When
sitting with colleagues recently appointed I occasionally reminded them that we
had a duty of public protection ensconced within the formulaic information
overload that they were doing their best to absorb. It was a
function that was rarely if ever mentioned in any training course and one with
which most new colleagues could immediately feel comfortable as they
were faced for the first or second occasion when the custody threshold had been
breached. For many the realisation that their decision meant that a fellow
citizen`s liberty was being taken from them was a
sobering moment. Such decisions and the structured
approach employed to achieve them were perhaps most significant when it came to
deciding if a custodial sentence could or should be
suspended. The pressures on so doing were and are
enormous. At all levels from Secretaries of State to L/As via PSRs
and trainers, the lower courts in particular are being “asked”
to employ some form of rehabilitative requirement and to eschew
immediate custody.
There is,
arguably, a common perception…..misconception?.......that those who commit
serious criminal offences are sentenced too leniently. In real
terms such comments are often related to offenders whose custodial sentence is
suspended. Custody suspended is a disposal only when the custody
threshold has been breached i.e. the offence is so serious that only custody is
appropriate and that it is inappropriate to impose a stand alone community
order or fine or any other non custodial sentence. The obvious effect of
such a sentence is that it might act as a deterrent against future offending
within the period of suspension because the default position in that event
would be immediate activation of all or part of the sentence. I
have copied below the relevant section of the original guidance on breaches of
a suspended sentence.
C. Breaches 2.2.15 The essence of a suspended sentence is to
make it abundantly clear to an offender that failure to comply with the
requirements of the order or commission of another offence will almost
certainly result in a custodial sentence. Where an offender has breached any of
the requirements without reasonable excuse for the first time, the responsible
officer must either give a warning or initiate breach proceedings.31 Where
there is a further breach within a twelve-month period, breach proceedings must
be initiated.32
2.2.16 Where proceedings are brought the court has several options, including
extending the operational period. However, the presumption (which also applies
where breach is by virtue of the commission of a further offence) is that the
suspended prison sentence will be activated (either with its original custodial
term or a lesser term) unless the court takes the view that this would, in all
the circumstances, be unjust. In reaching that decision, the court may take
into account both the extent to which the offender has complied with the
requirements and the facts of the new offence.33
2.2.17 Where a court considers that the sentence needs to be activated, it may
activate it in full or with a reduced term. Again, the extent to which the
requirements have been complied with will be very relevant to this decision.
2.2.18 If a court amends the order rather than activating the suspended prison
sentence, it must either make the requirements more onerous, or extend the
supervision or operational periods (provided that these remain within the
limits defined by the Act).34 In such cases, the court must state its reasons
for not activating the prison sentence,35 which could include the extent to
which the offender has complied with requirements or the facts of the
subsequent offence.
2.2.19 If an offender near the end of an operational period (having complied
with the requirements imposed) commits another offence, it may be more
appropriate to amend the order rather than activate it.
2.2.20 If a new offence committed is of a less serious nature than the offence
for which the suspended sentence was passed, it may justify activating the
sentence with a reduced term or amending the terms of the order.
2.2.21 It is expected that any activated suspended sentence will be consecutive
to the sentence imposed for the new offence.
2.2.22 If the new offence is non-imprisonable, the sentencer should consider
whether it is appropriate to activate the suspended sentence at all.
Where the court decides to amend a suspended sentence order rather than
activate the custodial sentence, it should give serious consideration to
extending the supervision or operational periods (within statutory limits)
rather than making the requirements more onerous.
The problem with SSOs is that there is an underlying prescription within the
Ministry of Justice that prison sentences are to be avoided and that such
sentences should be reserved for those most likely to be harmful to the citizen
going about his lawful business. However since the riots of 2011 and the
ongoing stirring up of fear of terrorism those whose actions threaten the
stability of the state appear also to be subject to increasingly harsh
immediate custodial sentences. My experience of structured sentencing is
that many legal advisors when presented with a bench`s decision of immediate custody
will offer “advice” that perhaps there is enough wiggle room to suspend the
sentence. The whole analysis of deciding if an offender having clearly
breached the custody threshold should be mitigated to that sentence being
suspended is thrown into disarray by sentencing at crown courts. About
16% of sentences for either way or indictable only offences receive community
orders. That includes those offenders who elect trial by jury and those sent
there for sentencing from the lower court.
Sensational headlines like this are nothing
new. But there is no doubt the whole process of a suspended custodial
sentence is a very hot potato. Sentencers only chip away to its underlying
principles as best as they can in order to use it justly for all involved.
The
latest twist in the saga of suspending custodial orders has been revealed by
the Sentencing Council. Incidentally I sometimes wonder whether this
organisation is the wagging tail of the public opinion dog. Whatever its
anatomical relationship to the concept of sentencing once more it is changing
direction as this report of a circular
released by its chairman Lord Justice Treacy reveals.
“Evidence suggested that part of the
reason for this could be the development of a culture to impose suspended
sentences as a more severe form of community order in cases where the custody
threshold may not have been crossed.
“In such cases, if the suspended
sentence order (SSO) is then breached, there are two possible outcomes –
neither of which is satisfactory. Either the courts must activate the custodial
sentence and the offender then serve time in custody even when it may never
have been intended that they do so for the original offence. Or the court could
choose not to enforce the suspended sentence, thereby diminishing the deterrent
power of such orders.”
Treacy added: “A suspended sentence is
a custodial sentence and not a more severe form of community order. They can
only be imposed where the court has determined first that the custody threshold
has been crossed and second that custody is unavoidable ... At that point the
court may then undertake a weighted assessment of the various factors which may
lead the court to consider that it is possible to suspend the sentence.”
In short all this hoo ha stems from the
failure of some sentencers and probation officers to follow a recommended
sentencing structure in which a suspension of a custodial disposal can take
place when and only when the custody threshold has been breached.
It would make more sense if all those involved followed the practice
intended. Even those with some influence seem to be mesmerised by this
topic. Penelope Gibbs, the director of Transform Justice, who
has seen the circular, fears it could lead to judges giving more prison
sentences if they are discouraged from using suspended sentences.
She said: “I completely understand
the desire of the Sentencing Council to increase community orders. But banning
the probation service from recommending suspended sentence orders is not the
right strategy. If a suspended sentence is not recommended, judges may use a
prison sentence instead, and we know that short prison sentences are
ineffective”
The only conclusion I can arrive at is
that the simple sequence in a structured sentencing policy that would satisfy
the original and not unreasonable reasons for the option of suspension of
custody has been ignored and needs to be re-visited.