, let alone been trained to evaluate although I quite understand how some magistrates with long memories might find themselves at odds with current thinking.  

The theoretical appeal of algorithmic decision-making in criminal justice is straightforward and not without merit. A machine, it could be argued, does not have bad days. It does not form unconscious impressions based on how a defendant presents. What an algorithm does inherit is the data on which it was trained.  The Lammy Review of 2017 established that at every stage of the criminal justice process in England and Wales people from black, Asian and minority ethnic backgrounds face worse outcomes than white defendants and that those disparities cannot be explained by the nature of the offences with which they are charged. When a predictive algorithm is trained on historical conviction and sentencing data it learns that pattern. It does not learn that the pattern might reflect injustice. It learns that the pattern is the baseline.

There is a wider context. The Court of Appeal's handling of the Post Office Horizon appeals, completed in 2021, established with the force of authority what common sense had always suggested: convictions cannot stand if based on unexamined software outputs.  The great majority of those prosecutions was heard in magistrates courts. The benches that convicted those defendants were not acting in bad faith. They were operating within a system that presented computer evidence as reliable, offered no mechanism for challenging it and proceeded on the institutional assumption that if a machine said it, it was probably true.  A bench can be challenged on its reasoning. A risk score cannot.

The Horizon software was not artificial intelligence in the modern sense. It was a financial management system that produced erroneous data and whose errors were systematically denied by those with an institutional interest in the system's reliability. 

But the principle is identical to the one that now applies in every courtroom where an OASys score informs a sentencing decision. If the output of a computer system is accepted without scrutiny, justice is not being done. It is being performed.  

In December 2023 the Courts and Tribunals Judiciary issued guidance to judicial office holders including magistrates on the use of artificial intelligence. The Judicial College identified preparing for innovation and change as a key objective in its activities report for 2023 to 2024. The Ministry of Justice's AI Action Plan, published in July 2025, committed to rolling out enterprise grade AI assistants to every member of Ministry of Justice staff by December of that year. Although substantial progress has been made that aspirational hope has still some way to go. However Microsoft 365 Copilot has been made available to leadership judges following a successful pilot. But to date even so called “leadership magistrates” have not been allocated Copilot licenses. Instead AI use in the magistrates’ courts is described to be at an operational/pilot level.

Whilst the above offers political sound bites [bytes?] for the MOJ  for the fourteen thousand or so lay magistrates of England and Wales there is currently no attempt to offer systematic understanding of the algorithmic tools that are already shaping the documents they read in court. There is no requirement that a pre-sentence report disclose the weighting applied by OASys to the variables it has assessed. There is no mechanism by which a defence advocate can challenge a risk score on behalf of their client.

The argument for the lay magistracy has always rested on the principle that local people, drawn from the full range of community life, bring a judgment to the lower courts that is both democratically grounded and practically wise. But that principle requires that magistrates be in full possession of all the material that bears upon the decision before them. A bench that is reading, without knowing it, the output of a commercial algorithm is not in full possession of the material. It is in possession of a summary that someone or something has already partially made up their mind about.  

It is a human not a machine which sits in the middle chair.  But that ephemeral machine has acquired a significant influence over what happens to the person who stands before it. That influence is invisible, unaccountable and, as far as the magistracy is concerned, but a phantom in time and space.  It is now apposite  for reality, transparency and confidence in humanity to once again oversee the court process. 

WHO, WHAT AND WHY IS THE MAGISTRATES LEADERSHIP EXECUTIVE?

For some time I have been gathering knowledge and information about a body that, without fanfare and indeed not a little secrecy, was created in 2018.  My first post on this topic was on 14th June of that year. Later, in October, quietly and without any public announcement a new body was inserted into the governance of the magistracy. It was called the Magistrates Leadership Executive, the MLE.    It came bearing the imprimatur of the Lord Chief Justice, the endorsement of the Senior Presiding Judge and the stated purpose of providing the magistracy with 'strategic leadership.'  The official narrative runs as follows: the old National Bench Chairmen's Forum had served its purpose; the 2016 Justice Select Committee had identified a need for more strategic leadership of the magistracy; after extensive consultation a new body was created with the support of the senior judiciary to provide just that.

Support from magistrates was less enthusiastic.  At that time the apex of their representation was the National Bench Chairmen's Forum, a body whose members were elected by their peers;  bench chairs chosen by bench chairs, accountable to those who selected them. Its abolition was preceded by a consultation. That consultation found that a majority of magistrates doubted the need for change at all and that among those prepared to accept reform a clear majority wanted any successor body to be elected rather than appointed. Both findings were registered but were set aside. Instead an appointed body was created reporting not to the magistracy but to the Senior Presiding Judge. Within a year of its creation two of its first members had resigned without explanation. 

The decision to appoint rather than elect, as it was later explained to the Justice Select Committee, was taken because an appointed body would have greater 'status' in dealings with the senior judiciary. In  simple terms the process was just another episode in the erosion of the binary concept of an independent part time lay magistracy which was also the most junior part of the judiciary. The principle underlying this arrangement is ancient and important: that justice in the lower courts should be administered by the people, through the people, with no professional stake in the outcome.  Indeed the Ministry of Justice with its recent frantic advertising for new magistrates to overcome the previous government`s recruitment  deficit consistently emphasises the continuing need for local people to administer local justice.  

The National Bench Chairmen's Forum embodied this principle in its governance. Its members were elected by the bench chairs of their regions. They were accountable to those who chose them and could be removed by them. They were, in a meaningful sense, representatives of the magistracy. The MLE is not. Its members are selected through a process that the public cannot observe by a panel whose composition is not published, appointed by the Lord Chief Justice on the advice of the Senior Presiding Judge. Their continuance in office depends on the SPJ's satisfaction. Their terms of reference can be altered or terminated by the SPJ.  

The logic offered for this arrangement was that the  'status' as above was enhanced in dealings with HMCTS  via the  judiciary and by default to government.  It might be noted in passing that an institution which can only acquire status by surrendering democratic accountability has a somewhat complicated relationship with the concept of representation. It is either a sophisticated constitutional argument or an admission that the independence of the magistracy's leadership was deliberately curtailed to make it more pliable. Readers may form their own view. Beneath all the gentlemanly toing and froing  there is under it all a political conjurer`s sleight of hand argument: it concedes, without apparently meaning to, that the MLE's authority flows downward from the judiciary, not upward from the magistracy. 

Three magistrates have held the post of National Leadership Magistrate. Jo King JP was the first, appointed July 2018. She had been the moving force behind the proposals that created the role she then took up; a sequence of events that should at minimum have prompted independent scrutiny of the appointment process and evidently did not.  Duncan Webster OBE JP succeeded her in 2019. His tenure was characterised by an accessible public presence; committee appearances, conference speeches, extensive correspondence with bench chairs  and by one episode that demands examination at greater length than it normally receives.  In January 2022 following the extension of magistrates' maximum custodial powers to twelve months significant criticism was directed at the magistracy from elements of the legal profession. Webster's response was to write to all magistrates. He had spoken, he told them, to the Lord Chief Justice. They had concluded together that it would not be 'appropriate nor dignified' for the magistracy to respond publicly. The Lord Chief Justice was, he added, confident that magistrates would exercise their powers responsibly.

Let us be precise about what happened here. The nominally unelected independent leader of the magistracy consulted the most senior professional judge in the land and then wrote to 13,000 unpaid members of the part time lay magistracy to instruct them not to speak. That instruction was issued in the name of representation. Its content was suppression.

The current National Leadership Magistrate is Alexia Fetherstonhaugh JP appointed by Lady Chief Justice Carr on the advice of Lord Justice Green with a term running to December 2026. Her deputy is Emily Aitken-Fell JP. Nine regional and specialist positions complete the current complement of twelve. Their names are now published on the judiciary website. Whether the magistrates in their regions know who they are, or what they do, is a different question.

For the record below is the current membership of the MLE (as published on the Judiciary website, 2026)

Alexia Fetherstonhaugh JP, National Leadership Magistrate

Emily Aitken-Fell JP, Deputy National Leadership Magistrate

Sara Brown JP, London Regional Leadership Magistrate

Clare Sawdon MBE DL JP, Midlands Regional Leadership Magistrate

Sharon Gould JP, North East Regional Leadership Magistrate

Kulvinder Panesar JP, North West Regional Leadership Magistrate

Jacky Froggatt JP, South East Regional Leadership Magistrate

Thura KT Win JP LLM FCMI MCIArb, South West Regional Leadership Magistrate

Lisa Gerson MBE JP, Wales Leadership Magistrate

Dippy Kharaud JP, Lead Diversity and Community Relations Magistrate

David Browne JP, National Digital Lead

Nigel Woodley JP, Deputy National Digital Lead Judiciary

The MLE's stated functions sound substantial: supporting the governance of magistrates' courts, working with HMCTS and the MOJ, providing leadership support to Presiding Judges and bench chairs, sharing guidance and best practice. In practice these functions resolve into something more modest. Regional leadership magistrates sit on Judicial Business Groups where they are one voice among professional judicial and administrative voices, advising the Presiding Judge. They communicate guidance downward to bench chairs. They relay concerns upward to the Magistrates' Liaison Group which is chaired by the Senior Presiding Judge and includes HMCTS officials. They have no budget, no disciplinary powers and no executive authority over any part of the system.

Their power is limited to three categories. First, consultation responses participating in reviews, submitting evidence and  attending hearings. Second, internal communications;  the mechanism by which the Lord Chief Justice's views reach all magistrates, as the 2022 episode above  illustrated. Third, strategic planning:  the MLE produced a Strategy for the Magistracy for the period 2019 to 2022, endorsed by the Lord Chief Justice and then decided not to make it publicly available; a detail of almost satirical aptness for a body whose defining characteristic is the management of information.  Recent developments suggest that HMCTS's programme of digital transformation is now formally within the MLE's ambit. Whether this represents a genuine voice for magistrates in the digitisation process or an additional channel through which digitisation policy is transmitted to the benches, remains to be seen.

The Magistrates' Association has  stated publicly and repeatedly that the MLE lacks legitimacy, that its members should be elected and that in its present form it is not a meaningful voice for the magistracy. The MA believes that elections, not selections, will ensure accountability.

It is unsurprising that relationships between the MLE and the Magistrates Association have not been without friction.  This blogger has not infrequently commented upon the latter organisation`s tendency to parrot government initiatives with nary a criticism and to question whether it truly represents the views of its members never mind the magistracy as a whole.  In 2025 a formal governance consultation sought views on the future structure of magistracy leadership. The MLE submitted its response included in which was a proposal to expand its own membership and to remove the MA from regional governance structures. The MA's reaction was restrained but unmistakable.  It was not unexpected therefore that the MA has opined that they risked weakening the independent voice of magistrates. They prioritised the expansion of the appointed body at the expense of the elected one.  Undoubtedly the net effect of the proposal, if implemented, would be to further concentrate the formal representation of the magistracy in a body accountable to the judiciary while reducing the influence of the body accountable to magistrates themselves. This would complete a logic that has been present in the structure since 2018 building further on increased emasculation of an independent magistracy in the decade previously. 

Last week I commented on the Courts and Tribunals Bill 2026.   This is arguably the most consequential legislation affecting the magistracy in a generation. To its credit the Magistrates Association has been engaged, articulate and specific. Its national chair has given evidence, issued public statements and pressed a clear position, broadly supportive of the direction but insistent on resources. Magistrates' courts face genuine bottlenecks; insufficient legal advisers, insufficient probation presence, insufficient courtroom capacity. The reforms will only work if those bottlenecks are addressed. This is a serious argument, made seriously, in the right forums. By contrast the MLE has not, in any traceable form, said anything about any of it.

The Senior Presiding Judge cannot comment (publicly) on legislation before Parliament. The National Leadership Magistrate reports to the Senior Presiding Judge. The NLM's ability to speak publicly on matters before Parliament is therefore constrained by the same conventions that constrain the judiciary. At precisely the moment when the magistracy most needs a leadership with a public voice;  at the moment of its greatest political significance in twenty years the body formally appointed to provide that leadership is constitutionally forbidden from providing it.  Silence has spoken. 

The MLE is best understood not as a standalone curiosity but as one episode in a longer process. Across the 21st century the independence of the magistracy has been progressively diminished. Half the country`s magistrates courts have closed. Administrative functions once managed locally by bench committees are now controlled by HMCTS. The role of the justices' clerk,  the independent legal adviser whose presence once provided a meaningful check on institutional pressure,  has been weakened by structural changes to the legal adviser function. The governance of the magistracy itself has been transferred from an elected body to an appointed one that reports to the professional judiciary. Each of these changes has been presented as modernisation.

I have no reason to believe that  individual members of the MLE are not, by all available evidence, dedicated, capable and well-intentioned. This post is not directed at them. It is directed at the structure they inhabit and the interests that structure serves. Whether or not it also serves their individual egos and ambitions is not for me to opine.  My personal involvement as a magistrate began just prior to the dying embers of the ancient regime finally being  extinguished.  Soon there will be few of my former colleagues who will have a memory of how things used to be.  The mantra of local justice for local people now has reduced substance with 300 or so active professional District Judges[MC] or Deputies employed by HMCTS. 

There are some who question the continued longevity of the institution of lay justices.  However until the day comes when this country can afford the increased costs of an estimated 700-1,000  full time salaried only judiciary for the lower [soon to be lowest?]court  i.e. District Judges,  the magistracy is likely to remain as an institution where over 90% of criminal cases are completed despite many within the legal profession hoping otherwise.  The MLE cannot protect or articulate that principle because the terms of its existence prevent it from doing so. It cannot advocate independently. It cannot speak to Parliament. It cannot challenge HMCTS publicly. It cannot even claim to speak for those it represents because those people never chose it.

Lay justice in England and Wales is not dead. It is alive in the daily work of every bench. But the governance of lay justice,  the structures that are supposed to give magistrates a voice, has been captured. The MLE is the evidence for that capture, clearly visible to anyone who cares to look.

Those who govern us are addicted to secrecy.  We read and hear about it every day. Tribunals, hospitals, charities, police, supposed independent inquiries etc etc etc.  The delegated guardians of our well being; the bodies charged with supervising the supervisors have that similar common theme.  Until that mentality of government changes the MLE will fall into line.  The question is whether anyone in a position to change it is willing to do so. The evidence so far is not encouraging.

FOR AND AGAINST COURTS AND TRIBUNALS BILL

If one were of a cynical disposition one would not be surprised that at the  Public Bill Committee stage of the Courts and Tribunals Bill David Lammy Lord Chancellor  stated,   "I absolutely retain the right hon. Gentleman's view that juries are a cornerstone of our system. They are fundamental. This Bill is about protecting them."  In 2017 Lammy was a reviewer arguing for jury protection on racial justice grounds and was quoted in favour of juries acting as "as a filter for prejudice"

In 2020 he was a politician arguing against removing juries for efficiency reasons. In 2026 he is a Lord Chancellor doing precisely what his 2020 self called "a bad idea" while insisting  in the same breath  that juries remain "fundamental."  Tailoring his opinion to fit the moment Lammy is as genuine as a £3 note.  

Many people will have little idea of what is actually being proposed.  To understand the situation it is helpful to know what offences currently termed either way offences are being changed from the current position where defendants can choose trial by jury or summary trial by magistrates [or a single District Judge {MC}]. 

Against the Person

Assault occasioning actual bodily harm (s.47 Offences Against the Person Act 1861)

Unlawful wounding / inflicting grievous bodily harm (s.20 OAPA 1861)

Harassment (Protection from Harassment Act 1997)

Stalking

Kidnapping (in less serious cases)

Dangerous driving

Causing death by careless driving

Dishonesty / Property Offences

Theft (Theft Act 1968) — the value of items stolen is an important determining factor 

Fraud and obtaining property by deception

Burglary where violence was used, an indictable offence was committed during it, or the defendant has two or more previous domestic burglary convictions)

Handling stolen goods

Making off without payment

Going equipped for theft

Obtaining services dishonestly

Forgery

Money laundering (lower-value cases)

Criminal damage (where value exceeds £5,000 — below that it is summary only)

Drug Offences

Possession of a controlled drug (Classes A, B and C)

Possession with intent to supply (lower-level cases)

Cultivation of cannabis

Sexual Offences

Sexual assault (Sexual Offences Act 2003)

Exposure

Voyeurism

Certain child sexual offences at the lower end of the sentencing range

Public Order / Miscellaneous

Affray

Threatening behaviour / violent disorder (lower-level)

Racially or religiously aggravated common assault

Carrying a bladed article / offensive weapon

Perverting the course of justice (lower-level)

Witness intimidation

Low-value shoplifting (goods under £200) — treated as summary only for allocation purposes, but the defendant retains the right to elect Crown Court trial

The Bill introduces a new Crown Court Bench Division to hear triable either way cases likely to receive a custodial sentence of three years or less to be tried by judge alone. The trigger is the likely sentence not directly the defendant's criminal history. However the two are linked in practice: a defendant with previous convictions is likely to receive a heavier sentence upon conviction, potentially pushing them above the three year threshold and therefore into jury trial territory. Conversely, a first-time offender facing the same charge may be assessed as likely to receive under three years, routing them to the judge alone Bench Division.  

The Bill`s supporters have made some cogent arguments.  They would argue that the principle is proportionality not discrimination. Differential treatment based on criminal history is not unequal treatment in the impermissible sense; it is simply proportionate justice.  A first-time offender and a repeat offender are not in identical situations before the law and treating them differently reflects that reality. Equality before the law does not require identical procedures; it requires that like cases be treated alike.  In addition unlike juries, judges will provide reasoned judgments for their decisions to convict or acquit.  On the other hand the argument on the basis of reducing the crown court log jam by an appreciable amount has been mocked by those using live statistical analyses. 

The core objection to the Bill in its present form is that equality before the law would be fundamentally compromised.   If two defendants face identical charges eg theft of identical value or the same class of assault  but one receives a jury trial and the other does not solely because of past conduct unrelated to the current charge, the law is being applied unequally to the present accusation. The principle that every person is innocent until proven guilty of the charge before the court is undermined if prior history determines the mode of trial for a new, separate allegation.  In addition, previous convictions might prejudice the allocation decision itself. A judge assessing likely sentence at the pre trial stage to determine which court will hear the case  will inevitably be aware of the defendant's record. Because a defendant's right to a jury trial will depend on the likely custodial sentence a judge will, for the first time, need to conduct a hearing to determine the likely sentence.  Such pre trial hearings are long established but prejudicial information before guilt has been proved might be placed  in the public arena.  Jury retention has long been argued as a constitutional safeguard not a privilege.  However as recent posts here have explained, the situation of perverse verdicts presents a challenge to that ancient concept.  A common argument amongst opponents of the Bill is the possibility of a disproportionate impact on vulnerable groups.  Defendants from ethnic minorities might feel that they should be tried by peers from their community and not a judge alone.  That, however, is an opinion likely to open a can of worms. 

The iniquity of mode of trial choice was apparent in the case of the 25p banana.  In the case of R v James Gallagher — Birmingham Crown Court, August 2008.  The defendant, James Gallagher, aged 23, of Linwood Road, Handsworth, Birmingham, was tried at Birmingham Crown Court having elected trial by jury. He was acquitted of burglary and the theft of a banana worth 25p from Birmingham's Bullring shopping centre. It had been alleged that he had entered an Italian restaurant before it had opened and stolen the piece of fruit.  

The district crown prosecutor for Birmingham, Martin Putar, stated that the CPS felt there was sufficient evidence and it was in the public interest for the prosecution to proceed. It is almost a perfect illustration of both sides of the argument simultaneously.  The Bill`s proponents would argue that a jury of twelve was empanelled, Crown Court resources deployed, and a full trial conducted for the theft of a 25p  piece of fruit; an obvious disproportionate use of public resources.  Those against  reform argue that Gallagher's own stated reason for electing,  that he feared the magistrates would convict him, but the jury acquitted him.   Under the Courts and Tribunals Bill 2026 that option would no longer be available to him and on his own assessment he would have been wrongly convicted.  Of course his own apprehensions are just those; they are not facts. It is perhaps the single most vivid real world example of the tension at the heart of the entire debate and has been quoted in parliament on a few occasions. 

Some jurisdictions based on common law allow with restrictions a defendant to choose mode of trial: Canada, USA, Australia and new Zealand. The current proposal is the English right of election to be removed rather than qualified. In Canada and most US states the defendant in limited offences retains the right with certain conditions  to choose either mode; the Bill proposes to eliminate that choice entirely for either way offences with maximum custody three years, replacing election with administrative allocation by a judge. No major common law jurisdiction with a comparable tradition has gone quite that far in one legislative step. 

It is reasonable to conclude that if there were a different Lord Chancellor at the dispatch box, a cabinet minister without the political baggage of the current incumbent, the Bill would perhaps be having a less divisive route through parliamentary procedures.  But perhaps it`s no bad thing that such an incompetent hostage to fortune as David Lammy is the proponent.  The debate has exposed serious divisions on a matter of constitutional principle and that, surely, is exactly what has been lacking in recent times when Left and Right are both targeting the great British middle.   

NOT LOOKING FOR A LEGAL NEEDLE IN A HAYSTACK

Over the last few weeks  I have posted on David Lammy`s proposals for radical changes within the courts` system, removal of right to jury trials, increased magistrates` sentencing powers, removal of automatic right to appeal to crown court and the statistics on such appeals.  Lammy continues to assert that his proposals on removing some jury trials will reduce the backlog to "normal" waiting times by 2035.  But could there be another underlying reason for his apparent endeavours to change a centuries old institution which are being opposed by almost all those for whom justice for all is a basis for their involvement in our legal system? 

One must consider whether there might be a connection between some "perverse" acquittals and the ethnic or political composition of jurors.  This country is no longer  a nation with a basic set of common values. There is a growing population of Muslims whose interests are the establishment of sharia  and who appear to be, at least philosophically, believers in a theocracy, such belief inherently in opposition to the British Judeo Christian foundations of our country. The pressure for special legal protection for supposed Islamophobia, a misnomer by any etymological inspection, is a current example of an unhealthy and unwelcome trend. 

Top 5 areas by number of Muslims (England & Wales) are

1. Birmingham        341,800

2.Bradford               166,800

3.Tower Hamlets    123,900
4.Manchester           122,900
5.Newham                122,100

Top 5 areas by percentage Muslim  population

1.Tower Hamlets                                    39.9%

2.Blackburn with Darwen                     35.0%

3.Newham                                                34.8%

4.Luton                                                     32.9%

5.Redbridge                                             31.3%

The question is whether it can be shown that the above demographic is linked to perverse jury verdicts connected with offences under the public order acts or those associated with criminal damage. Evidence of acquittals “against the evidence” can be suspected eg when protesters admit an intention to damage property yet are acquitted.

Nationally Muslims are about 6.5% of England and Wales so all above areas are far above average. The top 5 wards by % Muslim population exhibit even higher concentrations of Muslims.

1.Bastwell (Blackburn with Darwen)        73.5%

2.Shear Brow (Blackburn with Darwen)  70.3%

3.Whitefield (Pendle)                                   67.1%

4.Toller (Bradford)                                       64.3%

5.Small Heath (Birmingham)                     62.1%

At ward level 70%+ Muslim populations do exist but only in a small number of tightly clustered neighbourhoods. There is no direct statistical conclusion that the Muslim prison population is directly connected with the above numbers. What can be said is that with a Muslim population of 6.5% the prisons` Muslim  population is 18%. 

What is meant by "perverse" verdicts?  Typically this refers to: acquittals despite strong evidence, convictions despite weak evidence and “jury equity” cases (e.g. acquittals contrary to law/evidence). The well-known 2010 MoJ jury research study  "Are Juries Fair?" by Professor Cheryl Thomas (UCL), found high levels of jury comprehension and adherence to evidence but no basis for concluding widespread perverse outcomes but one could also consider whether there was any sufficient effort to look for such evidence.  Can juries in demographically exclusive enclaves where Muslims are in a high minority or low majority be trusted to be objective assessors of evidence?

Recent debate has centred on acquittals in cases involving disruption of infrastructure, climate or political protest and  criminal damage linked to protest.  Examples often cited in commentary include defendants associated with groups like Extinction Rebellion, Just Stop Oil and currently Palestine Action.  Some acquittals can appear to be perverse. "Lawful excuse” in criminal damage can be subjectively framed. Human rights arguments (Articles 10 & 11 ECHR) can be engaged and what appears factually obvious might still be legally contestable.  Public or political pressures might be behind weak or borderline cases  to be nevertheless brought to trial. In such cases perverse verdicts should be no surprise. There is, however, no statistical evidence that shows an increase in acquittals “against the evidence”. What can be said is that there is increased visibility and legal complexity of politically motivated criminality and social media ready to erupt as any vulcano given the slightest pretext. However DPP v Ditchfield 2023 Protecting Property has changed the balance to some extent insofar as a defence for protest motives was excluded.  Between 2019 and 2022 there appeared to be a spike in "perverse verdicts" but since then there has been  a decline in such acquittals. Now protest motives cannot justify damage in law.  

The conclusion thus far is that there is no evidential basis to relate those protest-trial outcomes to the “top 5” Muslim-population areas identified earlier. Any attempt to do so would be inferential and on the available data, weak. That`s not to say my earlier questions are without foundation.  If the needle is unwanted it`s pointless wasting time and resources looking in the haystack.  What David Lammy [and the legal deep state] don`t want us to know (or even themselves also)  about possible socio-political influence in juries selected in areas as listed above is a question to be asked before there is the possibility of an answer. 

THE SOUND OF SILENCE.....AT POLICE INTERVIEW

Decades ago long before I was appointed I was implicated in a minor motoring incident when a 3rd party who was involved sustained a very minor injury.  I called the police and assisted that 3rd party.  In due course police arrived and I explained the situation and signed a statement.  No doubt they also spoke to the mother of the 3rd party who was a minor.  Some few weeks later I received a letter stating that no further action was being  taken and that the case was closed.  Subsequently when I joined the bench the consequences of defendants deciding to go no comment to police requests for a statement became an important consideration of the decision on a defendant`s guilt or innocence.  This authority to draw adverse inference from a no comment interview is derived  from the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994 (CJPOA), which received Royal Assent and came into effect on 3 November 1994.  The governing law is contained within Sections 34, 35, 36 and 37 of the Act and these provisions are premised on the assumption that silence reflects guilt. Previously a judge could not normally make any comment to the jury on the accused's pre-trial silence when charged or questioned by someone in authority (R v Gilbert (1977)). Similar rules applied to the lower court. The police caution beloved by TV police officers was amended to read "You do not have to say anything. But it may harm your defence if you do not mention when questioned something which you later rely on in court. Anything you do say may be given in evidence." The middle sentence is the addition to the then existing caution.

The fundamental point of the topic is whether and/or in what circumstances a person arrested and/or being interviewed should volunteer a statement without a lawyer or go no comment with or without a lawyer. 

For most people a formal police interview [noted at the scene or at police station] would be a stressful event.  Without a lawyer being present it doesn`t take much imagination to consider that one could easily give contradictory accounts of an incident or be inconsistent in a situation designed deliberately to elicit evidence of wrong doing.  Misremembering events or their chronology could easily be interpreted as a sign of guilt.  For an innocent person caught up in a possible criminal investigation and without a lawyer present going no comment might be the sensible option notwithstanding that middle sentence of the police caution.  The pressure from police that assistance will speed up the process of being able to leave the police station can lead somebody  completely innocent to become confused and liable to be drawn into a net of suspects particularly if that individual is of a compliant or vulnerable disposition. 

Somebody who is perhaps at the periphery of an unlawful situation is arguably most at risk if s/he submits to interview without legal advice.  As explained above a no comment approach is arguably the only sensible option.  The near universal advice from criminal defence solicitors is: say nothing until you have spoken to a lawyer. The right to free legal advice in the police station (in England & Wales under the duty solicitor scheme) is absolute and costs nothing. There is no rational reason to waive it. Police will often try to persuade suspected persons with the comment that if  they have nothing to hide tell us what happened. That common objection; "but I'm innocent I have nothing to hide" ignores that the interview is not a conversation between equals. It is an evidence gathering exercise conducted by trained professionals and one is not on a level playing field without representation.

There have been a few studies on the benefits or otherwise of interviewees exercising their right to silence.    Bucke, Street & Brown (2000) for the Home Office found that suspects who exercised the right to silence were more likely to be charged than those who gave accounts  but this correlation does not prove causation (silent suspects may have been those with more to hide or those with better legal advice)

 

Research by Gudjonsson (2003) on false confessions is well established: a significant minority of people confess to things they did not do under police interview pressure particularly vulnerable individuals

The PACE 1984 and subsequent CJPOA 1994 changes were specifically driven by government concern that too many suspects were using silence to avoid conviction, implicitly acknowledging that silence was an effective protection. Studies on eyewitness and self-memory reliability (Loftus, 1996 onwards) consistently show that stress significantly degrades accurate recall supporting the risk of giving unadvised statements.

The bottom line for those being interviewed at a police station is to  exercise their right to free legal advice before saying anything. No comment with a lawyer who has reviewed the circumstances is a coherent, protected strategy. No comment without a lawyer is safer than talking without a lawyer but neither is ideal.

So in short: 30 years ago in November 1994 Parliament fundamentally changed a centuries old common law right and the courts have been refining exactly how far it reaches ever since.  It`s interesting to note that another centuries old common law right to trial by jury is currently in the headlines.  

Conviction cannot be based solely on inferences drawn from silence: there must be other evidence to establish a prima facie case. 

AN APPEAL FOR APPEALS

Below are several quotes by the Lord Chancellor on the subject of the removal of an automatic right of appeal from the magistrates court to crown court.

Hansard – House of Commons (16 Dec 2025)

On replacing the automatic right of appeal:

“Sir Brian recommended a permission stage, and we accept his recommendation for creating a permission stage on appeal. That is the right thing to do, particularly because many appeals have no merits, and that is why victims fall away.”

 Mr Lammy defending the removal of the automatic right of appeal in favour of a permission stage, because many appeals are unmeritorious and can delay justice. 

Parliamentary Record – Criminal Court Reform Statement (2 Dec 2025)

In outlining the broader justice reform package that includes the appeal change, Lammy stated (as part of the Government’s explanatory statement to Parliament):“The appeals process from magistrates’ courts will be reformed so that automatic appeals to the Crown Court in criminal cases are replaced with a permission stage, limited to points of law.”— Formal description of the policy as the Government plans to legislate it. In the House of Commons, 2 December 2025 (the main announcement)

In the House of Commons, 2 December 2025 (the main announcement):

Lammy's clearest statement on the appeal changes came in his Commons statement, where he said:

"I will limit appeals from the magistrates courts, so that they are only allowed on points of law, to prevent justice from being delayed further."

It might be appropriate to quote from my post of 28/05/2024

"The above is an extract from 10 years statistics on appeals to the crown court against verdict and sentence.  I am not a statistician and leave it to others who might explore some numbers or trends.  However a glance tells us that from 2017 there was a marked change in absolute numbers.  The figures for 2020-2022 are those of the period in which the epidemic skewed statistics for myriad organisations.  It is noteworthy in my opinion to look at the years 2014 and 2019.  In the former there was a total of 11,214 appeals at crown court of which 5,731 were against verdict. 2,529 of those were allowed.  Against sentence there were 4,816 with 2,222 being successful.  In 2019 there was a total of 7,925 appeals at crown court of which 3,863 were against verdict. 1,730 of those were allowed.  Against sentence there were 3,435 with 1,705 being successful.  Figures for 2023 are total of 5,803 appeals at crown court of which 2,614 were against verdict. 1,088 of those were allowed.  Against sentence there were 2,647 with 1,272 being successful.  Considering that there are 150 magistrates courts in England and Wales on average only 39 appeals were registered  per court for the year 2023.  Over a million cases are expected annual at magistrates courts.  At the end of September 2023 there were 352,945 outstanding cases at the magistrates' courts. 

There are perhaps two takeaways from the above; the first is the relatively few appeals in total annually and the arguably high rate of success.  Considering that the prime reason for Lammy`s proposals is the reduction of the crown court backlog his argument has little foundation in reality.  When an MP asked directly whether removing the automatic right to rehearing amounted to "easier wrongful imprisonment," Lammy replied: "Of course that person would get permission to appeal if the circumstances were legally correct."



So the questions remain as to why this little noticed proposal is being propelled through parliament. It might be useful to outline the history of the right to appeal.  The automatic right to appeal from the magistrates court to the crown court has long been part of the criminal justice system in England and Wales predating many modern reforms. It derives from longstanding statutory criminal procedure law codified in the Magistrates’ Courts Act 1980 (section 108) which provides that a defendant convicted after a summary trial in the magistrates court presently enjoys an automatic right of appeal to the crown court  against his/her sentence if they pleaded guilty and against their conviction if they pleaded not guilty  without needing permission.

Lammy told the House of Commons he would limit appeals from magistrates courts so that they are "only allowed on points of law to prevent justice from being delayed further."  Currently the magistrates court is not a court of record.  Whilst the court must keep a copy of the pronouncement of the bench`s decisions and reasons there is no transcript taken of the whole proceedings which is why an appeal is a full re-hearing of the case.  To fulfil Lammy`s change there will be increased costs of  having a transcript and a judge or recorder will have to wade through said transcript to determine whether or not there is an error in law to validate the permission to  appeal.  The requirement of equipping the necessary recording equipment in hundreds of courtrooms, the payments to judges and the training of staff will not come cheap.  

A prime area of concern if automatic right to appeal is removed is that there will be a massive increase in miscarriages of justice. Since the beginning of this century the availability of legal aid in the lower court has steadily been reduced. It is disconcerting to know that the MOJ has historically refused to publish official statistics on the rate of unrepresented defendants in magistrates' courts unlike in the crown court. The government has consistently failed to provide this data, saying it was "not centrally held." In simple terms that phrase translates as "we don`t want to know these numbers so we don`t collect them in a useable format".  The most significant data came from a parliamentary question answered in 2023 analysed by the Centre for Public Data. In the first half of 2023 48% of defendants appearing in magistrates courts on imprisonable summary offences, 9,240 defendants, did not have legal representation recorded on their case. This had risen from 35% during 2022. 

Taking available information a reasonable working estimate is that somewhere between 35% and 50% of defendants in contested magistrates court trials are unrepresented with the figure likely towards the higher end for summary only imprisonable offences.  One doesn`t have to be a lawyer, statistician, or even a politician to surmise that a defendant who self represented at an original trial in the magistrates court will also be a litigant in person at a crown court re-hearing.  

As usual the Magistrates Association is caught between kowtowing to government proposals, its supposed representations of its members` opinions and the public good.  In a summary of the profession’s responses to the proposed reform on appeals (as reported in The Times), the MA’s submission to the relevant consultation stated:

“While speedy summary justice is efficient, it may occasionally result in rough edges and potential errors. Retaining the option to appeal is seen as a crucial safeguard, enabling individuals to seek redress and a comprehensive review of their cases.”

“We are supportive of the right of appeal remaining, though if this will be restricted, we are pleased that there will still be provision for points of law, which will bring it into line with cases in Crown courts.”

“The government’s proposals are a big vote of confidence in magistrates, but to maximise the success of these changes they must be accompanied by investment in recruitment and improvements to court building infrastructure.”

More recently for the MA’s Oral and Written Evidence to the Justice Committee (January 2026) that the MA submitted to the House of Commons Justice Select Committee on criminal court reform, it did cover appeals from the magistrates’ court as part of the reform package but did not supply a stand alone detailed position specifically on restricting the automatic right. Such equivocal response is typical of this government lap dog`s attitude to its functions. The MA have not publicly published a dedicated official position paper exclusively on the restricted appeal proposal in Government’s reform bills.

In stark contrast The Law Society had already made its position clear in a response to the Law Commission's review of criminal appeals explicitly stating that it supports retaining the right of a person convicted in the magistrates' court to have an appeal in the crown court through a full rehearing.  In the Commons an MP directly challenged Lammy by pointing out that the Bar Council had seen "no evidence" that the reforms would significantly reduce the crown court backlog and called on the government to publish its modelling before legislating. The Centre for Criminal Appeals which handles wrongful conviction cases renewed its strong opposition to the government announcement describing it as drastically curtailing appeal rights. 

To put it plainly I have  three bones to pick with this proposal. Firstly it will make it harder to undo wrongful convictions.  Confidence in our justice system at present is hardly hitting the heights of public approval: reducing availability of appeal will hardly enhance it.  Secondly  without audio recording in magistrates courts and there isn't any,  how exactly is a defendant supposed to identify, let alone argue, a point of law?  And finally nobody in the Ministry of Justice has yet bothered to explain why appeals rather than years of starving the courts of money and sitting days are the thing causing the backlog. Ministers would do well to look in the mirror before blaming defendants for exercising rights that Parliament gave them and which have been exercised judicially and successfully for over 100 years to their and society`s benefit.