The Justice of the Peace Blog

Tuesday, 26 August 2025

RULES

Rules, rules and more rules seem to be the order of the day amongst so many professions and occupations. From the 12th century onward there was an increase in guilds especially in growing towns like London, York and Norwich. These regulated trades, set quality standards, trained apprentices and in so doing provided a barrier to non members attempting to emulate and/or compete with those who set themselves on an exclusive platform. By the 14th and 15th centuries many London guilds had evolved into the Livery Companies; powerful institutions that combined status for their members, mercantile protection and increasing political significance. In modern times economic regulation, educational and social charitable work and the enforcing of professional standards have become the mainstay of these institutions. There are many City of London freeholds owned by guilds now hired out for formal, political and social occasions their regulatory functions having been removed to be replaced by statutory bodies.

The legal and medical professions and their disciplinary offshoots are perhaps the best examples of those where in house control of their practitioners has been replaced by government appointed independent bodies. For obvious reasons the body overseeing the behaviour of judicial office holders has been the subject of much comment on this site. However a brief review of the cases published shows a dearth of information on this public site. In contrast the disciplinary functions and investigations of the body overseeing barristers; the Bar Tribunal and Adjudication Service (BTAS) provides detailed reports of alleged misconduct of barristers. Solicitors who are called to account do so within the rules of the Solicitors Disciplinary Tribunal. Both these supervisory organisations provide detailed reports of cases where the lives of the accused might be forever changed. Within the medical profession also the watchword is openness but that public insight has been late in arriving. In the 1980s I played a very small part in demanding that malpractice allegations` before the then disciplinary committee and held in secret be reported in full to the public. Now the Medical Practitioners Tribunal Service provides public hearings and reports.

The English legal system, its practice and its practitioners, has without any irony been a law unto itself until post 1960s. It might not be inaccurate to say that magistrates having one foot in the judiciary and the other as members of the public have been subjected to disciplinary processes unsuitable for their hybrid task. Some numbers might be informative at this point. In 1999 15 Justices of the Peace were removed from office: the same number as 2016-2017. 2017–18 saw 11 magistrates removed. Latest statistics are that between 28th April this year and 15th August 22 magistrates have been disciplined of whom 5 were removed from office. Considering there are 14,636 active magistrates the disciplinary record could be considered very low and an approval for the wisdom of the advisory committees which appointed them. From the point of view of magistrates they have a multitude of rules to follow; a far cry from their empowerment by the Justices of the Peace Act 1361 during the reign of King Edward III. For those interested these rules are stated below.

However as with all rules based systems there will always be those who seek to bend, avoid or transgress them. For the disciplinary committees involved there will always be those individually or organisationally who practise the concept that the upstandingness of the organisation must be at the forefront of any disciplinary process irrespective of many or most other considerations or the exposed victims. The closed shop mentality of the original guilds is not quite dead and buried.

The Judicial Conduct (Magistrates) Rules 2014

Coming into force --18th August 2014

CONTENTS

PART 1

General

1. Citation and commencement

2. Interpretation

3. Judicial office holders to whom these Rules apply

4.–8. Chairman of an Advisory Committee

9.–14. Making a complaint about judicial misconduct

15.–17. Time limits within which a complaint must be made

18.–21. Extension of time limits

22. Measurement of time for doing an act

PART 2

Assessment of complaint

23. Scope

24.–30. Consideration of complaint

31. Options when considering a complaint

32. Dismissal of complaint

33.–35. Dismissal procedure

36.–37. Referral to a conduct panel

38.–40. Procedure to be followed before a referral is made to a conduct panel

41. Interim suspension

42. Scope

43. Summary process

44.–46. Procedure

47.–48. Report

49.–51. Reporting procedure

52. Scope

PART 3

Summary Process

PART 4

Conduct Panel

53. Composition of a conduct panel

54.–57. The role of the Advisory Committee Secretary

58.–66. Procedure

67.–78. Hearings

79.–81. Conduct panel report

82.–94. Reporting procedure

PART 5

The role of the Judicial Conduct Investigations Office

95. Scope

96.–97. The role of the Judicial Conduct Investigations Office

98.–102. Referral to an investigating judge

103. Referral to a disciplinary panel

104.–105. Referral to the Lord Chancellor and the Lord Chief Justice

PART 6

Judicial Investigation

106. Scope

107. Nomination of investigating judge

108.–115. Investigation by an Investigating Judge

116.–121. Report of investigating judge

PART 7

Disciplinary panel

122. Scope

123. Disciplinary panel

124.–126. Functions of a disciplinary panel

127.–129. Procedure of disciplinary panel

130. Report and recommendation

131.–137. Report procedure

PART 8

Miscellaneous

138.–140. Re-opening a case that has been dismissed

141.–142. Procedure to be followed when re-opening a case

143.. Consideration of matter in absence of a complaint

144.-147 Withdrawal of a complaint

148.–149. Deferral of consideration of a case

150. Transitional provision

151. Revocation

The Lord Chief Justice, in exercise of the powers conferred by sections 115 and 117 of the

Constitutional Reform Act 2005, and regulation 7 of the Judicial Discipline (Prescribed

Procedures) Regulations 2014 and with the agreement of the Lord Chancellor makes the following

Rules:

PART 1

General

Citation and commencement

1. These Rules may be cited as the Judicial Conduct (Magistrates) Rules 2014 and come into

force on 18th August 2014.

Interpretation

2.—(1) In these Rules—

“the Act” means the Constitutional Reform Act 2005;

“Advisory Committee” means one of the Lord Chancellor’s Advisory Committees on justices

of the peace;

“bank holiday” means a bank holiday under the Banking and Financial Dealings Act 1971 in

England and Wales;

“business day” means any day other than a Saturday, a Sunday, Christmas Day, Good Friday

or a day which is a bank holiday in England and Wales;

“case” means a complaint or issue of misconduct being considered under these Rules;

“Chairman of an Advisory Committee” has the meaning given in rule 4 and rule 7;

“complaint” means a complaint containing an allegation of misconduct by a magistrate;

“designated member of an Advisory Committee” means a member of an Advisory Committee

who has been designated by a Chairman of an Advisory Committee under rule 5;

“disciplinary action” means—

(a) the exercise by the Lord Chancellor of the Lord Chancellor’ power to remove a

magistrate from office under section 11 Courts Act 2003; or

(b) the exercise by the Lord Chief Justice of the Lord Chief Justice’ powers under section

108(3), (4)(b) and (c) and (5) of the Act;

“disciplinary panel” has the meaning given by regulation 11 of the Regulations;

“investigating judge” has the meaning given by regulation 10 of the Regulations;

“licensing body” means any body that licenses or regulates any profession;

“magistrate” means a justice of the peace who is not a District Judge (Magistrates’ Courts);

“magistrate concerned” means the magistrate whose conduct is being considered in

accordance with these Rules;

“nominated judge” has the meaning given by regulation 9 of the Regulations;

“Regulations” means the Judicial Discipline (Prescribed Procedures) Regulations 2014;

“TDC” means a Training and Development Committee.

Judicial office holders to whom these Rules apply

3. These Rules apply to magistrates (including those on the supplemental list).

Chairman of an Advisory Committee

4. The Chairman of the Advisory Committee is the Chairman of the Advisory Committee for the

local justice area to which the magistrate concerned is assigned under section 10(2) of the Courts

Act 2003.

5. Subject to rule 6, the Chairman of the Advisory Committee may designate another member of

that Advisory Committee to act on their behalf in relation to—

(a) a specific complaint;

(b) all complaints; or

6. A designated member of an Advisory Committee may not deal with a complaint about

himself or herself.

7. Notwithstanding rule 4, the Chairman of an Advisory Committee may also ask another

Advisory Committee to deal with a specific complaint when there is a good reason to do so. In

such circumstances, references in these Rules to the Chairman of the Advisory Committee are to

the Chairman of the Advisory Committee to which a complaint has been transferred.

8. Notwithstanding any designation under rule 5, the Chairman of an Advisory Committee may

decide to deal personally with a specific complaint.

Making a complaint about judicial misconduct

9. A complaint must be made to the local Advisory Committee or its Secretary.

10. A complaint must contain an allegation of misconduct.

11. A complaint must be made in a complaint document unless the Chairman of the Advisory

Committee agrees to accept a complaint in another form.

12. A “complaint document” is a document in writing which—

(a) is legible;

(b) contains an allegation of misconduct on the part of a named or identifiable magistrate;

(d) states the name and address of the person who is making the complaint.

13. A complaint document is to be accompanied by the originals or copies of all the documents

within the control of the complainant to which he or she intends to refer.

14. The Advisory Committee or its Secretary must not accept a complaint in any case where the

complainant states that they do not want the magistrate concerned to see a copy of the complaint

document or of any document accompanying it.

Time limits within which a complaint must be made

15. A complaint must be made within three months of the latest event or matter complained of.

16. Subject to rule 18 (extension of time limits), the Advisory Committee or its Secretary must

not accept a complaint if the complaint is made outside the time limit in rule 15.

17. The complainant must be informed—

(a) that their complaint has not been accepted because it is out of time; and

(b) that they may make representations within ten business days of the notification that their

complaint is out of time to the Advisory Committee for an extension of the time limit.

Extension of time limits

18. The Chairman to the Advisory Committee may extend the time limit for making a complaint

only in exceptional circumstances.

19. The fact that a complaint may contain an allegation of misconduct will not, by itself, be

sufficient reason for the Chairman to the Advisory Committee to accept a complaint outside the

three month time limit.

20. The Chairman to the Advisory Committee may extend or shorten any other time limit under

these Rules, whether or not the time limit has expired, where there is good reason to do so.

21. Where the Chairman to the Advisory Committee has extended a time limit, it must—

(a) inform the complainant and, if they are aware of the complaint, the magistrate concerned;

and

(b) keep a record of the reasons for the extension.

Measurement of time for doing an act

22. In these Rules the time for doing any act in response to a notification, invitation or request

(“the document”) starts on the day that corresponds to the method of delivery used in relation to

the notification, invitation or request shown in the table below-

Method of delivery Starting day

First class post (or other method which

provides for delivery on the next business day).

The second business day after the day on which

the document was posted.

Second class post. The third business day after the day on which

the document was posted.

Delivering the document to or leaving it at a

permitted address.

If it is delivered to or left at the permitted

address on a business day before 4.30pm, that

day; or if delivered at, or after, 4.30pm, the next

business day.

Fax. If the transmission of the fax is completed on a

business day before 4.30pm, that day; or if

transmitted at, or after 4.30pm, the next

business day.

Other electronic method. If an e-mail or other electronic transmission is

sent on a business day before 4.30pm, that day;

or if an e-mail or other electronic transmission

is sent at, or after, 4.30p, the next business day.

PART 2

Assessment of complaint

Scope

23. This Part applies where—

(a) a complaint is made to an Advisory Committee or its Secretary under rule 9;

(b) the Lord Chancellor and the Lord Chief Justice refer a complaint to an Advisory

Committee in accordance with regulation 13 of the Regulations;

to deal with a case under rule 146 (consideration of matter in absence of a complaint); or

(d) the Ombudsman refers a case to an Advisory Committee to investigate under section

111(7)(b) of the Act.

Consideration of complaint

24. The Chairman of the Advisory Committee must initially consider whether an allegation of

misconduct has been made by a complainant.

25. If not, they may refer the matter to the Bench Chairman to deal with as a pastoral or training

matter.

26. Otherwise, the Chairman of the Advisory Committee must—

(a) decide what action to take under rule 31; or

(b) refer the complaint to the Advisory Committee to decide what action to take under rule

31.

27. For the purposes of deciding what action to take the Chairman of the Advisory Committee or

the Advisory Committee may—

(a) make such inquiries as they consider appropriate; or

(b) request any documents which appear to be relevant to the complaint.

28. The Advisory Committee Secretary must—

(a) where no referral is made under rule 25 to the Bench Chairman, inform the complainant

whether their complaint is being considered by the Chairman of the Advisory Committee

or the Advisory Committee; or

(b) where a referral is made under rule 25 to the Bench Chairman, inform the complainant

that their complaint is being dealt with as a pastoral or training matter by the Bench

Chairman.

29. Where the magistrate concerned has been informed of the complaint, the Advisory

Committee Secretary must send a copy of the complaint and any supporting documentation to the

Bench Chairman.

30. Where the Advisory Committee considers the complaint, it must do so in consultation with

the Advisory Committee Secretary.

Options when considering a complaint

31. The Chairman of the Advisory Committee or the Advisory Committee may—

(a) dismiss the complaint in accordance with rule 32;

(b) refer the complaint to a conduct panel in accordance with rule 36;

(d) where there has been no misconduct, refer the matter to the Bench Chairman to deal with

as a pastoral or training matter.

Dismissal of complaint

32.The Chairman of the Advisory Committee or the Advisory Committee must dismiss a

complaint, or part of a complaint, if it falls into any of the following categories—

(a) it does not adequately particularise the matter complained of;

(b) it is about a judicial decision or judicial case management, and raises no question of

misconduct;

(d) it is vexatious;

(e) it is without substance;

(f) even if true, it would not require any disciplinary action to be taken;

(g) it is untrue, mistaken or misconceived;

(h) it raises a matter which has already been dealt with, whether under these Rules or

otherwise, and does not present any material new evidence;

(i) it is about a person who is no longer a magistrate;

(j) it is about the private life of a magistrate and could not reasonably be considered to affect

their suitability to hold their judicial office;

(k) it is about the professional conduct in a non-judicial capacity of a magistrate and could

not reasonably be considered to affect their suitability to hold judicial office;

(l) for any other reason it does not relate to misconduct by a magistrate.

Dismissal procedure

33. The Chairman of an Advisory Committee or an Advisory Committee may not dismiss a

complaint under rule 32(a) unless the complainant has been given a reasonable opportunity to

provide adequate details of the complaint. A complainant must provide any further details within

15 business days of the request for further details.

34.Where an account of facts given by a complainant differs from an account given by the

magistrate concerned, the Chairman of the Advisory Committee or the Advisory Committee must

consider any source of independent evidence which exists and which may help to verify the facts

in dispute before it dismisses the complaint, unless to do so would be disproportionate in all the

circumstances.

35. Where the Chairman of the Advisory Committee or the Advisory Committee dismisses a

complaint under rule 32, they must inform—

(a) the complainant of the dismissal and the reasons for it; and

(b) if they are aware of the complaint, the magistrate concerned.

Referral to a conduct panel

36. The Chairman of the Advisory Committee or the Advisory Committee may refer a complaint

to a conduct panel where—

(a) the magistrate concerned accepts the misconduct alleged; or

(b) the Chairman of the Advisory Committee or the Advisory Committee consider that it is

appropriate to investigate the complaint further.

37. Where a complaint has been referred to a conduct panel it must be dealt with in accordance

with Part 4 of these Rules.

Procedure to be followed before a referral is made to a conduct panel

38. Before a referral can be made to a conduct panel, the Chairman of the Advisory Committee

or the Advisory Committee must—

(a) provide the magistrate concerned with—

(i) details of the complaint;

(ii) any supporting documents; and

(iii) any information obtained by the Chairman of the Advisory Committee or the

Advisory Committee when considering the complaint under this Part of the Rules;

(b) invite the magistrate concerned to comment upon the complaint within 20 business days

of the invitation to do so; and

39. The Chairman of the Advisory Committee or the Advisory Committee can continue to refer

the complaint to the conduct panel only if—

(a) the magistrate concerned has provided comments within the time provided; or

(b) the time has elapsed for providing comments and the magistrate concerned has not

responded.

40. The Chairman of the Advisory Committee or the Advisory Committee must provide to the

Bench Chairman a copy of the invitation made under rule 38(b) seeking comments from the

magistrate concerned.

Interim suspension

41. Regulation 17 of the Regulations governs the procedure relating to the possible interim

suspension of a Magistrate.

PART 3

Summary Process

Scope

42. This Part applies where the Chairman of the Advisory Committee or the Advisory

Committee has decided under rule 31(c) to deal with a complaint in accordance with the summary

process.

Summary process

43. The Chairman of the Advisory Committee or the Advisory Committee may advise the Lord

Chancellor and the Lord Chief Justice that the magistrate concerned should be removed from

office without further investigation where the magistrate concerned —

(a) has been convicted in the United Kingdom of any criminal offence and has been

sentenced to imprisonment, including a suspended sentence, as defined in section

189(7)(b) of the Criminal Justice Act 2003;

(b) has been convicted elsewhere of any criminal offence which, if committed in any part of

the United Kingdom would constitute a criminal offence, and has been sentenced to

imprisonment, including a suspended sentence;

order);

(d) has been convicted in the United Kingdom of an offence involving dishonesty, deception,

theft or perverting the course of justice;

(e) has been convicted in the United Kingdom of a sexual offence or violent offence;

(f) has been cautioned in relation to a criminal offence falling within sub-paragraphs (d) and

(e)of this paragraph;

(g) is an undischarged bankrupt or a person whose estate has had a sequestration awarded in

respect of it and who has not been discharged;

(h) is the subject of a bankruptcy restrictions order or an interim bankruptcy restrictions order

or an order of like effect made in Scotland or Northern Ireland;

(i) has made a composition or arrangement with, or granted a trust deed for, creditors and not

been discharged in respect of it;

(j) is subject to—

(i) a disqualification order or disqualification undertaking under the Company Directors

Disqualification Act 1986;

(ii) a disqualification order or disqualification undertaking under the Company Directors

Disqualification (Northern Ireland) Order 2002; or

(iii) an order made under section 429(2) of the Insolvency Act 1986 (disabilities on

revocation or administration order against an individual);

(k) has failed to disclose information concerning their suitability to hold judicial office to—

(i) an Advisory Committee; or

(ii) the person who made their appointment,

which they knew about before their appointment as a magistrate;

(l) has at any time been subject to any investigation or proceedings concerning their fitness

to practise by any licensing body, the final outcome of which was—

(i) the suspension of the magistrate concerned from a register held by the licensing

body, and that suspension has not been terminated,

(ii) the erasure of the name of the magistrate concerned from a register held by the

licensing body,

(iii) a decision that had the effect of preventing the magistrate concerned from practising

the profession licensed or regulated by the licensing body, or

(iv) a decision that had the effect of only allowing the magistrate concerned to practise

that profession subject to conditions, and those conditions have not been lifted;

(m) has been removed from another judicial office in accordance with prescribed procedures;

(n) has failed to comply without reasonable excuse with any sitting requirement specified by

the Lord Chancellor;

(o) is subject to any form of restriction or restraint in bringing proceedings before a court or a

tribunal in any part of the United Kingdom.

Procedure

44. Before advice may be given under rule 43, the Chairman of the Advisory Committee or the

Advisory Committee must give the magistrate concerned an opportunity to make representations

as to—

(a) whether the alleged ground took place; and

(b) if so, why they should not be removed from their office.

45. The magistrate concerned must provide the representations referred to in rule 44 within 15

business days of the request for them.

46. The Chairman of the Advisory Committee or the Advisory Committee can continue to

provide advice under rule 43 only if—

(a) the magistrate concerned has provided representations within the time allowed; or

(b) the time allowed for providing representations has elapsed and the magistrate concerned

has not provided any representations.

Report

47. The Chairman of the Advisory Committee or the Advisory Committee must prepare a report

if they intend to advise the Lord Chancellor and the Lord Chief Justice under rule 43.

48. The report must state—

(a) that one or more of the grounds in rule 43 applies and why; and

(b) any representations provided by the magistrate concerned under rule 45.

Reporting procedure

49. Rule 50 applies where a report is prepared by a member of the Advisory Committee who has

been designated by the Chairman of an Advisory Committee under rule 5.

50. The designated member of the Advisory Committee must submit a draft of their report to the

Chairman of the Advisory Committee. The Chairman of the Advisory Committee must consider

whether to change the report and communicate any changes to the designated member. The

designated member must accept those changes and produce a final report.

51.The Chairman of the Advisory Committee or the Advisory Committee must provide the

report to—

(a) the Lord Chancellor and the Lord Chief Justice;

(b) the magistrate concerned.

PART 4

Conduct Panel

Scope

52. This Part applies where—

(a) the Chairman of an Advisory Committee or an Advisory Committee refers a complaint to

a conduct panel under rule 36; or

(b) the Ombudsman refers a case to a conduct panel under section 111(7)(b) of the Act.

Composition of a conduct panel

53. An Advisory Committee conduct panel must be comprised of three members drawn from the

Advisory Committee or another Advisory Committee. If this is not possible members may be

drawn from a Sub-Committee of the Advisory Committee.

The role of the Advisory Committee Secretary

54. The Advisory Committee Secretary (or a nominee) will normally provide administrative

support to a conduct panel. The Advisory Committee Secretary may not be a member of the panel

and, whilst they may advise the panel on the application of these Rules and on the principles of

natural justice, the Advisory Committee Secretary may not take part in a panel’s deliberations on

the merits of the case. The panel must retain a note of any advice which the Secretary has

provided.

55. The Advisory Committee Secretary may assist with the drafting of any report, reasons and

recommendations.

56. The Advisory Committee Secretary must keep the complainant and the Bench Chairman

notified of the progress of the complaint. In particular, the Advisory Committee Secretary must

inform the complainant and the Bench Chairman of decisions made in relation to a complaint as

they occur, and in any event, provide updates at regular intervals.

57. The Advisory Committee Secretary must write to the magistrate concerned on behalf of the

Chairman of the Advisory Committee inviting the magistrate concerned to attend a conduct

hearing. The letter must:

(a) set out all of the issues under consideration;

(b) inform the magistrate concerned of their right to be accompanied at the hearing;

conduct matters which may be taken into account by the conduct panel if the complaint is

substantiated;

(d) where the conduct panel is investigating the complaint further—

(i) ask for details of any third party whom the magistrate concerned wishes to provide

evidence on their behalf; and

(ii) invite the magistrate concerned to submit statements from anyone able to provide

evidence on their behalf; and

(e) where the magistrate concerned accepts the misconduct alleged—

(i) advise the magistrate concerned that a conduct panel will be convened to make

recommendations to the Lord Chancellor and the Lord Chief Justice on the admitted

facts of the complaint; and

(ii) inform the magistrate concerned of their right to make written or oral representations

to the panel before they make their recommendations.

Procedure

58. The conduct panel may—

(a) make such inquiries that it considers are appropriate to fulfil its functions;

(b) request any documents which appear to be relevant to the complaint.

59. But any records on the files of the magistrate concerned must not be shown to the conduct

panel unless the panel decide that the complaint is substantiated.

60. Unless rule 61 applies, a conduct panel must take oral evidence from the magistrate

concerned. The hearing must be conducted in accordance with rules 67 to 78.

61. Where the magistrate concerned fails, without good reason, either to agree a hearing date or

to attend a conduct panel hearing which has been arranged, the conduct panel must consider the

case on the papers along with any evidence provided under rule 76.

62. A record must be made of the conduct panel’s reasons for proceeding in the absence of the

magistrate concerned.

63. A conduct panel may take evidence, including oral evidence, from any other person.

64. Any evidence obtained under rule 63 must be disclosed to the magistrate concerned. A

hearing under rules 67 to 78 may only proceed where the magistrate concerned has been given a

reasonable opportunity to consider such evidence.

65. If the magistrate concerned requires more time to consider evidence disclosed to them under

rule 66 before a hearing then the hearing must be adjourned.

66. The panel must consider, in consultation with the Bench Chairman and the Justices’ Clerk,

whether it is appropriate for the magistrate concerned to abstain from duties where they have

failed to provide written comments, agree a hearing date or attend a conduct hearing.

Hearings

67. Each member of the conduct panel must be in possession of a copy of the complaint, the

response (if any) from the magistrate concerned and any other written evidence.

68. Subject to rule 76, the conduct panel must not have seen, heard or be in possession of

evidence that has not been disclosed to the magistrate concerned.

69. The Advisory Committee Secretary must arrange for a full and accurate note of the

proceedings to be taken.

70. The substantive part of the hearing must begin with the magistrate concerned being asked

whether they agree wholly or in part with the facts as set out in the papers.

71. The facts must be checked chronologically, if possible, separating those which are agreed

from those which are disputed, and following up the latter with appropriate questions.

72. The magistrate concerned must be invited to answer any questions raised.

73. Follow up questions may be asked when the magistrate concerned has responded to the

initial questions.

74. Subject to rule 75, any person providing evidence to the panel must attend only for the

purposes of giving evidence and must not be present during any other part of the proceedings.

They may be accompanied, while giving evidence, but unless there are wholly exceptional

circumstances, they must speak for themselves.

75. The magistrate concerned must be given the opportunity to hear any evidence given to the

conduct panel and be invited to comment on that evidence after a person giving such evidence has

finished and in their presence.

76. But where the magistrate concerned has been informed that a witness will be asked to attend

a conduct panel hearing to provide evidence and the magistrate concerned does not attend the

hearing, the conduct panel may hear from that witness in the absence of the magistrate.

77. The conduct panel Chairman may wish to follow-up any issues which require clarification.

78. When this process has finished, the magistrate concerned must be asked if there is anything

in conclusion which they wish to say to the panel.

Conduct panel report

79. The conduct panel must prepare its report setting out:

(a) the details of the complaint;

(b) a summary of the evidence presented;

(d) a full explanation of the panel’s reasoning; and

(e) a clear statement of its recommendations.

80. The conduct panel must complete its report within ten business days of the hearing.

81. If the conduct panel concludes that there has been misconduct—

(a) the Advisory Committee Secretary must put before the conduct panel any relevant

records relating to other conduct matters brought to the magistrate’s attention in the past,

together with any written representations made by the magistrate about the accuracy of

the record; and

(b) the panel must then move on to consider what advice it will offer to the Lord Chancellor

and the Lord Chief Justice on whether disciplinary action should be taken, and if so what.

Reporting procedure

82. Rules 83 to 86 apply where the conduct panel recommends that disciplinary action should be

taken.

83. The conduct panel must send a copy of its report and note of the hearing to the magistrate

concerned and invite the magistrate concerned to make representations upon the report.

84.When sending the report to the magistrate concerned and where the report recommends

removal or suspension from office, the relevant Advisory Committee must ask the magistrate

concerned if they want the matter referred to a disciplinary panel to consider.

85. The magistrate concerned may within 15 business days of receipt of the report—

(a) provide comments on the report to the relevant Advisory Committee;

(b) make representations to the relevant Advisory Committee regarding the need for further

investigation into the matter;

a disciplinary panel to consider the complaint.

86.—(1) The Advisory Committee must inform the Judicial Conduct Investigations Office of

any request from the magistrate concerned to have their matter referred to a disciplinary panel.

(2) The conduct panel must send a copy of the report to the Judicial Conduct Investigations

Office and to the Chairman of the Advisory Committee together with a copy of—

(a) the complaint;

(b) the representations (if any) from the magistrate concerned;

(d) a full and accurate note of the hearing.

87. The Bench Chairman, the Justices’ Clerk and the complainant must be informed that the

panel’s report has been sent to the Judicial Conduct Investigations Office.

88. Where the conduct panel decides to dismiss a complaint, the conduct panel must send a draft

of its report to the Chairman of the Advisory Committee together with—

(a) the complaint;

(b) any other written evidence considered by the panel; and

89. If the Chairman of the Advisory Committee makes a proposal that the conduct panel’s report

should be changed, the conduct panel must consider whether or not to change it to give effect to

that proposal.

90. If the Chairman of the Advisory Committee agrees that the complaint should be dismissed,

the conduct panel must—

(a) inform the Bench Chairman of its decision;

(b) send a copy of its report to the magistrate concerned; and

91. If the complaint raises any pastoral or training issues, the conduct panel must always

consider whether to refer those issues to the Bench Chairman and/or the Chairman of the TDC as

appropriate.

92. When considering whether a complaint raises pastoral or training issues, the conduct panel

may seek advice from the Judicial College.

93. The Justices’ Clerk must be consulted and kept informed of any referral under rule 91.

94. Any correspondence with the Bench Chairman or the TDC Chairman must be copied to the

magistrate concerned.

PART 5

The role of the Judicial Conduct Investigations Office

Scope

95. This Part applies where a conduct panel has sent its report to the Judicial Conduct

Investigations Office in accordance with rule 86.

The role of the Judicial Conduct Investigations Office

96. On receipt of the report from the conduct panel the Judicial Conduct Investigations Office

must examine the papers to ensure that—

(a) all the information necessary for the Lord Chancellor and the Lord Chief Justice to make

a decision has been obtained; and

(b) the procedure set out in these Rules and in the Regulations has been followed.

97. Where procedures have not been followed, the Judicial Conduct Investigations Office may

remit the case back to the Advisory Committee Secretary with advice as to further action.

Referral to an investigating judge

98. Where the Judicial Conduct Investigations Office considers that a complaint is sufficiently

serious or complex, or that a more detailed investigation is required to establish the facts of a

complaint, the Judicial Conduct Investigations Office may request that a complaint is referred to

an investigating judge to investigate in accordance with Part 6.

99. A request under rule 98 must be considered by a nominated judge.

100. If a nominated judge agrees to the request, then the complaint must be referred to an

investigating judge to consider in accordance with Part 6.

101. If a nominated judge disagrees with the request, then the Judicial Conduct Investigations

Office must—

(a) refer the case back to the Advisory Committee Secretary in accordance with rule 97;

(b) refer the case to a disciplinary panel in accordance with rules 103 to 105; or

accordance with rule 106.

102. Where a complaint is referred to an investigating judge, the Judicial Conduct Investigations

Office must—

(a) inform the magistrate concerned and the complainant that the complaint has been referred

to an investigating judge;

(b) provide the report of the conduct panel together with any representations received from

the magistrate concerned under rule 85 to the investigating judge.

Referral to a disciplinary panel

103.Where the magistrate has requested that their case be referred to a disciplinary panel to,

consider, the Judicial Conduct Investigations Office must—

(a) refer the complaint to a disciplinary panel to consider in accordance with Part 7 of these

Rules;

(b) send the report of the conduct panel to the disciplinary panel together with any

representations received from the magistrate concerned under rule 85; and

to a disciplinary panel.

Referral to the Lord Chancellor and the Lord Chief Justice

104. Where the circumstances in rule 105 apply, the Judicial Conduct Investigations Office must

send the conduct panel report and any representations received from the magistrate concerned

under rule 86 to the Lord Chancellor and the Lord Chief Justice.

105. The circumstances referred to in rule 104 are—

(a) where—

(i) the report of the conduct panel recommends that some disciplinary action, other than

removal or suspension, should be taken; or

(ii) the report of the conduct panel recommends that the magistrate concerned should be

removed or suspended from office and the magistrate concerned has not confirmed

that they want a disciplinary panel to consider the complaint under rule 103; and

(b) no referral has been made to an investigating judge under rule 100.

PART 6

Judicial Investigation

Scope

106. This Part applies where a referral is made to an investigating judge—

(a) by the Judicial Conduct Investigations Office under rule 100; or

(b) by the Lord Chief Justice and Lord Chancellor under regulation 13 of the Regulations; or

Nomination of investigating judge

107. The investigating judge must be nominated in accordance with regulation 10 of the

Regulations.

Investigation by an investigating judge

108. The investigating judge must—

(a) determine the facts of a case;

(b) determine whether in the facts amount to misconduct; and

109. Any question as to whether a fact is established must be decided on the balance of

probabilities.

110. The investigating judge must—

(a) decide how to conduct the investigation;

(b) notify the magistrate concerned and any complainant of the proposals for the conduct of

the investigation, and whether oral evidence will be taken;

procedure adopted; and

(d) record any representations on the proposals that are received.

111. The investigating judge may invite the complainant or any person who may be able to

assist the investigation to give evidence about the case.

112. Any evidence or representations from the complainant, the magistrate concerned or any

other person must be provided to the investigating judge within ten business days of an invitation

under rules 110(c) or 111.

113. The investigating judge may take oral evidence if it is considered necessary to do so.

114. The investigating judge must disclose any evidence obtained under rule 111 to the

magistrate concerned and must invite the magistrate concerned to make representations about the

evidence.

115. The magistrate concerned must make any representations under rule 114 within ten

business days of the invitation under that rule.

Report of investigating judge

116. The investigating judge may decide the form of their report.

117. The investigating judge must disclose a draft of their report to the magistrate concerned and

invite the magistrate concerned to comment on it. The comments may include proposals for

changes to the report.

118. The investigating judge may show a draft of their report to any other person, and invite

them to comment upon it.

119. Disclosure of the draft report under rule 118—

(a) may be of the whole or part,

(b) may be in the form of a summary, and

Act (confidentiality).

120. Any comments must be provided to the investigating judge within ten business days of

disclosure of the draft report under rules 117 and 118.

121. After considering any comments received in accordance with rules 117 and 118 the

investigating judge must—

(a) complete their report and submit it to the Lord Chancellor and the Lord Chief Justice with

details of any requested changes which the investigating judge has not made.

(b) send a copy of their report to the magistrate concerned; and

invited to comment upon it, but omitting any material the disclosure of which is

prohibited under section 139 of the Act (confidentiality).

PART 7

Disciplinary panel

Scope

122. This Part applies where—

(a) the Judicial Conduct Investigations Office refers a complaint to a disciplinary panel under

rule 103;

(b) the Lord Chancellor and Lord Chief Justice have referred a complaint to a disciplinary

panel under regulation 13 of the Regulations;

111(7)(b) of the Act; or

(d) a referral is made under rule 140(b)(ii).

Disciplinary panel

123. The disciplinary panel must be convened in accordance with regulation 11 of the

Regulations.

Functions of a disciplinary panel

124. A disciplinary panel may consider and review—

(a) any findings of fact;

(b) any finding as to the conduct of the magistrate concerned; and

125. Where a disciplinary panel reviews any findings of fact under rule 124(a), any question as

to whether that fact is established must be decided on the balance of probabilities.

126. Where a conduct panel has recommended that the magistrate concerned should be removed

or suspended from their office, the disciplinary panel must advise the Lord Chancellor and the

Lord Chief Justice whether removal or suspension is justified.

Procedure of disciplinary panel

127. The disciplinary panel may—

(a) make such inquiries as it considers are appropriate to fulfil its functions;

(b) request any documents which appear to be relevant to the complaint.

128. A disciplinary panel must take oral evidence from the magistrate concerned unless it

considers it unnecessary to do so.

129. A disciplinary panel may take evidence, including oral evidence, from any other person.

Report and recommendation

130. The disciplinary panel must prepare a report that sets out—

(a) the facts of the case;

(b) whether in its opinion there has been any misconduct; and

Report procedure

131. The disciplinary panel must send its draft report to the magistrate concerned.

132. The disciplinary panel may disclose its draft report to the complainant and any other person

who may be affected by its contents.

133. Disclosure of the report under rule 132—

(a) may be of the whole or part;

(b) may be in the form of a summary;

Act (confidentiality).

134. The disciplinary panel must invite each person to whom it discloses its report to comment

on it.

135. Any comments on the report must be made within ten business days of the day on which

the report is sent out for comment.

136. In finalising its report the disciplinary panel—

(a) must have regard to any comments received under rule 134;

(b) must include those comments with its report.

137. The disciplinary panel must send its report to the Lord Chancellor and the Lord Chief

Justice.

PART 8

Miscellaneous

Re-opening a case that has been dismissed

138. Exceptionally, a Chairman of an Advisory Committee may re-open a complaint that has

been dismissed where they receive new information concerning that complaint.

139. For these purposes, new information means information which—

(a) relates to judicial misconduct;

(b) is cogent and credible;

(d) is sufficiently serious to justify re-opening a complaint.

140. If a Chairman of an Advisory Committee decides to re-open a complaint, they may—

(a) consider the complaint in accordance with Part 2;

(b) refer the complaint to—

(i) another Chairman of an Advisory Committee to consider under Part 2; or

(ii) a disciplinary panel to consider in accordance with Part 7; or

judge in accordance with rule 100.

Procedure to be followed when re-opening a case

141. A Chairman of an Advisory Committee may re-open a case of their own volition.

142. A complainant may provide new information to the Chairman of an Advisory Committee.

Consideration of matter in absence of a complaint

143. Where a Chairman of an Advisory Committee receives no complaint but receives

information from any source which suggests to them that taking disciplinary action might be

justified they must consider that information as though it were a complaint and deal with it under

these Rules with the exception that any obligation to be discharged in relation to a complainant

does not apply.

Withdrawal of a complaint

144. A complainant may withdraw their complaint at any time.

145. Where a complaint is withdrawn, it may still be investigated if rule 146 applies.

146. A withdrawn complaint may continue to be investigated where it is being considered by—

(a) a Chairman of an Advisory Committee or the Advisory Committee if the Chairman of an

Advisory Committee or the Advisory Committee considers it appropriate to continue to

investigate the complaint;

(b) a conduct panel under Part 4 of these Rules if the conduct panel considers it appropriate

to continue to investigate the complaint;

appropriate to continue to investigate the complaint; or

(d) a disciplinary panel under Part 7 of these Rules if the disciplinary panel considers it

appropriate to continue to investigate the complaint.

147. Where rule 146 applies, the case is to continue to be considered under these Rules as if the

complaint had not been withdrawn and the complainant must be informed of this decision by the

Chairman of the Advisory Committee, the Advisory Committee, the investigating judge or the

disciplinary panel as the case may be.

Deferral of consideration of a case

148. A Chairman of an Advisory Committee or an Advisory Committee may defer consideration

of a case where there is good reason to do so.

149. Where consideration of a complaint is deferred, the Chairman of the Advisory Committee

or the Advisory Committee must inform the complainant and, if they are aware of the complaint,

the magistrate concerned.

Transitional provision

150. These Rules apply to any complaint made before these Rules come into force which has not

been withdrawn, dismissed or determined.

Tuesday, 19 August 2025

IS JUSTICE STILL JUSTICE WITHOUT JURIES?

The jury system is often hailed as the crown jewel of English justice. Twelve people plucked from the electoral roll entrusted with liberty and guilt. It sounds noble. But step back and ask: are juries the only way to reach fair decisions? Sections 44 to 50 of Part 7 of the Criminal Justice Act (CJA 2003) provide for non-jury trial in cases where there is danger of jury tampering or where jury tampering has taken place. This allows the prosecution to apply for the trial to be conducted without a jury and for a jury to be discharged during the course of the trial. The vast majority of civil cases in England and Wales are heard by a judge alone without a jury. Juries are only used in a few specific civil cases most notably libel and slander trials. The current proposals for a new intermediate criminal court where a District Judge[MC] will preside flanked by two magistrates have drawn fiery antagonistic outbursts from many lawyers. Their underlying reasoning such as it is asserts that only jury trials can deliver fair unbiased verdicts based on the evidence presented during the trial. Recent jury decisions have raised questions as to whether such unaccountable jury decisions have been based on matters not presented in court as evidence.

There is a very strong case for immediate intimate research into how jury decision making is conducted. Judges sitting alone make decisions every day that withstand appeal far better than jury verdicts. Why? Because judges are trained in the law, experienced in sifting evidence and guided by legal principle rather than emotion. Appeal courts overturn far fewer judge only decisions than jury ones. That should give us pause.

Think of a complex fraud trial or a negligence case laden with technical jargon. A lay jury, however conscientious, is swimming against the tide. A judge trained in handling complexity is not. Jurors, despite instructions, may be swayed by media coverage, personal prejudices or sympathy for one party. And if and when it comes to reviewing those decisions later the appeal court can see exactly the reasoning applied by judges in their public pronouncements. Juries are under strict instructions of silence post trial. Perverse verdicts are somehow seen as the epitome of English justice but are only lawful when argued by a litigate in person: it is against Bar Standards Board rules for such a position to be argued by a barrister.

Bias is another uncomfortable truth. Jurors bring with them the baggage of everyday life: prejudices, sympathies, the latest newspaper headline. Judges aren’t saints but they are bound by professional standards and their decisions are accountable. And there is the question of efficiency. Jury trials take longer, cost more and clog the courts. Bench trials do not. In an era of ballooning backlogs efficiency matters.

So while juries carry symbolism and democratic value let’s not fool ourselves. Justice can be and often is delivered without them; sometimes better, sometimes faster and often more fairly.

Tuesday, 12 August 2025

MAGISTRATES` £££ - V - District Judges` ££££

I suppose that there are three prime functions of a modern government; protection of the realm and its citizens, the provision of a justice system and an effective finance system including the efficient use of citizens` taxes to provide for the common good. Of these requirements the last is usually uppermost in the minds of most people. To that end all governments manipulate what they tell us and what they try to keep from prying eyes.

The justice system of late has had more column inches than perhaps is usual with the headlines on costs of immigration and prisons colliding in the corridors of the Treasury. One definite result of the government`s hoped for improved efficiency is the establishment of a new tier of court between magistrates and the crown court in which a District Judge[MC] would sit with two magistrates. Unlike judges in crown court District Judges [MC] sit with a legal advisor as is the case when a lay bench is sitting. I have often wondered why such additional help is needed for a legally qualified judge such help being anticipated to apply at the new court. HMCTS is unable (unwilling?) to provide the costs of legal advisors assisting magistrates. I wonder whether the district judges collectively have been approached as to whether they would negotiate for higher salaries on sitting without the advisor and if any savings would result in their so doing cf the current position especially when so many lawyers would gladly have the full time judiciary sit in place of lay magistrates.

There was a report in 2000 (Morgan & Russell) where comparison was made between costs of a DJ court and a magistrates` presided court. References suggest £52.10 per hour for lay magistrates vs £61.90 per hour for District Judges. The next similar investigation was Ipsos MORI & Ministry of Justice (2011). That study explicitly compared its findings with Morgan & Russell noting differences in methods and sample size and that Morgan & Russell concentrated on fewer courts (Morgan & Russell: 3,047 cases across 10 courts; the 2011 study used 2,276 cases across 44 courts).The conclusion was “Despite the relative speed with which they handle cases the cost model showed that District Judges are typically more costly per case (where key differences are controlled for) than magistrates in terms of the magistrates’ court processing costs. This was mainly due to their salary costs.”

Current estimates for using lay magistrates is (loss of earnings, training, allowances) £26.80 per hour plus an additional estimated volunteer "value" to the broader economy (proxy cost): £10 per magistrate per hour making a total of £56.80 per hour for a bench of three although that unverified figure seems rather low. For District Judges inclusive of salary, training, recruitment, equipment, overheads: £148.32 per hour which after being adjusted to reflect actual sitting days works out at £162.16 per hour.

At current modelled rates even without legal advisors District Judges would cost roughly three times more per hour than a bench of magistrates even when accounting only for magistrates’ direct expenses let alone their “volunteer value.” So removing the legal adviser does not close the cost gap. The salaried nature and associated overheads of District Judges still make them substantially more expensive than lay magistrates although they process cases more quickly.

Legal advisors are paid [according to seniority] £37,683 -£50,192. Add on costs (employer NI + pension + overheads) are roughly an additional 33%. So using a sensible base the costs to the tax payer are around £58,520 per LA per year. The cost per LA per hour might be estimated at £53.00 making the cost per hour of a DJ court £215.00. Over a standard 5.5-hour sitting day that’s about £290 per day extra. The cost of the DJ + LA can be estimated at £1,183 daily and £892 sitting alone.

Using same methods and calculations the cost of three magistrates sitting with a LA are 109.80 per hour and £603.90 per day.

Even with a legal adviser a magistrates bench is cheaper than a District Judge; roughly half the cost if you count only direct expenses and still about two thirds the cost if you include volunteer value

So it seems that the legal profession looks likely to have to tolerate lay magistrates for some considerable time because where the MOJ is concerned ££££ are more important than any other consideration.

Tuesday, 5 August 2025

JURY TRIAL: HERE TODAY GONE TOMORROW?

There is disquiet in the legal fraternity, to say the least, over the proposals to allow some previous either way offences to be tried by a bench of lay magistrates in addition to the continual alternative of a single district judge [MC]. There has been an underlying antipathy between the professional lawyers and the "amateurs" for generations. Perhaps that is due to the appointment of Justices of the Peace having been based on local power plays and political leverage. Despite lawyers and their organisations lobbying for fewer lay magistrates and more district judges The Justice of the Peace Act 1949 reaffirmed the role of lay magistrates.

The current concern is that lay magistrates are just not capable, in the eyes of lawyers, of being able to interpret complex statutes and can be biased against working class defendants although that latter criticism has been reduced by the efforts of the Ministry of Justice to follow rules on Diversity Equity and Inclusion on selections. The possibility of rogue sentencing by lay magistrates has been all but eliminated by the setting up of Sentencing Guidelines in 2010. Perhaps the fact that the costs of magistrates expenses are less than the costs of paying a sufficient number of district judges is a deciding factor for a government having pawned so much of the family silver. However it has been mooted that if district judges sat without a legal advisor, a requirement for a lay bench, the balance of cost might be tipped the other way. There is of course another reason why criminal lawyers are frothing at the mouth and that is because legal aid fees, frugal as they are, are less for appearing at the lower court than for an equivalent case at the crown court.

Magistrates' Court:

Preparation: £52.15 per hour.

Advocacy: £65.42 per hour.

Attendance with Counsel: £35.68 per hour.

Travel and Waiting: £27.60 per hour (only for undesignated areas).

Crown Court:

Representation: £60-£70 per hour, according to Legal Action Group.

Fees can vary significantly based on case complexity and the work required .

Fixed fees may apply for certain types of cases or hearings . For example, a one-day summary trial in the Magistrates' Court might be around £1200-£5000 plus VAT.

Generally speaking the mooted court changes will reduce lawyers` incomes and as with most professionals such change will be a driving force to other considerations.

When it comes to the first level civil courts single district judges[CC] have long held sway without complaint from the legal professions. Their argument or non argument stems from the fact that the standard of proof required in the criminal court is beyond reasonable doubt but in the civil court the balance of probabilities is the requirement. The civil court offers financial not custodial penalties and the disputes are private and rarely of public interest.

I suppose the argument put forward by lawyers against an increasing use of lay magistrates is their lack of legal training but that surely is the essence of their existence: they are appointed as communal representatives (although that could be questioned) and supposedly are vetted as to their ability to follow sometimes complex legal argument assisted by the legal advisor. And that is where I must offer my opinion that from my experience not all magistrates have that ability. The selection process is far too orientated to D, E, I, as noted previously, to the exclusion of perhaps perspicacious and analytical qualities.

The position is that lawyers support jury trials in criminal cases but accept judge only civil trials insofar as in the former a person`s liberty can be at stake but a financial penalty in the latter. Criminal law involves the power of the state and serious consequences whilst jury trial is seen as a constitutional safeguard against abuse or bias. However this current constitutional bulwark is under stress re the action and reaction to the proscription of Palestine Action and perverse verdicts. [this blog July 1st 2025] A further argument to support an apparent contradiction in attitudes towards single judge trials is that civil cases often involve technical or commercial complexity to which judges bring consistency, speed and legal accuracy whilst jury trials involve rights and liberty.

There is no doubt that although there are millions of words commenting on the whys and the wherefores of trial by jury sooner or later this government or the next must produce research on the whole process; eg magistrates courts decisions must be explained in public whatever the outcome. Is it not now the time for a jury, perhaps with legal assistance, to explain its conclusions? Is a 12 person jury with the occasional 10-2 majority the most suitable number of jurors? Why not 7 jurors? Should a legal advisor be available to a jury? Should non UK citizens be excluded from juries? Should mandatory English language proficiency be introduced? Should defendants be assured that jurors uphold English law as opposed to any religious affiliations which might be contradictory? Could AI give reliable or more reliable verdicts that could be a basis for jury discussion? Those and other questions must surely be centre stage in the light of a society undergoing fundamental changes as is British society.

Tuesday, 29 July 2025

STRAIGHT FROM THE HORSE`S MOUTH: THE IMBECILITY OF IT

Commenting on cases at the Appeal Court is generally for those above the pay grade of a magistrate especially one who`s retired but sometimes there are cases which demand a flicker of interest either for the matter in principle under appeal or as a subject which might eventually trickle down the legislative slope to affect everyone.

I have commented not infrequently that it is only when they are retired that very senior members of the judiciary occasionally give their opinions on subjects which by their very nature are of concern to many. One major difference between the British legal system from that of the Americans is that in their pursuit of democratic reforms during the Jacksonian era 1829 to 1837 the English tradition of appointment by state governors of judges was under pressure insofar as it was considered a non democratic process retained from the colonial period. In 1846 New York State was the first to elect its judges when its constitution was changed. By the time of the civil war most states had elections for judges. Reformers believed that appointed judges were too closely tied to political elites and lacked accountability. After 1865 the principle of electing officials in many posts was firmly established.

And where are we in England? Last week to little fanfare a historic decision was made in the Court of Appeal that the secretive way judges are appointed via an ‘old boys' network could be at an end. Commenting on the outcome Stuart Fegan, GMB union national officer, said: “This is an incredibly important ruling and a victory against the old boys’ network that’s dominated our judiciary for too long. Although the Court did not quash the JAC’s decision in Judge Thomas’s specific case – largely due to insufficient information and late disclosure – she can feel truly vindicated."

The justice system in this country moves at a rate that would make the erosion of glaciers seem hypersonic in comparison. The "we know best" attitude that underlines so much of the way this country is run has not been a glowing success if recent and current statistics on so many aspects of our society are meaningful.

Housing or the lack thereof must be one of the major blights on the way fundamental requirements of UK government`s overseeing of our lives is failing so many millions. In the UK during 2024 England recorded approximately 164,000 dependent children living in temporary accommodation at the end of the quarter July–September 2024; the highest level since records began according to publications.parliament.uk

By the end of December 2024 that figure rose slightly to 165,500 dependent children living in temporary accommodation in England representing a 13.7% increase compared to December 2023. The future of these children is almost certainly one in which they will be hard pressed to reach their full potential. And yet the supply of rented accommodation has for decades between a tug of war between government and local authorities and landlords: standards being the concern of the former and return on capital for the latter. Government action is to increase regulation and reduce financial incentives for landlords the whole process more like two kids on a seesaw than an honest realistic non party political way of offering security and permanence for those who need it most. Licensing of rental properties has become like a tennis ball at Wimbledon with proposals tabled and rejected as is the case in Luton.

Official secrecy has been an integral part of the manner of British parliamentary and legal practice for centuries. Whilst there can be no such thing as truly open government light must be shone upon the more obscure or remote of many activities currently in the shadows behind closed doors. The recent revelation of a super injunction re Afghans requesting emergency evacuation to this country is a fine example. The Watergate burglary in Washington DC on 17 June 1972 gave a new term worldwide for government cover up of a scandal. Just think of how many such events have been revealed in Britain this century from Hillsborough, tainted blood scandal, post office scandal, myriad medical scandals, cash for honours, MPs` expenses, Iraq War Dossier / "Dodgy Dossier", Windrush scandal, Cambridge Analytica, COVID-19 PPE Contracts / "VIP Lane", Partygate to name but some of the most infamous.

The election of Police and Crime Commissioners has been anything but a success and no doubt is in the minds of Whitehall flunkeys when any suggestion of more open and/or elected officialdom is mooted. Perhaps the British of 2025 are not the irascible citizens of a bygone era. Perhaps it was that irascibility that was a counterweight to the unknown few who were running the country. Tony Blair has confessed that with regard to the Freedom of Information Act, "You idiot. You naive, foolish, irresponsible nincompoop. There is really no description of stupidity, no matter how vivid, that is adequate. "I quake at the imbecility of it".

One might conclude that the above, straight from the horse`s mouth or lack of it sums up this entire post.

Thursday, 24 July 2025

MORE MOJ NUMBERS FOR THE NUMBER CRUNCHER

The Ministry of Justice just loves its statistics. Perhaps it`s akin to parents who think that they`ve given everything possible to ensure a child`s well being except that vital commodity love. Click on item 13 here and judge [no pun intended] for yourself on statistics for magistrates.

The full release of similar information is available here.

Tuesday, 22 July 2025

THE FUTURE IS TOMORROW

"It was the best of times, it was the worst of times, it was the age of wisdom, it was the age of foolishness, it was the epoch of belief, it was the epoch of incredulity, it was the season of Light, it was the season of Darkness, it was the spring of hope, it was the winter of despair, we had everything before us, we had nothing before us, we were all going direct to Heaven, we were all going direct the other way..."

One of the most recognisable opening paragraphs of a novel ever written; it is of course a Tale of Two Cities by Charles Dickens 1859. That year also saw the publication of what could be argued was the most influential and far seeing theory of all time vying with Einstein`s Theory of Relativity; On the Origin of Species by Means of Natural Selection, or the Preservation of Favoured Races in the Struggle for Life by Charles Darwin. It sold out in a matter of days. Both publications developed the idea of time both absolute and relative and are instrumental to this day in how we view the natural world.

Perhaps in his novel it could be described as Dickens looking back and forward simultaneously from a tumultuous period still within the memory of many of his readers to an England approaching its zenith as an empire builder. With significant imminent changes to our system of lower courts in more than 50 years expected shortly it prompted me to think of how magistrates courts would be operating in the next 50 years.

1. Virtual and Decentralised Courtrooms

Personal appearances by interested parties ie bench, legal advisor, defendant and witnesses would be the exception rather than the rule. Virtual reality systems are currently at a stage where TV was in 1950. By 2075 all immersive systems will be the norm including AI simultaneous translating systems.

2. AI-Powered Legal Processing

Non human sentencing by AI will be the norm with the possibility of appeal to what might still be recognised as today`s bench of a judge and two magistrates.

3. Reform-Focused Justice

Courts will prioritise rehabilitation and social integration over punishment. Possibly with the use of compulsory medical [physical and psychological] intervention. Out of court pathways with a Dickensian Christian pathway updated for a modern workhouse concept will become available for recidivists.

4. Data-Driven Sentencing

Current sentencing guidelines will be as simple arithmetic cf simultaneous equations in 2075. With billions of bits of information it will be the natural extension of 2. above.

5. Magistrates as Legal Navigators

If lay magistrates have not been replaced completely by District Judges [MC] an entirely optimistic position, they will work alongside AI systems to ensure fairness, ethics and social context are considered.

6. Transparency and Public Access

Almost certainly the proceedings at many magistrates courts will be transmitted by live TV or VR to local areas with advertisers paying fees per types of courts eg remand, trial or sentencing with hard copy newspaper reports as outdated as pen and ink. Current court TV is a very basic concept but it has established the principle.

There will be of necessity human hands within or available in the chain of events as per 2. above. A light hand on the tiller for continuous monitoring to ensure decisions are free from algorithmic bias especially with biometric data and personal analytics will monitor events in real time.

Of course all the above might be derailed by man made or natural catastrophe. The generals and politicians involved in British policy at the time of the Boer War of 1899-1902 could never have foreseen the situation in 1939-1945 in their wildest nightmares. Slave trading was abolished in 1807, transportation to Australia was effectively stopped in 1857 and both decisions were considered to be monumental errors by some vested interests. However ever increasing influence of AI in so many aspects of our lives now and in the near future is likely to have similar unexpected repercussions as did the industrial revolution except the time frame will be in decades and not centuries.

When I started school the family had to be put on a waiting list to have a shared party line telephone, trams were the transport for 90% of city journeys, I learned to write with a slate pencil on a slate board, I watched the 1953 coronation on a rich aunt`s 12" television set. On the other hand I played in the street, walked to school from 5 years old with my classmate next door, played in a local park a mile from home at 7 with my younger cousin and ran off when the park keeper thought we were misbehaving, travelled alone when I was 8 on a 300 mile train journey and wanted to be an astrophysicist when I grew up; an ambition foiled when I discovered my maths wasn`t up to the task. Blogging has been around for a quarter of a century and this blog since 2013. I wouldn`t bet the term will still be around in 2075. Like the word charabanc probably unfamiliar to many readers not retired it will probably be out of use long before then.

The future is tomorrow: long might it continue.

Thursday, 17 July 2025

SAME OLD STORY

Tuesday, 15 July 2025

LAY JUSTICES: APPEALING OR APPEALED AGAINST?

I would imagine that most readers are familiar with the system of magistrates courts and have strong opinions on whether the three lay magistrates sitting in judgement provide as good a system of justice as those who preach to us from on high keep telling us. Impending procedural changes are now in sight after a gestation period of twenty years. The anomaly of defendants` right to choose jury trial in “either way” matters is likely to be removed in what will be the most contentious of these changes to be replaced by a bench chaired by a District Judge [MC] sitting with two lay magistrates. Whether justice will be better served will be a moot point for at least a decade until there is a sufficiency of statistics for those in Petty France to produce conclusions. Until then all we have is a study of appeals on verdict and/or sentence from the lower court to the crown court.

A Commons committee in 2021 reported magistrates have a very low appeal rate of ~0.7% with half of those appeals dismissed or abandoned. Historically there are about 14,000 appeals per year with approximately 2,000 successful convict appeals and 3,000 sentence variations meaning a success rate of ~39% overall. There’s no comprehensive public data directly comparing overturn rates per bench of magistrates vs. DJ since appeals challenge the final decision not who made it.

DJs are full-time, legally trained professionals. They sit alone, move swiftly and apply the law with consistency. Their courtroom manner can vary but few would doubt their command of legal process. The lay magistracy brings something different: lived experience, community connection and the expected collective wisdom of three heads thinking better than one. But JPs are not lawyers. They rely on legal advisers to steer them through tricky case law and/or procedure.

It’s widely accepted if not openly said that lay benches are slightly more prone to decisions that don’t survive appeal. It’s not dramatic. It doesn’t suggest incompetence. But the variation that comes with a bench of three non-legally trained volunteers is inevitably greater than with a single judge who’s spent decades in courtrooms.

As written above the total appeal rate from magistrates’ courts is tiny and of those only around 39% result in an overturned conviction or a sentence adjustment. That means the vast majority of decisions stand. The question is will those figures reflecting as they seem to do a standard of justice well done and seen to be well done be repeated with more serious matters likely to be coming in front of a lay bench? Confidence in justice depends on the public believing they’ll be treated fairly no matter who’s on the bench. The legal profession has never been over confident in the lay magistracy. Whether that`s a result of their pecuniary interest insofar as appearing at the crown court commands higher pay rates or that many lawyers think rightly or wrongly that their clients are more likely to be acquitted at crown court is a moot point amongst many such points when discussing our legal system.

During my tenure there was an "appeals folder" in the retiring room where every appeal and its conclusion was listed with the original JPs or DJ named. During the latter half of my time on the bench that folder disappeared never to return. As has become so very apparent in this century the more government conceals or tries to conceal controversial information the more likely there is to be a vulcanic type eruption when more openness might have allowed interested parties to let off steam with reduced pressure.

With so many sections of our country`s infra structure frayed at the edges the forthcoming changes in the justice system in general and the magistrates courts in particular will come under increased scrutiny. It is to be hoped that relevant statistical information will be published so that certainty supersedes suspicion when the trend to minimise the lay magistracy`s jurisdiction to non imprisonable offences, notwithstanding the current recent increase to 12 months custody, is once again reversed as has happened in the recent past.

Wednesday, 9 July 2025

NOT A SOOTHSAYER

Can`t say I disagree with today`s statement above. Some of my projections now are likely to have substance. But one cannot be an accurate forecaster all the time when musing on such matters five years in the future. A soothsayer I am most certainly not.

Tuesday, 8 July 2025

CAN ENGLAND STILL BE ENGLISH WITHOUT TRIAL BY JURY?

The effective classifying of Palestine Action as a terrorist organisation has caused stirring amongst many in the legal profession and been amplified by some unexpected sources. The Times earlier this week had a leader opposing the legislation now applied to PA. Simultaneously the mooted addition to the courts system whereby an intermediate court over which a District Judge [MC] would preside assisted by two magistrates has those same legal eagles in a spin. Trial by jury is considered one of the inalienable rights of being an English person. It ranks with Our NHS as a virtual totem created with wisdom and to be venerated by all. Millions, probably billions, of words on the topic are available for anyone with a functioning keyboard. Is it immutable?

Jury trial is a mainstay of predominantly societies deriving from the British era of colonisation; USA, Canada, Australia etc although some such nations notably India have dispensed with the format. The proscribing of PA has raised an interesting question touched upon here last week when a spokesperson of said group was quoted as saying, "The public is on our side. Remember that being acquitted can happen and we’re seeing it happen now." Last Friday, Huda Ammori, the co-founder of Palestine Action, told a public meeting of more than 1,000 supporters that campaigns of civil disobedience, "will make the ban unenforceable."

In England and Wales peremptory challenges which allow defendants to dismiss a certain number of potential jurors without giving a reason were abolished by the Criminal Justice Act 1988, specifically under section 118.

Now both the prosecution and defence may only challenge a juror "for cause". This means they must provide a specific, valid reason for objecting to a juror’s inclusion, such as:

The juror is personally known to a party or a witness.
The juror has a conflict of interest or bias.
The juror is disqualified, e.g., due to a criminal conviction.

Challenges for cause are rare and are scrutinized by the trial judge who decides whether the juror should be excluded. Although peremptory challenges no longer exist, the judge can still stand jurors by for consideration (effectively sidelining them) in certain cases, particularly if concerns about fairness or impartiality arise. Additionally, the jury vetting process allows for some background checks in limited circumstances (usually national security or high-profile cases), but this is strictly regulated.

At the time of my appointment I had to state on the application which party I had voted for in the previous general election. That requirement was abolished some years later. I suppose in the minds of the "great and the good" who drafted such questions a politically balanced magistracy was an enhancement to the concept of all people being equal under the law. In today`s England the great and the good are more interested in whether you consider yourself white Welsh or brown Indian or perhaps black African. Three incubating disturbing trends which are likely in my opinion to be major factors in our society by 2030 are the disillusionment with the two main political parties, the rise of a minority although vociferous Muslim minority seeking protection for Islam as a religion under the law and a corresponding rise in ouvert antisemitism camouflaged as anti Zionism precipitated by the reaction to the Hamas massacre of October 7th 2023 in Israel such racism having been shown historically to be a prelude to underlying societal breakdown or worse.

How likely or unlikely would it be for the verdicts of controversial trials to be determined on the political bias of jurors as quoted above by PA? It is my opinion that that alone is an argument for dispensing with jury trials at least in such cases as happened in Northern Ireland during the Troubles when Diplock Courts were established. The alternative would be adopting the American system where jurors can be excluded .

As with so much of everything that is British, changes will be made only when the powers that be have been hurtled into a situation either unforeseen or facing problems that have been swept under the carpet for them and the rest of us to forget.

Tuesday, 1 July 2025

PERVERSE ACQUITTALS AND THE WEAPONISATION OF JURIES

One of the great fictions clung to by our legal establishment is the untouchable wisdom of the English jury. Twelve men and women, good and true, convened to determine guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Except of course when they don't. And occasionally, spectacularly so.

From time to time there are assault cases reported where despite video, multiple corroborating witnesses and visible injury or similar evidence, unmoved by the forensic and testimonial parade a jury has returned a majority not guilty verdict. Court reports would mention "sympathy for his circumstances"; he’d lost his job, the victim had a prior caution etc. The facts apparently irrelevant in such cases being secondary to other factors .

We’ve seen it before. Climate activists gluing themselves to roads acquitted despite clear breaches of the law because juries “understand their cause.” For many decades there have been instances where protesters trespassing at military bases have walked free. It’s not the legality being judged but the politics and in some cases perhaps the charisma of the defendant.

These aren’t just quirks; they’re known quantities. Litigants in person can ask juries to ignore the law; barristers can`t. Barristers sometimes count on jury “common sense” to ignore the law when it doesn’t suit. It’s supposedly the unwritten safety valve of our system. The formal word is “jury equity”; the informal reality is selective application of justice.

To be clear, most jurors do their best. But unlike magistrates who are trained, appraised, and generally held to some level of consistency, juries operate as legal mayflies: brief, unaccountable and gone before the consequences have landed.

Perhaps it is time we considered more transparency: not full public disclosures of deliberations; no one wants mob-judged justice but at least a recognition that jury trials are not infallible. A verdict isn't necessarily right simply because it came from twelve people in a room with a foreman and a checklist, an appeal being rejected by the Court of Appeal and has been dismissed by the The Criminal Cases Review Commission.

The problem of course is that criticising juries is something of a taboo. It's a bit like that totem, OUR NHS, our national treasure. If we are to have an honest conversation about justice in 21st century Britain we must be prepared to acknowledge that not all verdicts are wise, just or even comprehensible. To pretend otherwise is to indulge in comforting fiction and fiction has never been much of a foundation for justice.

It takes a certain type of chutzpah to boast about acquittals before a trial has even begun. Yet that is precisely what a member of Palestine Action recently did remarking, "The public is on our side. Remember that being acquitted can happen and we’re seeing it happen now." One might imagine such a statement would raise eyebrows among those concerned with the rule of law. After all, if verdicts are anticipated not on the basis of evidence or law but on the perceived sympathy of a jury what does that say about the state of our justice system? The message is clear enough: The law might say one thing but juries will say another because they like us. In other words conviction or acquittal is not necessarily tethered to legal merit but to public sentiment. That’s not justice; that’s a popularity contest. The courts are not supposed to be arenas for ideology. Yet in recent years certain activist groups, Palestine Action among them, have learned that the courtroom can double as a stage. They’re not just seeking to defend their actions but to put the system on trial. And juries in their secretive deliberations sometimes oblige. Today activist groups are increasingly calculating jury psychology as part of their tactical toolkit. Legal guilt is almost secondary.

There’s a disturbing logic to this: break the law, make the right noise and rely on a jury’s reluctance to punish those who claim moral high ground. The more emotive the issue; war, climate, colonialism the better the odds. It’s not just courtroom drama; it’s calculated legal theatre. Since some suggest that being a barrister is akin to treading the boards we should not be surprised that even some members of the legal profession agree that there are colleagues who are willing participants in this charade. And the consequences are far-reaching. When certain causes are seen to receive jury indulgence public faith in even-handed justice begins to erode: one rule for activists another for everyone else. Ask the man convicted of criminal damage for scratching a neighbour’s car if he had the luxury of moral justification that the hooded trespassing paint sprayer of military jets claims.

Juries are a cornerstone of our criminal justice system. But they are not infallible nor immune to influence. When defendants begin campaigning to jurors, not before the judge, the balance has already shifted.

One might have hoped that those charged with criminal offences would meet their day in court with humility, not hubris. But humility is in short supply when you’ve discovered how to turn the jury system into a political loophole. Consider that open boast above from a Palestine Action member, made with the confidence of someone not fearing justice but anticipating a sympathetic audience. Will we have to follow the Americans in extending the right to exclude would be jurors?

Translation? Break the law, wrap yourself in a fashionable cause, and let the jury do the rest. Legal guilt is negotiable when ideology is your shield.

This isn’t brave resistance; it’s cynical manipulation. It’s trial by politics not trial by evidence. What these defendants are really banking on is not the strength of their case but the predictable failure of jurors to apply the law when feelings get in the way. And they’re not wrong. Recent acquittals of activist vandals some caught red-handed have shown that for certain juries a cause deemed righteous excuses criminal damage. Smash up a weapons factory or spray paint government buildings and if you cry “human rights” loud enough, you might just walk free. The more performative the better. Hence the accusation at the investigative stage against police and CPS of two tier justice.

For those of us who sat for decades on the bench striving for consistency, fairness and fidelity to the law this is not just frustrating. It is corrosive. It mocks the entire foundation of the criminal justice system: that the law applies equally, regardless of politics, passions, or protest signs. Worse still, this selective indulgence sends a message to the public: some offenders are more forgivable than others not because of what they did but because of why they say they did it. That’s not rule of law; it’s rule by narrative.

Let’s be clear: jury trial is a cornerstone of English justice. But when it’s treated as a get-out-of-jail-free card for the ideologically aligned it risks becoming a constitutional liability. If the law bends only for those who shout the loudest we don’t have justice: we have judicial theatre with a pre-approved script.

Perhaps a modernised version of the system witch finders employed for centuries in determining a woman`s guilt or innocence to a charge of practising witchcraft is a sub conscious underlying feature of facts being abandoned: the woman was tied to a stool which was immersed by a wooden beam in a lake or river. After one or several immersions if she survived she was considered guilty and punished and if she drowned her innocence had been established.

It`s increasingly obvious that it`s only after they retire that the most senior judges voice their often critical comments on the legal system. Of course their conversations with government whilst they are active are top secret. I suppose that process succeeds depending on which side of the judicial fence one is standing to view it.

And those of us who actually believe in equal justice? We're expected to sit quietly and clap from the gallery.

No thanks.

Tuesday, 26 August 2025

RULES

Tuesday, 19 August 2025

IS JUSTICE STILL JUSTICE WITHOUT JURIES?

Tuesday, 12 August 2025

MAGISTRATES` £££ - V - District Judges` ££££

Tuesday, 5 August 2025

JURY TRIAL: HERE TODAY GONE TOMORROW?

Tuesday, 29 July 2025

STRAIGHT FROM THE HORSE`S MOUTH: THE IMBECILITY OF IT

Thursday, 24 July 2025

MORE MOJ NUMBERS FOR THE NUMBER CRUNCHER

Tuesday, 22 July 2025

THE FUTURE IS TOMORROW

Thursday, 17 July 2025

SAME OLD STORY

Tuesday, 15 July 2025

LAY JUSTICES: APPEALING OR APPEALED AGAINST?

Wednesday, 9 July 2025

NOT A SOOTHSAYER

Tuesday, 8 July 2025

CAN ENGLAND STILL BE ENGLISH WITHOUT TRIAL BY JURY?

Tuesday, 1 July 2025

PERVERSE ACQUITTALS AND THE WEAPONISATION OF JURIES

Monday, 30 June 2025

AND SO IT CONTINUES

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