UNDERAGE DRINKING 2010 AND 2026

It was in a bar in Venice about 100 metres from the Rialto Bridge that I bought my 15 year old his first alcoholic drink.  He didn`t much take to a demi litre of the local draft beer but did at home at Christmas and birthdays learn how to appreciate fine Scotch whisky, blend or single malt, when quality not quantity is the rule.  At the age of 13 that was how my son`s grandfather had introduced me to the "water of life" and how to enjoy a dram as one would enjoy other rare occasions when the senses would be tuned to an exquisite sunset on Santorini, the Mona Lisa at The Louvre or Beethoven`s  Fifth at the Albert Hall.  

These thoughts on children and alcohol have been prompted by my 4th December 2010 diary entry posted on https://amagistratesdiaries.blogspot.com/ 1st November 2026.  It was prompted by the Government's proposed Police Reform and Social Responsibility Bill and in particular its proposals to give local authorities greater control over alcohol licensing and stronger powers to deal with premises persistently selling alcohol to children.  The obfuscation about the relationship between legislation, enforcement and political promises is just a microcosm of how we are governed and whether this system can survive the societal changes happening right now under our collective nose. 

Whether by peer pressure, curiosity or lack of positive parenting many children obtain their alcohol from shops willing to break the law under Section 146 regarding the sale of alcohol to children as part of the Licensing Act 2003.  Over the last decade research and data from organisations like Alcohol Concern (now part of Alcohol Change UK) consistently estimate that approximately 40% of youth offences are committed while the young person is under the influence of alcohol. Violent crimes, public disorder and anti-social behaviour by young offenders are inextricably linked with the consumption of alcohol.  Criminologists and health economists are generally agreed that alcohol frequently acts as an aggravating catalyst rather than the sole trigger of youth offending.

Whilst researching this post it became apparent that there are two approaches to the study of alcohol and children.  There is mine as outlined in my opening paragraph and the zero tolerance approach adopted by strict parental control which found that adolescents from such households generally delayed heavy drinking longer and consumed less alcohol overall.


Since that post of 2010 I would question whether there has been any substantive change in the relationship between legislation and the scourge of under age drinking. The Ministry of Justice's historical figures provide some cause for concern. Between 2010 and 2015 defendants proceeded against for the s.146 offence fell from 316 to 89. Convictions fell from 277 to 73. Both represent reductions of more than 70 per cent. These figures do not establish that illegal sales increased nor do they prove that enforcement became less effective. They do, however, demonstrate a substantial reduction in the number of cases reaching the courts.

If a Government wishes to demonstrate that its licensing policy is working it should be able to tell the public how effectively that policy is being enforced.  Just as with crime statistics generally the numbers or rather the lack of numbers on which policies can be judged are conspicuous by their absence.  How many test purchases have been conducted by trading standards officers? How many resulted in the discovery of illegal sales? How many premises received warnings? How many licensing reviews were initiated? How many premises had conditions imposed or their licences suspended or revoked? How many fixed penalties were issued, and how many cases resulted in prosecution?  These are not obscure statistical curiosities. They are the basic measurements by which the effectiveness of a licensing regime ought to be judged. Yet the national picture is remarkably incomplete. There is no readily available, consistent annual national series bringing together all these measures for the period from 2010 to 2025.  The MOJ can tell us how many defendants were proceeded against and convicted. That is useful but it tells us nothing about the number of suspected offences which never reached court.  

In 2010 the transfer of licensing responsibilities from magistrates to local authorities was already a matter of concern to me. The argument for local involvement was that decisions would become more responsive to local circumstances and community interests.  That may have been the intention but intention and performance are different matters.  Local authorities now have substantial responsibilities for licensing enforcement often through trading standards and environmental health departments. Their ability to discharge those responsibilities depends upon resources, staffing, priorities and the willingness to take action.  I know from my own borough that it has a projected deficit this upcoming year of £200 million and according to its latest Trading Standards Annual Report (2025/2026) the figures show zero court convictions specifically for underage alcohol sales but massive escalation in other product categories. The Government should be able to publish an annual national return showing the number of test purchases, breaches identified, enforcement notices, licensing reviews, suspensions, revocations and prosecutions. Such information should be broken down by local authority so that variations in enforcement can be examined. There is nothing particularly radical about this proposal. It is simply the collection and publication of information necessary to judge whether the law is working.  Governments are quick to boast of the new powers they have made available to public bodies but are less vociferous in publishing the results of such legislation.  Below is a table that illustrates s.146 action 2010-2015.  

The historical figures do not, however, establish what happened after 2015. The MOJ`S latest Criminal Justice Statistics Quarterly publication, covering the year to June 2026, includes updated offence-level data. The individual s.146 entries for 2016–2025 still need to be extracted and checked before a complete sixteen year comparison can be published.

Parliament may prohibit the sale of alcohol to children but the protection intended by that prohibition depends upon its enforcement. A law which remains on the statute book but is increasingly absent from the courts risks becoming a declaration of good intentions rather than an effective safeguard. If a government wishes to demonstrate that its licensing policy is working surely it should be able to tell the public how effectively that policy is being enforced. The argument for local involvement in 2010 was that decisions would become more responsive to local circumstances and community interests.

The decline in s.146 prosecutions between 2010 and 2015 deserves investigation. The figures from 2016 to 2025 must be established before it can be said whether that decline continued. Equally, the absence of a comprehensive national record of enforcement activity makes it difficult to judge whether the transfer of licensing responsibilities has delivered the benefits originally promised.

Sixteen years after questioning the transfer of licensing responsibilities from magistrates to local authorities the evidence suggests that the fundamental problem has not gone away. Prosecutions and convictions for selling alcohol to children have fallen dramatically. Yet who can say whether this reflects less offending or simply less enforcement? A  convincing national picture of under age sales, alcohol-related offending and the effectiveness of licensing controls is still lacking. Governments can pass laws, announce tougher penalties and congratulate themselves on decisive action but legislation without enforcement is little more than political theatre. My warning in 2010 was that responsibility had been transferred without sufficient regard to the consequences. The question now is stark.  Has effective enforcement for administrative convenience been sacrificed and the law left to gather dust?

Finally on a personal note as above some research indicates that young people who receive alcohol from their parents are more likely, not less likely, to engage in binge drinking and experience alcohol related harm later in adolescence.  With that statistical  metaphoric wrap upon my knuckles I must add that if my family were interviewed for such research we would be outliers. 

THE MOJ AND THE CULTURE OF EXECUTIVE DENIAL

"If you owe the bank £100, that’s your problem. If you owe the bank £100 million, that’s the bank’s problem."  That old adage that has survived since John Maynard Keynes re-defined it 1n 1945 can loosely describe any system which has become too large or ungovernable to respond expertly or rationally to apparently insurmountable or unexpected turns of events. But this blog is not about economics or even about topics allied to economics: it is about justice as an umbrella and we, the public, who shelter under its protection. When that umbrella fails in a gale force wind during a storm and the user is soaked blame can be allocated in a spectrum from his own stupidity in venturing out in dangerous conditions to faulty manufacture owing to inadequate design and/or low quality materials. When a justice system is seen to fail in part or as a whole to whom are those responsible accountable? What happens in the MOJ is, in microcosm, typical of  the thought processes of those who govern us and their individual departments.

It can be said that without justice there can be no democracy but equally without democracy there can be no justice.  In effect there is a symbiotic relationship without which our model of society cannot survive.   In a symbiotic star system  when a critical threshold is reached a sudden, violent thermonuclear explosion called a nova takes place and the relationship between those heavenly bodies begins anew.  And so history shows us does the relationship between a people and their government when the bond of trust is broken beyond repair.  

When things do begin to go wrong we are entitled to ask where does responsibility lie. Parliament is accountable to the electorate. Ministers can be dismissed. Police officers can face disciplinary proceedings. Solicitors and barristers have professional regulators. Yet the public may find it difficult to establish who is responsible when a serious failure occurs within the courts. When a wrongful conviction occurs who takes responsibility for the failure? When a court repeatedly fails to sit because of inadequate resources who is answerable? When official statistics reveal a persistent problem but no effective remedy follows who must explain the inaction? And when successive governments introduce reforms that fail to deliver their promised benefits, is anyone required to account for the outcome?

The judiciary is independent and is not and should not be answerable to politicians so we are told but as has become more common in recent years whispers from on high can steer sentencing in a desired direction: deterrent sentences during and after the London riots of 2011 and more recently sentences imposed for on line offending and those involving banned organisations are newsworthy.  Although the Judicial Conduct Investigations Office exists to oversee judicial conduct the issue is not whether individual judges should be answerable to politicians for their decisions. Judicial independence is fundamental. The question is whether independence has sometimes become confused with institutional immunity from meaningful scrutiny.  General boundaries of responsibility are set out below.

Public confidence requires more than independent judges and sound legal principles. It requires institutions that acknowledge failure, explain its causes and demonstrate that lessons have been learned.  The Criminal Cases Review Commission (CCRC) is the last resort where convictions can be reviewed.  When that organisation`s flawed procedures are exposed as in the case of Malkinson (often misspelt as Mallinson), who was wrongfully convicted of a 2003 rape in Salford his story might have been authored by Franz Kafka. He served 17 years in prison for a rape he did not commit because he steadfastly refused to admit guilt to gain early parole. His conviction was finally quashed in July 2023.  The case brought into the public view the failures of the system.  Briefly, just three years after his conviction, deep-clean forensic testing under a cold-case review ("Operation Cube") discovered DNA from another, unidentified man on the victim's clothing. The Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) and Greater Manchester Police were notified by December 2009 but chose not to act.  The Court of Appeal quashed Malkinson's conviction in July 2023 and the perpetrator Quinn was eventually convicted of the original rape in 2026.

The repercussions of this failure were substantive.  In January 2025 Helen Pitcher (Chairwoman of the CCRC) resigned.  In July 2025 Karen Kneller (Chief Executive of the CCRC)  resigned.  the Independent Office for Police Conduct (IOPC) placed five former Greater Manchester Police officers under formal investigation for gross misconduct.  One of these retired detectives is also under active criminal investigation for misconduct in public office and perverting the course of justice regarding the hidden witness evidence and destruction of DNA samples.  Despite the CPS advising police to bury the breakthrough DNA lead in 2009, no senior prosecutors or leadership figures resigned or were dismissed. The agency issued institutional apologies but avoided individual personnel accountability at the executive level.

Following the scathing independent review into the Andrew Malkinson case the CCRC launched a massive historical trawling operation to re-examine thousands of past cases where critical DNA testing opportunities may have been missed. 2,553 cases were passed to a specialist forensics team. Currently the specialist forensics team has completed reviews on 728 of those cases resulting in dozens of brand new forensic inquiries leaving 1,825 historical DNA cases still actively undergoing review.



With internal processes having been re-assessed The CCRC noted in its latest annual report updates that it has intentionally shifted away from rigid "speed metrics" (which historically incentivized caseworkers to quickly close down complex files to hit timelines) toward an intensive, quality first approach to ensure no more hidden DNA profiles are overlooked.

But questions still remain.  The CCRC was created by the Criminal Appeal Act 1995 and officially began its work investigating miscarriages of justice on 31 March 1997.  Before the CCRC existed there was no independent watchdog. The predecessor function was split between a political office and a specific government department. That entire system collapsed in public confidence during the late 1980s and early 1990s following high profile miscarriages of justice such as the Guildford Four and the Birmingham Six. On the exact day the Birmingham Six walked free in 1991 the government announced the Royal Commission on Criminal Justice (The Runciman Commission) which ultimately recommended stripping the Home Office of its previous powers and creating the independent CCRC.

Such stories as above have in essence been repeated in many other situations the most heinous of which have been the blood scandal, the Post Office scandal and a multitude of corruption scandals within various hospital trusts leading to hundreds of unnecessary deaths.  The current revelations on the lies of the Health Secretary during the Covid epidemic show that the very highest people in government will seek to preserve their own position when the greatest of problems are likely to reveal their own  inadequacies.  

There is no doubt that some areas of government must be kept secret and a no through road sign presented to those who are employed to navigate such obstructions. Those restrictions, however, are apparently being extended to suit the whims of Cabinet Ministers and others beholden to the state for their highly paid and influential positions.  The balance of power between open democratic governance and a country`s rulers` obsession with secrecy is not a fixed entity. It must vary with circumstances.  In times of war flaws in that balance can be fatal. This government is telling us this month that we must stock up with three days food supplies, candles and battery radios.  Is this crying wolf to take our attention away from an imminent financial collapse?  Is guns before butter the slogan of failure or preparedness? Without public confidence in the integrity of those who rule us and their directly appointed devolved organisations including the MOJ, life and society as we know it  cannot continue in its present form.  

The case of Andrew Malkinson is just a terrible example of what can go wrong will go wrong. "Lessons will be learned" is often the final paragraph of a major inquiry.  It is the repetitive, institutional platitude that public bodies almost universally issue following catastrophic institutional failures.  The core issue isn't a lack of rules but an institutional widespread, cultural resistance starting right at the top of the system; any system. 

In the context of British justice inquiries the phrase has become a hollow administrative shield proving that while lessons are frequently identified they are rarely ever actually learned. Independence is essential to the administration of justice but accountability for the system's performance is also a pre-requisite for public confidence in it.  The question is whether the public still has that confidence. 

THE JUSTICE SYSTEM IS JUST THE BEGINNING

For those who wonder how on earth our so called justice system is very near breaking point on a number of parameters there is no need to search legal journals or listen to here today gone tomorrow politicians of all shades tell their tales of fantasy. My post today in https://amagistratesdiaries.blogspot.com/ dated 3rd December 2010 is merely a glimpse of the total inadequacy of a single member of a cabinet recently selected to follow Tony Blair`s Labour defeat.


With a new prime minister appearing to follow the Tik Tok approach to politics we are already on the downhill slope to abject failure. The shenanigans at MOJ are being repeated in almost every sphere of government to be publicly revealed when the bubble bursts. Immigration policy denied then approved by the minister in charge is but one example.


So as we all are advised to stock up with water, tinned food, battery radios, cash in hand and all the necessities for a possible descent into an undeclared wartime situation my near relatives who actually participated in a real war would be turning in their graves at the state in which our country has descended since their heroics.

EARLY RELEASE: JUST ONE SIGN OF A FAILING JUSTICE SYSTEM

This time last year the phrase early release would generally have had little meaning or recognition amongst many [most?] of the great British public.  Where it might have resonated with people would have been with regard to those being released from over crowded hospitals before their maladies warranted such discharge in order to free up bed spaces. Currently in the face of public disquiet the phrase has widespread recognition of a government policy that a prisoner may be released long before the public believes justice has been served.  For years successive governments have spoken of punishment, deterrence, rehabilitation and public protection. Yet the gap between the language of politicians and the expectations of ordinary people remains a recurring source of discontent. 

Recent polling provides some indication of the scale of that dissatisfaction. In August 2026 Ipsos reported that 69 per cent of those surveyed opposed the early-release scheme then under discussion while 79 per cent regarded prison sentences being too short as a serious problem. In May 2025 a YouGov survey found that three quarters of respondents thought the prison system was working badly. When asked what single change they would most like to see 17 per cent called for longer sentences or for prisoners to serve their full terms while an equal proportion favoured rehabilitation and reducing reoffending. These findings deserve attention but they must be read with care: a response to a particular question is not necessarily a settled view on every aspect of sentencing policy. Nor does dissatisfaction with early release automatically establish that sentencing guidelines themselves are defective.

There is, however, a glaring gap in any discussion of this nature.  Where is the reliable evidence showing how many members of the public, how many serving judges, magistrates, barristers and solicitors believe the guidelines are no longer fit for purpose? Without that evidence, assertions about what the country wants remain political claims rather than demonstrated conclusions.  The point in question as in so many others is the lack of sufficient  transparency that is consistent and credible to command public confidence a criticism which applies to all governments. 

Generally speaking polling suggests that given a say there is a public demand for five changes or improvements to the justice system.  There is doubt that offenders face consequences that fit the crime.  This does not establish that the public invariably wants longer prison sentences. It indicates that people want punishment to have meaning and offenders to be held responsible.

Public protection and more effective policing are felt to be lacking.  A YouGov survey published in March 2026 found widespread lack of confidence among adults in England and Wales in the system's ability to investigate minor crimes, impose appropriate sentences and reform offenders. It also found that 56% of victims who reported crimes were dissatisfied with the way police handled their cases.  Politicians speaking tough at party conferences  are soon exposed when actions fail their rhetorical flourishes. 

Since Covid long delays affect victims, defendants, witnesses and the proposal to reduce jury trials has exposed those delays to a wider public. 

An interesting finding from 2025 research is that the public is sceptical about the effectiveness of prison in preventing further crime. 

30% believed prison makes reoffending more likely.

35% believed it makes no difference.

21% believed it makes reoffending less likely.

In simple terms many people have little confidence that current policies of rehabilitation are succeeding.  Proven reoffending among adult offenders in England and Wales rose from around 23% during the pandemic to 28–30% in the latest published figures.  The 2025 More in Common research found that 58% thought the criminal justice system did a bad job of reducing crime while 39% thought it did a bad job of protecting the public. In September 2026, further polling reported that only 18% believed people who commit crimes usually face real consequences.

Apart from the government lap dog AKA, The Magistrates Association, there has been little support in legal circles for the Starmer government`s plan to reduce availability of jury trials. With magistrates` recruitment in crisis and increasing numbers of experienced JPs reaching the extended retirement age of 75 the concern must be the abilities of the lower court to offer quality judicial decisions especially with the current automatic right of appeal likely to be restricted.  

When sentencing is discussed, the most consistent question of opinion offered to the public is that of the death penalty.  It`s a subject so profound that I still have the school exercise book  in which whilst in Primary 7 when, years before its abolition, I wrote a few hundred words on why capital punishment should be abolished.  A YouGov survey in 2022  suggests that support for it stood at 40%, opposition 50% and 10% don`t know.  By November 2025, however, YouGov reported a change: 50% supported reintroducing capital punishment for some crimes compared with 45% opposed.  The particular offences proposed for that most serious punishment were listed as the murder of a child, murder committed as part of a terrorist act and multiple murder.

Like many parts of the Bible the basis of all sentencing, the Sentencing Guidelines, is open to interpretation.  Are they no longer fit for purpose? What do the public and legal profession think?  Public opinion is charted below.

In January 2025 the Law Society of England and Wales responded to the Government's sentencing review. Its response argued that successive governments had increased sentence lengths and created additional offences. It also raised concerns about sentence inflation, under resourced probation services and the consequences of inadequate information for sentencers. However this response cannot be treated as a poll of all solicitors, barristers and judges.

It`s not too impulsive to believe that the now easily recognised policy of early release which has been available in some form for decades has not become more acceptable to many people.  

There is a growing divide between what the criminal justice system says it is trying to achieve and what the public believes it is delivering. Sentencing guidelines are intended to ensure consistency and fairness but how can public confidence survive when the sentence announced in court seems so different from the time an offender actually spends behind bars? That is not, in itself, proof that the guidelines are wrong. It does, however, raise a question that the justice system cannot afford to ignore.

We must distinguish between the sentence imposed by the court and the time actually served. The first is determined by the judge or magistrates applying the law and the relevant guidelines; the second depends on the rules governing release. Yet the public hears the sentence, not the small print. When an offender is released much earlier than people expected it is hardly surprising that they question what the original sentence really meant. If the system wishes to retain public confidence it must explain that difference honestly and clearly.

Rehabilitation is another part of the equation. If offenders return to crime we must ask whether the measures intended to prevent it are working. Rehabilitation matters but it cannot simply be accepted as a worthy objective without examining the results.

And what of early release? Should it be something an offender earns through good behaviour, genuine engagement with rehabilitation and evidence of readiness to return to society, rather than something routinely anticipated? There is a strong case for that approach provided decisions are based on proper assessment and public safety is not compromised.

Prison overcrowding may demand urgent action but it should not become a substitute for a coherent sentencing policy. The public is entitled to expect punishment to mean something, rehabilitation to produce results and release decisions to be made responsibly.

Ultimately, the first duty of a sentencing system must be to protect the public. Punishment and rehabilitation both have a part to play but neither should be allowed to take precedence over the safety of the law abiding majority. That must be the starting point for any serious debate about sentencing reform.

DOES JURY RANDOMNESS STILL SERVE THE INTERESTS OF JUSTICE?

Juries: I think that my reader is well aware of the controversy emanating from the previous incumbent at the Ministry of Justice and his wish to eliminate some trials currently happening before a jury of "12 good men and true" although that early 17th century, 'good' implied distinguished rank or valour. The following is an attempt to reveal the underlying reality of juries and jurors.  But first some history: the modern English jury as we know it was established 1/6/1974 by the Juries Act.  Juries are selected by designated local catchment areas with reference to post codes. 

The current basic requirements for jury service are:-

Age: 18-75 on the date service starts

Registration:be on electoral register

Residency: lived in UK for at least 5 years since aged 13

Foreign nationals who meet Residency rule

Disqualifications are:-

Bail: anyone currently on bail connected to a criminal offence

Criminal Convictions: anyone who has received a custodial or detention sentence of at least 5 years

Recent Sentences: of custody active or suspended or community order or drug rehabilitation requirement within last 5 years.

It would seem that lacking a comprehensive knowledge of the English language would be a given for rejection of a juror but that assumption, unlike in America, is rather hasty because under s12 of the Juries Act 1974 defence and prosecution have the right to challenge an individual juror but they must provide a cause: prima facie evidence to the judge proving the juror is unfit to serve and before the juror is sworn.  That is therefore a rather difficult task in the circumstances. In addition a juror can be challenged if related to or knows persons involved in the case.  For obvious reasons an employee of the CPS cannot be a juror on a case prosecuted by his/her employer nor can a police officer if connected to the police station where s/he is based.  A juror can be excused if having served as such within two years previously. 

The prosecution retains an ancient right known as "Stand By for the Crown" to ask a juror to step down without giving an immediate reason.  This applies only when the potential juror is clearly unable to serve, eg if drunk or in high profile cases involving national security. It is the judge, however, who has the finial say in the discharge of a juror.  

Other common law based jurisdictions including Australia and some American states allow more challenges to potential jurors. 

The principle of a random selection of "peers" to determine a defendant`s guilt or innocence is now being questioned. Since 1945 this country has been subject to unprecedented levels of immigration and those newcomers have tended to settle with their kith and kin to the extent that today for example there is a concentration of non white citizens in various areas, eg 

English courts have historically ruled that "randomness" overrides "forced representation".  In practice this means that where an ethnic minority defendant is tried in an urban centre before a highly diverse jury the outcome could be different if the exact same offence were tried before a mono-racial jury.  This is no esoteric subject for ivory tower debate.  Annually roughly 350,000 - 480,000 citizens are randomly selected for jury duty and around 200,000 are actually selected to undertake jury service sitting on 13,000+ completed trials.  However recently, and the topic of some of my posts here earlier this year, the subject of perverse verdicts has become more than just a matter for legal eagles` discussions over tea and scones in an Oxbridge college. It focuses minds on whether "randomness" is approaching its sell by date. 

In landmark cases like R- v-Ford [1989] and R-v-Bridge[2019] the Court Of Appeal established that a defendant does not have a legal right to a racially balanced jury nor can a judge deliberately manipulate the random selection process to engineer an ethnically diverse jury pool.  Although perverse verdicts in a handful of high profile cases have drawn attention, particularly protest related ones, overall conviction rates in the Crown Court have been fairly stable over the long term, which doesn’t suggest a growing pattern of “runaway” acquittals.  However there is perception and there is reality.   Academics and civil rights groups have pointed out there is a major issue with perception and trust. 

The fact that no research has been or is allowed into the findings of a jury and how those findings were constructed are firmly closed to scrutiny leads to speculation, educated or otherwise.  Section 8 of the Contempt of Court Act 1981 makes inquiry into their deliberations an offence. Professor Cheryl Thomas’s research for the Ministry of Justice found no sign of systematic bias and found that verdicts broadly tracked the evidence. Variation between juries is inevitable but variation is not unreliability. The more pressing question is trust. Government intentions to remove some offences from eligibility for trial by jury are now in a state of flux.  Reducing the trial backlog as the reason for the proposed changes has been exposed as a possible curtain over more nefarious reasons.  

The case for the reform is vulnerable on its own terms. The evidence suggests that juries are not the primary cause of the backlog and the government’s own estimate of the saving is some £31 million, about 0.2% of the Ministry’s budget. The Criminal Bar Association attributes delay to chronic underfunding and restricted sitting days and warns that shifting fact finding to a less diverse judiciary risks undermining public confidence. The Institute for Government has gone further, cautioning that the changes could raise the risk of wrongful convictions.

The irony is plain. Random selection, the very feature that critics might point to as a weakness, is what gives a jury verdict its legitimacy. A decision by twelve strangers carries a representative authority that a single judge, however able, cannot replicate. If public confidence in the criminal process is to be protected the more promising course is to address resourcing and court capacity, not to trade away the one institution that the public demonstrably trusts but for how much longer.

INEFFECTIVE TRIALS 2013-2026: WHY HAS SO LITTLE CHANGED? PART 3

Plus ça change, plus c'est la même chose.  It`s not uncommon for a foreign language to express sentiment, observation or opinion more pithily and accurately than in English. And so it is on the subject of this my final thoughts on ineffective trials. 

As a reminder in 2013 ineffective magistrates court trials were already 18%.  By 2015 the figure had fallen to 15%. Then along came Covid. Current figures suggest that nearly 90,000 cases are awaiting trial at the magistrates court with overlisting still being considered at around 23% of cause of ineffective trials.  It seems that the problem is known but the remedy is not.   I have previously written what an ineffective trial really is and the ramifications it has for all those involved.  The Independent Review of the Criminal Courts has made the point with unusual clarity. Courts are under pressure to reduce backlogs while dealing with uncertainty over sitting days, judicial availability and case preparation. Overlisting becomes a way of trying to ensure that court time is not wasted when a trial drops out but when the listed cases actually do proceed some cannot be heard and become ineffective.  As I wrote in Part 2, " When too many cases enter the system [overlisting] some trials do not proceed and add to the queue in a vicious circle."

A courtroom is not a railway carriage.  If there are ten passengers and only six seats putting ten people on the platform does not increase the number of seats. Courts have a finite number of courtrooms, judges, magistrates, legal advisers and sitting hours.  Current listing practice is like force feeding geese to expand their livers prior to their slaughter to produce pâté de foie gras although it might initially make the waiting list look worse; so be it.  An honest waiting list is preferable to an apparently efficient list in which cases repeatedly collapse and have to be relisted. 

We are told almost daily of the advances in AI and daily there is a not insubstantial number of courts closed for myriad reasons.  Below is the crown court  situation today. 

Distant video hearings have been commonplace for ever increasing forms of hearings. With a well designed system underutilised courtrooms could be considered for an expansion of such hearings.  There will obviously be cases where geography, defendant welfare, witnesses, security or the interests of justice make transfer to such courts inappropriate but where those considerations do not apply, spare capacity should be capable of being used.  A case should go to an available court real or video rather than wait unnecessarily for an unavailable court.

I ended Part 2 of this series as follows,"Statistics which are not measured might be helpful in understanding why the courts are in this untenable position.  Are such numbers available?  If not, why not?  Are they available but being withheld?"  I would suggest that it might be useful to know of an ineffective trial:-

Why did it fail?

When was it first apparent that it would fail?

Could the problem have been avoided?

Who was in a position to prevent it?

How much court and professional time had already been spent?

How long did the defendant, victim and witnesses subsequently have to wait?

A box ticking exercise perhaps but one which could produce greater efficiency in the gathering of statistics and forming a realistic platform on which to consider change. If the problem is truly over listing then changes surely must be considered. 

If it is poor prosecution preparation, change prosecution case management.
If it is defence readiness address that.
If it is lack of court capacity, provide more capacity or reduce demand.
If it is judicial or legal adviser availability, deal with that directly.



A statistic which merely says "ineffective" is a description.
A statistic which identifies the preventable cause is a tool for reform. Every trial which fails to take place has cost money; in many cases lots of money, such sums currently not known to the public. Another example of statistics not known or wanted by the MOJ or known and withheld. To list but a few that come to mind in terms of possible cost:-


How many judicial hours?
How many court staff?
How many advocates?
How many witnesses?
How many police officers?
How many hours of preparation?
How many journeys?

A court that lists fewer cases but hears them effectively may be performing better than a court which appears extremely busy but continually adjourns, relists and reopens cases.  Even in my time on the bench there were various training sessions in pushing matters to an early conclusion the most memorable being under the slogan CJSSS:  Criminal Justice: Simple, Speedy, Summary.  That was followed by  "Stop Delaying Justice!" initiative that succeeded CJSSS in 2011. Legal analysts, senior judges and practitioners generally view programs like CJSSS and Stop Delaying Justice! as short-term successes that ultimately collapsed because they failed to fix the fundamental structural issues of the wider justice system.  There is a danger especially with a new government which is using modern social media in attempts to furnish its image that the answer to every difficulty will be another administrative reform, another procedure, another target or another management initiative. 

There are only two fundamental ways to reduce an overloaded system: increase capacity or reduce demand and preferably both. In addition to enough sitting days, judges, magistrates, legal advisors, courtrooms and properly prepared advocates to deal with the work which Parliament requires the courts to undertake, does every case currently entering the criminal courts need to consume the amount of court resource it presently does?

After thirteen years perhaps the statistics have finally done their job. They have shown that ineffective trials are not simply occasional accidents nor a problem created by Covid. They are symptoms of a criminal justice system which has repeatedly struggled to match the work demanded of it with the capacity available.  An uncomfortable [for some] conclusion is, as in so many aspects of our society, we have become better at managing failure than preventing it.  A case which repeatedly returns to the list is not evidence of efficiency. It is evidence that something has gone wrong.  When a trial fails the system should know why, whether the failure could have been avoided and what it cost. 

The lesson from 2013–2026 is therefore simple. We already know much of what goes wrong. The real question is whether there is now the courage to change the system that allows it to happen.

THE END.

INEFFECTIVE TRIALS 2013-2026: WHY HAS SO LITTLE CHANGED? PART 2

The phenomenon of trials failing to proceed in 2013 was not new.  The politicians in the House of Commons might have wished it away but deep in the bowels of Petty France mathematicians, statisticians, market research analysts, data scientists, data analysts, operations research analysts and others of similar expertise were like busy bees looking for explanations as to why the known problem of maladministration causing overlisting, defendants being absent and witnesses being unavailable was apparently intractable. Then along came Covid. 

It would be wrong to pretend that the pandemic did not fundamentally disrupt the criminal courts. Courts closed or operated with reduced capacity. Hearings were postponed. Jury trials were suspended or severely restricted. Cases accumulated but Covid was the exception, not the rule. Pre Covid the ineffective trial rate in magistrates courts was fairly settled at around 15%-16%. In 2026 Q1 the rate was 21% and had been steady for six years. In the same quarter overlisting was the cause of 21% of ineffective trials. The courts did not simply suffer a temporary Covid spike and then return to normal. They reached a new plateau. At the end of March 2026 the magistrates courts had 370,722 open cases; a series peak. The non-Single Justice Procedure caseload alone stood at 184,565. More strikingly, the number of open trial cases had reached 83,020, up 15% in a year and substantially above the 50,689 recorded in Q1 2022. Trial receipts have exceeded trial disposals in every quarter since Q1 2022. That is not simply a statistical curiosity. If more cases enter the trial system than leave it the queue grows. And when the queue grows finding courtrooms, judges, magistrates, advocates, witnesses and defendants at the same time becomes progressively more difficult.

In Q2 and Q3 2013, 72% of the ineffective trials attributed to court administration were not heard because of overlisting.  Plus ca change........It could be argued that there is a chicken and egg situation with regard to ineffective trials:  the backlog causes ineffective trials but also ineffective trials contribute to the backlog.  When too many cases enter the system [overlisting] some trials do not proceed and add to the queue in a vicious circle.  

In Q1 this year 4,884 trials were vacated before the date set. 52% resulted from the prosecution discontinuing the case before trial and 19% were attributed to an anticipated lack of court time. A case discontinued before trial, a trial vacated because there is no court time, a cracked trial following a late guilty plea and an ineffective trial are all different events but from the perspective of all those anticipating to be present; victim, defendant, witness or police officer their time has been wasted. For the victim reluctant to attend it might be a final straw in a decision to withdraw. For a police officer it is a further waste of public money when s/he could be "on the streets." For the rule of law it could be a further example of an offender "getting away with it."

Similar problems beset crown court. The ineffective rate in Q1 2016 was 24% compared with <20% in 2019. For a defendant who has pleaded not guilty and is eventually dealt with by a jury trial the median waiting time in Q1 2026 was 48 weeks compared with 27.1 weeks in 2019.  This is the government`s quandary now that the proposed reduction in jury trials is again up for debate. 

The answer to the above disappointing statistics can no longer be the mantra that Covid caused the backlog. There is a strong argument that ineffective trials remain substantially above their pre Covid level insofar as trial receipts continue to exceed trial disposals; the number of open trial cases continues to rise; overlisting remains a major cause of ineffective trials and the time taken to bring cases to completion remains above pre Covid levels. So the question must be asked if Covid was the cause of the problem or merely the event which revealed how little spare capacity the system actually has. If the answer is the latter, putting more meat through the meat grinder cannot be a suitable remedy.

Statistics which are not measured might be helpful in understanding why the courts are in this untenable position.  Are such numbers available?  If not, why not?  Are they available but being withheld? 

To be continued...................................

MORE DISTRICT JUDGES: FEWER LAY MAGISTRATES

I was reading an article yesterday on the state of the current housing market. Its central observation was that too many sellers are attracted to the agent who appears to give the best i.e. highest value for their property only to find that many weeks or months down the line the house is still for sale with limited interest being shown. Such sellers either have to offer the contract to another agent with a realistic i.e. lower valuation or remove it from the market to re offer months later.

In April the MOJ began a marketing campaign to enlist thousands of new magistrates.  It would appear that like the house vendor who can`t sell their house the recruitment drive has been re launched today.  At a time of financial belt tightening for so many families is it any wonder that there is a dearth of capable people willing to sacrifice annually a minimum of 13 full days worth of earning potential or leave from employment to enter a system of which truly most are unable to imagine.  Added to that time commitment there is additional need for training days and an awareness that social rules applying to judges at the High Court are applied equally also to the newest recruit to the magistracy.  

Unlike the estate agent the MOJ does not have a financial market as a guide to its selling the position of a lay magistrate to the general public.  Either it reduces the requirements of candidates or accepts that its offer is unacceptable at current standards. 

With the MOJ under the spotlight more in the last year than in the last decade it will take only a single academic study to show that full time district judges without the need for a legal advisor can take over from lay magistrates at no additional cost when their increased efficiency is taken into account, for that hitherto unthinkable change to be seriously proposed.  Like so much ad hoc reasoning within this government as with its predecessor this problem will be pushed into the neverland of tomorrow as so many others have been since 2024.  

INEFFECTIVE TRIALS 2013-2026: WHY HAS SO LITTLE CHANGED? PART 1

I suppose I am not unique at having reached a stage in life when looking back has a longer perspective than looking forward.  Now, a decade or more on from my last sitting, that perspective allows me to consider whether my meandering legal observations were just that or whether there was a substance to them, particularly substance borne out by the reality of change effected by some of the most inept political figures ever to have sat round the cabinet table at 10 Downing Street.  It might only be a footnote in history but is there significance in the fact that of all those Lord Chancellors, 14 since 1997 and 9 since 2012,  only one ever made it to occupy the highest office of prime minister and that was by common consent the most  calamitous, incompetent and hapless of them all; The still Right Honourable Liz Truss?  

There is an old saying that those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it. The criminal justice system has an additional problem. Sometimes it does remember the past because the statistics are still there  but nobody appears to have asked whether the problem recorded then is still the problem being experienced today. Back in 2013 this blog was looking at the effectiveness of trials in the magistrates' courts. It was not a new subject even then. In the first quarter of 2013 39,115 trial hearings were listed in magistrates courts. Of those 44% were effective, 38% were cracked and 18% were ineffective indicating that those trials although listed did not take place and had to be re-listed.  In practical terms it meant that a courtroom had been occupied. A bench or judge had been allocated. A legal adviser had prepared. Prosecution and defence lawyers may have prepared. Witnesses may have attended. A defendant may have attended. Victims may have waited. And then nothing happens.

According to the MOJ for Q1 2013 court [mal?]administration was responsible for 21% of those ineffective trials, the defendant did not appear for 20% and prosecution witness[es] failed to attend in 16%.  Between 2015 and 2019 that ineffective rate had steaded to around 15% but for Q1 2019 court administration problems had risen to 27% and absent defendants to 24%.  Within the former group 72% of the failures were due to overlisting. That management issue was and is perhaps the most galling for magistrates.  It certainly was for me personally.  One couldn`t but feel sympathy for those attending be they lawyers or witnesses who were told that their case could not be heard. In Q1 of this year overlisting accounted for 21% of ineffective trials. So notwithstanding all the apparent technical advantages bestowed upon magistrates courts since my retirement efficiency is running to stand still. 

And then along came Covid.  The MOJ's current series shows the ineffective-trial rate rising from 17% to 23% across 2020 and 2021. Since then the rate has remained broadly stable at between 21% and 23%. The pandemic undoubtedly disrupted the operation of the courts.  That was then, this is now.  Why has the criminal court system not returned to its pre Covid level of trial effectiveness?  That is rather more difficult to answer.  Comparative figures for ineffective trials for 2013 and Q1 2026 are below.

At the end of March 2026, the magistrates courts had an open caseload of just over 370,000 and open trial cases had reached 83,020.

Scattering the numbers above is not to suggest that the good old days of 2013 were better; that would be ludicrous; there have been enormous changes.  In 2013 overlisting was already a recognised problem.  In 2019 court administration remained the largest individual cause. Then Covid produced a major deterioration and in 2026 overlisting is again the largest recorded reason for ineffective trials.  The last thirteen years have seen major reforms in the lower court including  the introduction of technology, halving the number of actual courts to the raising, lowering and raising again the sentencing powers of these courts.  But overlisting is still the bane for all court users.  Perhaps the criminal justice system has spent years trying to deal with the symptoms of delay without sufficiently addressing some of its causes.

END OF PART 1